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# PHILOSOPHY LECTURE PROSPECTUS

UNDERGRADUATE LECTURES  
OTHER EVENTS  
GRADUATE CLASSES

HILARY TERM 2026

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## Notes:

- The normal duration of an event is one hour. Where a class or lecture lasts longer than an hour, both the start and end times will be given.
- By convention, in-person lectures at Oxford begin five minutes past the hour and end five minutes before the hour.
- Unless otherwise specified, lectures and classes run during Weeks 1–8.
- Teaching takes place in person.
- The Faculty Canvas site for graduate courses contains a folder for each class. If you are taking a class, please visit the Canvas site for further information. Where no description appears in the published Prospectus, one is usually provided on Canvas nearer the start of term. Reading lists are often available on ORLO.
- Enquiries about class attendance should be addressed to [admin@philosophy.ox.ac.uk](mailto:admin@philosophy.ox.ac.uk).
- This Lecture Prospectus was published on **30 January 2026**. Every effort has been made to ensure the information is accurate at the start of term. However, occasional errors may occur. If you believe you have found a mistake, please contact the Education Support Officer at [ug.admin@philosophy.ox.ac.uk](mailto:ug.admin@philosophy.ox.ac.uk).
- The Lecture List details for each paper in this Prospectus were correct at the time of publication. Please note that these details may be subject to change. Any late updates will be clearly marked in **red** in the Lecture List HT26, which is available on the Faculty of Philosophy website:
- <https://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/lectures/>

# **Undergraduate Lectures**

## **Lectures for the First Public Examination (Prelims or Mods)**

Students preparing for their First Public Examination (Prelims or Mods) should attend the following lectures this term:

PPE, Philosophy and Modern Languages, Philosophy and Theology, Psychology and Philosophy: Moral Philosophy, and General Philosophy

Mathematics and Philosophy, Physics and Philosophy, Computer Science and Philosophy: Elements of Deductive Logic, and General Philosophy

Literae Humaniores: any listed Prelims/Mods lecture that corresponds to their chosen Philosophy option for Mods.

### **Philosophical Topics in Logic and Probability (for students in MP, PP, CSP only)**

Prof Beau Mount

Weeks 1-8 / Tuesdays/ 12:00-13:00

Location: Maths Institute (L1)

This course will cover both formal and philosophical topics in logic, expanding on material studied in Introductory Logic, and in the theory of probability. There will be extensive lecture notes in lieu of a textbook. Weekly topics are as follows:

1. Syntax and semantics of predicate logic
2. Completeness of predicate logic
3. Skolem's paradox
4. Putnam's model-theoretic argument
5. Mathematics of probability
6. Credence
7. Chance
8. Confirmation

Supplementary lectures may be arranged, if needed, to cover additional mathematical background.

## **Lectures for the Honour Schools (Finals - FHS)**

Lectures listed in this section are core lectures for the papers in the Honour Schools: that is, these are lectures intended especially for students taking those papers at Finals. Questions set in Finals papers usually take the content of core lectures into account. It is therefore very much in your interest if you are a finalist to attend as many relevant core lectures as your schedule permits.

Students should also refer to the section Other Lectures, following. Lectures listed there are not official core lectures, but sometimes cover topics of relevance to the Finals papers.

Advanced undergraduates, especially but not only those considering graduate study of philosophy, are encouraged to consider attending relevant graduate classes as well. Permission should be sought from the class-giver(s): it is usually readily given.

### **101 Early Modern Philosophy: Locke**

Prof Paul Lodge

Weeks 1-8 / Tuesdays/ 10:00-11:00

Location: Schools (Room 7)

An introduction to the philosophy of John Locke for students taking the FHS paper in Early Modern Philosophy. The lectures will cover some of the core topics that Locke discusses in his *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*.

1. Introduction to Locke's Essay
2. The attack on innateness
3. The theory of ideas – including abstract ideas
4. Primary and secondary qualities
5. Substance and essence
6. Personal identity
7. Knowledge
8. Lecture course roundup and its relation to the FHS exams

### **102 Knowledge and Reality: Metaphysics**

Prof Nick Jones

Weeks 1-8 / Tuesdays/ 11:00-12:00

Location: Schools (Room 7)

These lectures will provide an introduction to some of the central topics of metaphysics for the Knowledge and Reality paper. Weeks 1-4 will focus on modality and possible worlds, exploring David Lewis's theory of concrete possible worlds and an alternative theory of abstract possible worlds. The second half of term will apply the tools developed for thinking about modality to other topics in metaphysics. Weeks 5-6 will explore the metaphysics of time, focussing in particular on structural similarities between the nature of time and modality. Weeks 7-8 will explore persistence across time and coincident material objects,

focussing in particular on using tools developed for theorising about time and modality to evaluate arguments about persistence and coincidence.

