Metaphysics and Epistemology Group (Tuesday - Week 6, TT23)

"It is natural to think that intentions are formed and revised in relation to a space of possibilities that you regard as open in practical deliberation. Usually, we think that that space is carved out by your beliefs. This explains why we think that there are certain norms of rational coherence relating your intentions to your beliefs. One simple example: we think it is irrational to intend to do what you believe you will not do. However, there seem to be cases where your beliefs do not, and in fact should not, carve out the space of possibilities that you regard as open in deliberation. Say that to ‘accept’ a proposition in a deliberative context is to be then disposed to deliberate on the assumption of its truth. If so, then there seem to be deliberative contexts in which you don’t accept propositions you believe and accept propositions you don’t believe. If this is so, then, presumably, the same idea that has led people to think that there are norms of rationality relating your intentions to your beliefs, should lead us to think that there are norms relating your intentions to the propositions you accept. Perhaps, for instance, it would be irrational to intend to do what you (in an appropriately specified deliberative context) accept you won’t do. In this talk, I begin to explore the question of whether there are such requirements and, if so, what they would look like.”