Robert Audi (University of Notre Dame): 'Intrinsic Value, Inherent Value, and Reasons for Action'
This presentation will sketch a theory of value aimed at doing justice to both its plural forms and its role in guiding practical decisions. The focus includes moral value as an important case but is much wider. A central question is what kinds of things are “valuable in themselves” and what that means. Aesthetically rewarding experiences provide an instructive example of what is good (hence valuable) in itself (so not just as a means to something else). Painful experiences exemplify what almost everyone considers bad in itself. But experiences, as episodes in the lives of living beings, are one thing, and beautiful paintings, which are inanimate examples of “intrinsically good” objects, are in a very different category. How are these two kinds of things, which are widely considered good in themselves,” related? What is wrong with considering aesthetic value simply a special case of instrumental value? Might the idea that value is “organic” help in answering these questions? And how, in the light of answers to them, should we conceive reasons for action, “the good life” for human beings, and our moral obligations?