## **103 Ethics**

Dr Nick Clanchy

Weeks 1-8 / Mondays / 10:00-11:00

Location: Schools (South School)

Are there any moral facts? If there are, are they mind-dependent or mind-independent? If the latter, are they natural or non-natural? If there are no moral facts, what are we doing when we make moral judgments? Are we expressing false beliefs, or not expressing beliefs at all? These lectures aim to cover some of the major positions on these questions, including naturalist realism, non-naturalist realism, expressivism and quasi-realism, error theory, and constructivism. They also aim to critically assess a number of the major arguments pertinent to answering these questions, such as Moore's open question argument, Mackie's arguments from queerness, and Street's evolutionary debunking argument.

### **Week 1: What is Metaethics?**

Michael Smith (1994), *The Moral Problem* (Oxford: Blackwell).

Stephen Finlay (2007), 'Four Faces of Moral Realism' in *Philosophy Compass* 2(6): 820-849.

### **Week 2: Naturalist Realism**

G.E. Moore (1908), *Principia Ethica* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), Ch.1 'The Subject-Matter of Ethics'.

Peter Railton (1986), 'Moral Realism' in *The Philosophical Review* 95(2): 163-207.

Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons (2013), 'Twin Earth, Moral' in Hugh LaFollette (ed.), *The International Encyclopedia of Ethics*.

### **Week 3: Non-Naturalist Realism**

Terence Cuneo (2007), 'Recent Faces of Moral Nonnaturalism' in *Philosophy Compass* 2(6): 850-879.

David Enoch (2011), *Taking Morality Seriously: A Defence of Robust Realism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

### **Week 4: Emotivism**

A.J. Ayer (1946), *Language, Truth, and Logic* (2<sup>nd</sup> ed., London: Gollancz), Ch.6 'Critique of Ethics and Theology'.

Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue* (3<sup>rd</sup> ed., London: Bloomsbury), Chs.2-3.

### **Week 5: Expressivism and Quasi-Realism**

Simon Blackburn (2004), *Spreading the Word: Groundings in the Philosophy of Language* (Oxford: Clarendon Press), Ch.6 'Evaluations, Projections, and Quasi-Realism'.

Andy Egan (2007), 'Quasi-Realism and Fundamental Moral Error' in *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 85(2): 205-219.

Mark Schroeder (2010), 'What is the Frege-Geach Problem?' in *Philosophy Compass* 3(4): 703-720.

### **Week 6: Error Theory**

J.L. Mackie (1977), *Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong* (London: Penguin), Ch.1 'The Subjectivity of Values'.  
Bart Streumer (2017), *Unbelievable Errors: An Error Theory about All Normative Judgments* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

### **Week 7: Evolutionary Debunking Arguments**

Sharon Street (2006), 'A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value' in *Philosophical Studies* 127(1): 109-166.  
Katia Vavova (2014), 'Debunking Evolutionary Debunking' in *Oxford Studies in Metaethics* 9: 76-101.

### **Week 8: Constructivism**

John Rawls (1980), 'Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory' in *Journal of Philosophy* 77(9): 515-572.  
Christine Korsgaard (2008), *The Constitution of Agency: Essays on Practical Reason and Moral Psychology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), Ch.10 'Realism and Constructivism in Twentieth-Century Moral Philosophy'.

## **104 Philosophy of Mind**

Prof Raphaël Millière  
Weeks 1-8 / Mondays/ 10:00-11:00  
Location: School (Room 8)

### **Overview**

This course examines what minds are and how they fit into the natural world. We will evaluate the main theoretical frameworks for understanding mental phenomena by analysing canonical arguments and contemporary debates.

### **Recommended Textbooks and Anthologies for Background**

Bayne, T. (2021). *Philosophy of Mind: An Introduction*. Routledge.  
Chalmers, D. J. (Ed.). (2021). *Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings* (2nd edition). Oxford University Press.

