Daniel Kodsi (Balliol) Causation, Harm and the Non-Identity Problem
In this talk, I explain the error in the counterfactual view of harm, and show how it can be repaired. The resultant analysis clearly avoids, I will suggest, the preemption problem (without misclassifying any other ordinary cases). I will also argue that the proposed analysis, more importantly, leaves us in a considerably better position with respect to the non-identity problem, and sketch a solution to the residual complications.
Ruby Shao (Exeter) Not Moral Vagueness, but Mere Ignorance
Moral ignorance refers to cases in which one does not know whether an act is permissible. Some philosophers have recently posited moral vagueness, which refers to cases in which one does not know whether an act is permissible, because one cannot, in principle, know whether that act is permissible. The literature on moral vagueness splits over whether it is semantic, epistemic, or ontic. However, nobody has explored the possibility that moral vagueness might not exist.
Chair: Sarah Chan
Ockham Society Convenor: Charlotte Figueroa | Ockham Society Webpage