Philosophy of Mind Seminar (Friday - Week 1, TT26)

Abstract: Why do people who share the same facts still disagree about what those facts show? This talk suggests that, in many cases, the issue is not missing information but explanatory structure. The same body of evidence can be organized in different ways, with different relations foregrounded, backgrounded, or made salient. Narrative matters because it is one especially powerful way of making such structure visible.

I argue, first, that abstract principles and general explanations presuppose a prior organization of the evidence and therefore cannot always replace narrative without loss. Second, I argue that the affective dimension of narrative need not be merely persuasive or ornamental. Affect helps guide salience and relevance for thinkers like us (Damasion; Barrett), and narrative can coordinate an audience’s orientation to a body of evidence in ways that make certain explanatory relations stand out. On this view, the epistemic contribution of narrative lies not in adding new facts, but in reorganizing familiar ones so as to yield explanatory grip.

Registration: If you do not hold a university card, please contact the seminar convenor or admin@philosophy.ox.ac.uk at least two working days before a seminar to register your attendance.