### **Lecture Plan**

1. The Mind-Body Problem
2. Physicalism and Functionalism
3. Consciousness
4. Intentionality and Mental Content
5. Perception
6. The Self
7. Animal Minds
8. Artificial Minds

### **Lecture 1: The Mind-Body Problem**

This lecture introduces the central question that has shaped modern philosophy of mind: what is the relationship between mental phenomena and physical processes? Beginning with Descartes's formulation of substance dualism, we will examine the conceptual

foundations of the mind-body problem and engage with the classic objections to dualism—particularly the problem of mental causation.

- Can a non-physical mind causally interact with a physical body without violating the causal closure of the physical world?
- Does substance dualism rest on a category mistake?
- If the mental is distinct from the physical, in what sense can we say that mental states exist?

### Main Readings

Descartes, R. (2008). *Meditations on First Philosophy with Selections from the Objections and Replies*. Oxford University Press. Meditations II and VI. Also available as Chapter 1 of

Chalmers, D. J. (Ed.). (2021). *Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings* (2nd edition). Oxford University Press.

Elisabeth, Princess of Bohemia & Descartes, René. (2007). *The Correspondence Between Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia and René Descartes* (L. Shapiro, Ed. & Trans.). University of Chicago Press. Letters: Elisabeth to Descartes, 6 May 1643; Descartes to Elisabeth, Egmond du Hoef, 21 May 1643; Elisabeth to Descartes, 10 June 1643; Descartes to Elisabeth, Egmond du Hoef, 28 June 1643; Elisabeth to Descartes, 1 July 1643. Also available as Chapter 3 of

Chalmers, D. J. (Ed.). (2021). *Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings* (2nd edition). Oxford University Press.

Smulyan, R. M. (2002). An unfortunate dualist. Available as Chapter 7 of Chalmers, D. J. (Ed.). (2021). *Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings* (2nd edition). Oxford University Press.

### Further Readings

Ryle, G. (2002). Descartes' Myth. Available as Chapter 8 of Chalmers, D. J. (Ed.). (2021). *Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings* (2nd edition). Oxford University Press.

Robinson, H., & Weir, R. (2025). Dualism. In E. N. Zalta & U. Nodelman (Eds), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2025). Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2025/entries/dualism/>

Robb, D., Heil, J., & Gibb, S. (2023). Mental causation. In E. N. Zalta & U. Nodelman (Eds), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2023). Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2023/entries/mental-causation/>

Kim, J. (1990). Explanatory exclusion and the problem of mental causation. In E. Villanueva (Ed.), *Information, Semantics and Epistemology*. Blackwell.

Montero, B. (1999). The body problem. *Noûs*, 33(2), 183–200.

### Lecture 2: Physicalism and Functionalism

This lecture examines the two dominant materialist approaches to the mind-body problem. We begin with the type-identity theory, the thesis that mental states are identical to brain states. We then consider Putnam's multiple realizability argument against type-identity and his development of functionalism, which defines mental states by their causal-functional roles rather than their physical constitution.

- Does the possibility of “multiple realizability” refute the mind-brain identity theory?
- Is the analogy between the mind and computer software sufficient to explain the nature of mental states?

- Does functionalism successfully avoid the pitfalls of both behaviorism and identity theory?

### Main Readings

Smart, J. J. C. (1959). Sensations and Brain Processes. *Philosophical Review*, 68, 141–156. Available as Chapter 11 of Chalmers, D. J. (Ed.). (2021). *Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings* (2nd edition). Oxford University Press.

Putnam, H. (1978). The nature of mental states. In N. J. Block (Ed.), *Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology* (pp. 223–231). Available as Chapter 12 of Chalmers, D. J. (Ed.). (2021). *Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings* (2nd edition). Oxford University Press.

Block, N. (1978). Troubles with functionalism. *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, 9, 261–325. Available as Chapter 15 of Chalmers, D. J. (Ed.). (2021). *Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings* (2nd edition). Oxford University Press.

### Further Readings

Stoljar, D. (2024). Physicalism. In E. N. Zalta & U. Nodelman (Eds), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2024). Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.  
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2024/entries/physicalism/>

Levin, J. (2023). Functionalism. In E. N. Zalta & U. Nodelman (Eds), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2023). Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.  
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2023/entries/functionalism/>

Lewis, D. (1978). Mad pain and martian pain. In N. J. Block (Ed.), *Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology* (pp. 216–222). Available as Chapter 14 of Chalmers, D. J. (Ed.). (2021). *Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings* (2nd edition). Oxford University Press.

