Metaphysics Work-in-Progress Group (Thursday - Week 5, TT22)

I'm in need of evidence for some improbable L  --- evidence, say,  that I will the lottery.  No problem!  From the fact D that dogs exist, it follows that DvL.  DvL probabilifies L, so I'm done.  Something must have gone wrong here; evidence can't be manufactured at will.   Carnap would say that I have violated the "total evidence requirement."   Question: how is weakening D to DvL any better than what Goodman does when he weakens  E = <<Certain emeralds are observed and green>> to EvM = <<Those emeralds are observed and green, or they are not observed and blue>>?  Carnap suggested already in 1946  that it's the same fallacy in both cases.   Could the grue paradox be based on a mistake this elementary?

Anyone interested in attending the seminar, please email Alex Kaiserman in order to be added to the mailing list.