Workshop in Ancient Philosophy (Thursday - Week 8, MT24)

Abstract: "In this paper I propose a new interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of scientific a-propositions in Posterior Analytics 1.4–6. A scientific a-proposition is an affirmative universal proposition (of the form ‘A belongs to all B’) that can feature as a premise or conclusion of a scientific demonstration. The standard view is that, for Aristotle, in every scientific a-proposition (and indeed in every necessary affirmative proposition), there is a definitional connection between the proposition’s subject and predicate: either the predicate is part of the definition of the subject, or vice versa. I argue that this view leads to two significant problems in Aristotle’s account in Posterior Analytics 1.4–6, problems that threaten the coherence of his theory of science. I defend solutions to these problems by defending new interpretations of the relevant passages (1.6, 74b5–12 and 75a28–37). I argue that the standard view is mistaken: in these passages Aristotle is not committed to the claim that in every scientific a-proposition (or in every necessary affirmative proposition) there is a definitional connection between the proposition’s subject and predicate. Rather, on my interpretation, he is committed to a significantly less restricted theory of scientific a-propositions and, as a result, a significantly less restricted theory of science. Furthermore, I argue, this less restricted theory is consistent with his other commitments in Posterior Analytics 1.4–6".