### Lecture 3: Consciousness

This lecture focuses on phenomenal consciousness—the subjective, qualitative character of experience, or “what it is like” to be in a particular mental state. Building on the previous lectures, we confront consciousness as a particularly recalcitrant problem for materialist theories of mind. The central puzzle is whether physical and functional accounts can fully explain why there is “something it is like” to have experiences, or whether subjective experience constitutes an irreducible feature of reality that resists such explanation.

- Can the subjective character of conscious experience be fully explained in physical or functional terms, or does consciousness pose a distinctive “hard problem” that resists such explanation?
- Does the conceivability of beings physically identical to us yet lacking conscious experience (philosophical zombies) establish that physicalism is false, or might there be a physicalist response to such conceivability arguments?
- Why do we find consciousness puzzling at all? Is the “hard problem” a genuine metaphysical obstacle, or could it be explained away as a cognitive illusion arising from how we represent our own mental states?

### Main Readings

Nagel, T. (1974). What Is It Like to Be a Bat? *The Philosophical Review*, 83(4), 435–450.  
<https://doi.org/10.2307/2183914>

Chalmers, D. J. (1995). Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness. *Journal of Consciousness*

*Studies*, 2(3), 200–219.

### Further Readings

Jackson, F. (1982). Epiphenomenal qualia. *Philosophical Quarterly*, 32(127), 127–136.  
<https://doi.org/10.2307/2960077>

Dennett, D. C. (1988). Quining Qualia. In A. J. Marcel & E. Bisiach (Eds), *Consciousness in Contemporary Science* (pp. 42–77). Oxford University Press.

Chalmers, D. J. (2018). The meta-problem of consciousness. *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, 25(9–10), 6–61.

Frankish, K. (2016). Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness. *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, 23(11–12), 11–39.

Nida-Rümelin, M., & O Conaill, D. (2024). Qualia: The knowledge argument. In E. N. Zalta & U. Nodelman (Eds), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2024). Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.  
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2024/entries/qualia-knowledge/>

Levine, J. (1983). Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap. *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*, 64(October), 354–361.

Churchland, P. S. (1996). The hornswoggle problem. *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, 3(5–6), 402–408.

### Lecture 4: Intentionality and Mental Content

In this lecture, we will turn to intentionality—the “aboutness” or “directedness” of mental states—and the related question about mental content. Following Brentano’s influential suggestion that intentionality is “the mark of the mental”, we consider whether intentionality can serve as a criterion distinguishing mental from physical phenomena. The central contemporary debate concerns how to account for mental content: can intentionality be “naturalised” through causal, informational, or teleological theories, or does it resist such reduction? This lecture builds on earlier discussions of physicalism and functionalism by asking whether mental representation poses a distinctive challenge for materialist theories of mind.

### Main Readings

Crane, T. (1998). Intentionality as the mark of the mental. In A. O’Hear (Ed.), *Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Mind*. Cambridge University Press.

Putnam, H. (1975). The Meaning of ‘Meaning’. *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, 7, 131–193.

### Further Readings

Millikan, R. G. (1989). Biosemantics. *Journal of Philosophy*, 86(6), 281–297.  
<https://doi.org/10.2307/2027123>

Burge, T. (1979). Individualism and the Mental. *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*, 4(1), 73–121.

Fodor, J. A. (1987). Introduction: The persistence of the attitudes. In *Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind* (No. 2; pp. 1–26). The MIT Press.

Jacob, P. (2023). Intentionality. In E. N. Zalta & U. Nodelman (Eds), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2023). Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.  
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2023/entries/intentionality/>

Schulte, P., & Neander, K. (2022). Teleological Theories of Mental Content. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2022). Metaphysics Research Lab,

Stanford University. <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2022/entries/content-teleological/>

### **Lecture 5: Perception**

Perception is the primary interface between mind and world, raising fundamental questions about how sensory experience can give us knowledge of, or even genuine access to, mind-independent reality. This lecture examines the *problem of perception*—the challenge posed by illusion and hallucination to our ordinary understanding of perceptual experience as direct awareness of the external world—and surveys the major theories developed in response: sense-datum theory, representationalism, and naïve realism.

