Neil Levy

neil levy resized
Senior Research Fellow
Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics
neil.levy@philosophy.ox.ac.uk

 

See citations webpage: https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=hqLeZWcAAAAJ&hl=en

I graduated from Monash University, Australia, with a PhD in continental philosophy in 1995; I qualified for a second PhD (on the metaphysics of free will) in 2006. From 2002 to 2009 I was a research fellow at the Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics at the University of Melbourne; from 2006, I combined that position with a part-time role at the Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics. From 2010, I was head of neuroethics at the Florey Institutes of Neuroscience in Melbourne. Since 2015, I have been professor of philosophy at Macquarie University, Sydney, while continuing my role at the Uehiro Centre.

Levy, N. Bad Beliefs: Why They Happen to Good People. Oxford University Press (under contract).
Levy, N. Forthcoming. 'Virtue Signalling is Virtuous'. Synthese.
Levy, N. Forthcoming. 'The Surprising Truth about Disagreement'. Acta Analytica.
Levy, N. Forthcoming. 'Suspiciously Convenient Belief'. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice.
Levy, N. & Savulescu, J. Forthcoming. 'Epistemic Responsibility in the Face of a Pandemic'. Journal of Law and the Biosciences.
Nadelhoffer, T., Shepard, J., Crone, D., Everett, J., Earp, B., & Levy, N. Forthcoming. 'Does encouraging a belief in determinism increase cheating? Reconsidering the value of believing in free will'. Cognition.
Levy, N. & Alfano, M. 2020. 'Knowledge from vice: Deeply social epistemology'. Mind 129: 887-915
Levy, N. 2020. 'Rationalization is rational'. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 43: 28-9.
Levy, N. 2020. 'Belie the Belief'. Religion, Brain & Behavior 10: 35-48.
Levy, N. 2019. 'No Platforming and Higher-Order Evidence, or Anti-Anti-No-Platforming'. Journal of the American Philosophical Association 5: 487-502
Crone, D. & Levy, N. 2019. 'Are free will believers nicer people? (Four studies suggest not)'. Social Psychological and Personality Science 10: 612-9.
Levy, N. 2019. 'Applying Brown and Savulescu: The Diachronic Condition as Excuse'. Journal of Medical Ethics 45: 646-7
Levy, N. 2019. 'Putting the Luck Back Into Moral Luck'. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 43: 59-74.
Levy, N. 2019. 'Taking responsibility for responsibility'. Public Health Ethics 12: 103-113 
Levy, N. 2019. 'Nudge, Nudge, Wink, Wink: Nudging is Giving Reasons'. Ergo 6(10). http://dx.doi.org/10.3998/ergo.12405314.0006.010
Australian Brain Alliance 2019. 'A Neuroethics Framework For The Australian Brain Initiative'. Neuron 101: 365-369.
Levy, N. 2019. 'Due Deference to Denialism: Explaining Ordinary People's Rejection of Established Scientific Findings'. Synthese 196: 313-327.

 

I am a wide-ranging philosopher, working principally at the intersection of philosophy of mind and psychology and ethics. I also have serious research interests in free will, moral responsibility, epistemology, and applied ethics.