Post-Kantian European Philosophy Seminar (Tuesday - Week 4, HT24)

Nietzsche’s writings on the perspectival are frequently presented as among his most consequential philosophical contributions. Despite attracting considerable scholarly attention and their evident centrality to the late works, there remains little agreement as to what Nietzsche means by terms like ‘perspective’ and ‘perspectivism’. Indeed, the problems posed by the relevant writings are deeper than has been appreciated, raising serious questions as to whether Nietzsche’s remarks can be rendered consistent and intelligible. In this paper, I present an account that does just that. I elaborate both his understanding of perspective, and the relation he envisages between perspectives and the drives, affects, and values to which he connects them. I then draw on this material to construct an account of perspectivism. This, it transpires, is no doctrine, but is instead part of Nietzsche’s rejection of a specific conception of cognition, the vestiges of which he finds latent in a number of areas of philosophy and the sciences.

Post-Kantian European Philosophy Seminar Convenors: Joseph Schear, Manuel Dries, Kate Kirkpatrick and Mark Wrathall