- If perceptual experience can misrepresent (illusion) or fail to connect us with external objects (hallucination), can we ever be directly aware of mind-independent reality?
- Is the phenomenal character of perceptual experience best explained by representational content, by a relation to external objects, or by something else entirely?
- Do veridical perception and hallucination share a common fundamental nature?

### **Main Readings**

Bayne, T. (2021). *Philosophy of Mind: An Introduction*. Routledge. Chapter 4.

Harman, G. (1990). The Intrinsic Quality of Experience. *Philosophical Perspectives*, 4(n/a), 31–52. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2214186>

### **Further Readings**

Crane, T., & French, C. (2021). The problem of perception. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2021). Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.

<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2021/entries/perception-problem/>

Fish, W. (Ed.). (2010). *Philosophy of Perception: A Contemporary Introduction*. Routledge. Chapter 1-5.

Logue, H. (2015). Disjunctivism. In M. Matthen (Ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Perception* (p. 0). Oxford University Press.

<https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199600472.013.013>

Martin, M.G.F. (2002). The Transparency of Experience. *Mind & Language*, 17(4), 376–425. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0017.00205>

Austin, J. L. (1962). *Sense and Sensibilia* (G. J. Warnock, Ed.). Clarendon Press. Chapter 1-3.

Phillips, I. (2016). Naïve realism and the science of (some) illusions. *Philosophical Topics*, 44(2), 353–380. <https://doi.org/10.5840/philtopics201644227>

### **Lecture 6: The Self**

This lecture examines two interconnected sets of questions about the self: the question of what the self fundamentally is, and the question of how we are conscious of ourselves as subjects of experience.

- Are we fundamentally human animals, or does personal identity depend on psychological continuity?
- Is there a persisting self, or is the self an illusion?
- What is the relationship between bodily awareness and self-consciousness?

## Main Readings

Parfit, D. (1971). Personal identity. *Philosophical Review*, 80(1), 3–27.  
<https://doi.org/10.2307/2184309>

Olson, E. T. (2003). An argument for animalism. In R. Martin & J. Barresi (Eds), *Personal Identity* (No. 11; pp. 318–334). Blackwell.

## Further Readings

Dennett, D. C. (1992). The self as a center of narrative gravity. In F. S. Kessel, P. M. Cole, & D. L. Johnson (Eds.), *Self and Identity: Fundamental Issues* (pp. 103–115). Oxford University Press.

Bermúdez, J. L. (2011). Body awareness and self-consciousness. In S. Gallagher (Ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of the Self*. Oxford University Press.

de Vignemont, F. (2016). Bodily Awareness. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2016). Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.  
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2016/entries/bodily-awareness/>

Siderits, M. (2011). Buddhist non-self. In S. Gallagher (Ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of the Self* (pp. 297–315). Oxford University Press.

## Lecture 7: Animal Minds

This lecture asks what it takes to attribute mental states to nonhuman animals, and how much of the familiar architecture of the human mind we should expect to find beyond our species. We will connect earlier themes to the methodological constraints of comparative cognition, where we infer mental attributes from behaviour under severe evidential limits.

- What standards of evidence justify attributing sophisticated mental states to animals, rather than explaining their behaviour via non-mental or “thin” psychological capacities?
- Do belief and thought require language and rational normativity, and if not, what replaces them as constraints on attributing minds to animals—especially when choosing between associative-learning explanations and richer cognitive explanations?
- What is the best case for thinking that some animals are sentient, and how—if at all—can we distinguish sentience from sophisticated but non-conscious information processing?

## Main Readings

Andrews, K., & Monsó, S. (2021). Animal Cognition. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2021). Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.  
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2021/entries/cognition-animal/>

Browning, H., & Birch, J. (2022). Animal sentience. *Philosophy Compass*, 17(5), e12822.  
<https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12822>

## Further Readings

Halina, M. (2023). Methods in Comparative Cognition. In E. N. Zalta & U. Nodelman (Eds), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2023). Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2023/entries/comparative-cognition/>

Birch, J. (2024). *The Edge of Sentience: Risk and Precaution in Humans, Other Animals, and AI*. Oxford University Press. Chapters 12-13.

Halina, M. (2024). *Animal Minds*. Cambridge University Press.

Davidson, D. (1982). Rational animals. *Dialectica*, 36(4), 317–327.

