Workshop in Ancient Philosophy (Thursday - Week 4, HT25)

Abstract: Aristotle asserts that we acquire the archai or starting points for ethical inquiry through epagōgē (induction), perception, habituation, and other methods (EN I.7, 1098b3–4). However, his precise meaning and understanding of these terms remain open to interpretation. In this presentation, I seek to elucidate Aristotle’s view on the relationship between induction and starting points. Specifically, I examine how induction generates general concepts and universal claims from particular instances. One such claim is: ‘Excellence is the best state, condition, or capacity of all things that have a use or function’ (EE II.1, 1218b38–1219a1). How does Aristotle arrive at this claim through induction? I argue that addressing this question sheds light not only on his function argument within this context but also on the broader role of induction in providing premises for demonstrations. This analysis is crucial if, as many interpreters reasonably contend, Aristotle regards ethics, at least in part, as an explanatory science. However, there is reason to think that the role of induction is not limited to providing premises for demonstrations; I suggest that it can also be employed, as in the case of geometry (e.g., APo I.1, 71a17–29), to identify particulars as instances of a universal.