Workshop in Ancient Philosophy (Thursday - Week 6, MT19)

Since Mates’ seminal Stoic Logic there has been uncertainty and debate about how to treat the term anapodeiktos when used of Stoic syllogisms. This paper argues that the customary translation of anapodeiktos by ‘indemonstrable’ is accurate, and it explains why this is so. At the heart of the explanation is an argument that, contrary to what is commonly assumed, indemonstrability is rooted in the generic account of the Stoic epistemic notion of demonstration (apodeixis). Some minor insights into Stoic logic ensue.

^{If you would like to join the speaker for dinner after the seminar, please email the chair by Tuesday before the workshop.}

_{Workshop in Ancient Philosophy Convenors: Ursula Coope, Simon Shogry and Luca Castagnoli}