The Ockham Society (Friday - Week 4, MT18)

Ockham Society
Friday 2nd 2018, 13:00
(Lecture Room)

Joseph Borges-Santos (Keble) Towards Internalism about Reasons as Such

According to internalism about practical reasons, our normative reasons for action fundamentally depend on what we desire, care about, or value. According to what I call internalism about reasons as such, this is true of all our normative reasons (e.g. epistemic reasons). In this essay I show that some, if not all, internalists about practical reasons should either become internalists about reasons as such or abandon internalism altogether.

Christopher Benzenberg (St. Cross) Oops!... I did the right thing: The Moral Worth of Actions

Actions can be morally right while lacking moral worth. Kant’s prudent shopkeeper, for example, treats his customers fairly to maximise his long term profit. Surely the fair treatment of his customers is the right thing to do. However, we certainly do not think that the shopkeeper’s actions have moral worth. But what makes it the case that right actions have moral worth? The aim of this paper is to answer this question. The structure: After rejecting the right-reasons-account of moral worth (§ 1), a new account of moral worth is stated and defended (§§ 2-3).

 

Chair: Sebastian Liu

Ockham Society Convenor: Charlotte Figueroa | Ockham Society Webpage