Hegel Reading Group
We shall be meeting on Tuesdays 6-7.30 pm on Skype; please email email@example.com for the Skype link.
This term and the next we are reading Hegel’s Anthropology, in the ‘Philosophy of Mind’ (translation is by Wallace and Miller) but we will work from the Michael Inwood revision (OUP 2007). We are starting (in 1st Week) from para 377, eventually getting to the end at para 412 (we will not read the Zuzatse in the sessions).
The reading is posted each week on hegelinoxford.wordpress.com
Gadfly Reading Group
focusing on the writings of Plato
Meet on Tuesdays during term time, 7:30pm at St John’s College
“I am the gadfly of the Athenian people” - Socrates, in Plato’s Apology
The Gadfly Club was founded because we believe that dialogue is the principal and most effective method of understanding ourselves and the world around us. We thus read Plato’s dialogue not just as a model of dialogue, nor only for his philosophical insights; we use his dialogues as a springboard to discuss the real and living problems they present. This is why, after an hour or more of live-reading, we head to the only place friends and philosophers must go – the pub!
We encourage all – especially those who don’t consider themselves ‘students of philosophy’ – to come and join us, hoping to remain true to the main desire of the OSM – that of stimulating inter-disciplinary engagement.
Speaker: Sophia Moreau
Time: 3pm to 4.30pm
Venue: Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, Suite 1, Littlegate House, 16-17 St Ebbe’s Street, Oxford, OX1 1PT, (Buzzer no. 1)
Can someone be bound by a moral obligation and yet at the same time have a moral complaint about being so bound? That is, there is something that they ought, all things considered, to do, for moral reasons. And yet, we and they feel that they have a moral complaint about being the one who is bound to do it: it is unfair that they, and not others, should bear the burden of having to do or attend to whatever this obligation requires. This is what I shall call an “objectionable obligation.” Do such obligations exist? Is this idea even coherent? And if it is, what follows from this fact? These are the questions I shall address in this talk. I shall try to show that in many commonplace situations, our intuitive reaction is that someone has both a moral obligation and a moral complaint about it. For instance, systemic discrimination, properly understood, involves not just a collective failure to attend to our non-objectionable obligations to subordinated groups, but also the imposition on subordinated groups of objectionable obligations. However, moral theories such as consequentialism and contractualism seem to leave no conceptual space for such obligations. If I am right that we need to be able to recognize such obligations, this casts doubt on these theories --and on any theory that aspires to moral completeness, purporting to provide a single procedure for determining what we owe to others that captures all morally relevant considerations.