Buckner, C. (2017). Understanding Associative and Cognitive Explanations in Comparative Psychology. In *The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Animal Minds* (pp. 409–418). Routledge.

Newen, A., & Bartels, A. (2007). Animal minds and the possession of concepts. *Philosophical Psychology*, 20(3), 283–308.

### **Lecture 8: Artificial Minds**

This final lecture evaluates whether artificial systems can satisfy the conditions for possessing mental states. We compare behavioural criteria (what a system can do) with mechanistic criteria (what kinds of internal organisation and causal roles would have to underwrite those capacities), and we ask how the progress of contemporary AI models bears on those question.

### **Main Readings**

Block, N. (1981). Psychologism and Behaviorism. *The Philosophical Review*, 90(1), 5–43.

Chalmers, D. J. (2023). Could a large language model be conscious? *Boston Review*.

### **Further Readings**

Turing, A. M. (1950). Computing Machinery and Intelligence. *Mind*, 59(236), 433–460.

Dreyfus, H. L. (1967). Why computers must have bodies in order to be intelligent. *The Review of Metaphysics*, 21(1), 13–32.

Buckner, C. (2019). Deep learning: A philosophical introduction. *Philosophy Compass*, 14(10), e12625.

Millière, R. & Buckner, C. (ms.) The Philosophy of Language Models.

Butlin, P., Long, R., Bayne, T., Bengio, Y., Birch, J., Chalmers, D., Constant, A., Deane, G., Elmoznino, E., Fleming, S. M., Ji, X., Kanai, R., Klein, C., Lindsay, G., Michel, M., Mudrik, L., Peters, M. A. K., Schwitzgebel, E., Simon, J., & VanRullen, R. (2025). Identifying indicators of consciousness in AI systems. *Trends in Cognitive Sciences*.

Millière, R., & Rathkopf, C. (2023). Why it's important to remember that AI isn't human. Vox Media. <https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/23971093/artificial-intelligence-chatgpt-language-mind-understanding>

Millière, R. (2024). The Turing tests of today are mistaken. <https://iai.tv/articles/the-turing-tests-of-today-are-mistaken-auid-2790>

## **107 Philosophy of Religion**

Dr Tim Mawson

Weeks 1-8 / Fridays/ 10:00-11:00

Location: Schools (Room 7)

These lectures will seek to introduce the main philosophical arguments pertaining to the Western monotheistic religions: Judaism, Christianity and Islam.

### **Overview of the Lecture Series**

Those who believe that there is a God of the sort Jews, Christians and Muslims worship believe that there is a being who is personal, incorporeal/transcendent,

omnipresent/immanent, omnipotent, omniscient, eternal, perfectly free, perfectly good, and necessary. He has created the world; He is a source of moral obligations for us; He has revealed Himself to us; and He has offered us everlasting life. In these lectures, I shall first explore the meaning and consistency of this – the classical theistic - conception of God and then move on to consider some of the traditional arguments for and against the existence of such a being; specifically, I shall consider the Design Argument; the Cosmological Argument; the Ontological Argument; the Argument from Religious Experience; the Argument from Apparent Miracles; and the Problem of Evil. Finally, I shall consider Pascals' Wager and the relation between faith and reason.

### **General Reading**

There are a number of good introductory books. One is:-

C. Taliaferro            *Contemporary Philosophy of Religion* (Blackwell)

Two useful collections of papers are:-

T. Morris (ed.)            *The Concept of God* (O.U.P.)

B. Mitchell (ed.)            *The Philosophy of Religion* (O.U.P.)

Two classic statements of the arguments for and against the existence of God are:-

R. Swinburne            *The Existence of God* (O.U.P.)

J. L. Mackie            *The Miracle of Theism* (O.U.P.)

Each lecture will come with a handout, and suggestions for reading specific to the topics covered in that lecture.

### **109 Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Criticism**

Prof Louise Hanson

Wednesdays

**Weeks 1-3, 5-7 / 14:00-15:00**

**Weeks 4, 8 / 17:00-18:00**

Location: Schwarzman Centre - Lecture Theatre L1 (10.300)

Aesthetics concerns philosophical questions about art and beauty. These lectures will cover some key debates including:

#### **Art and Morality**

Can artworks be morally bad? If so does that make them bad art/less good art, leave their artistic merit unaffected, or can it ever make them better art? Does moral insight or goodness make artworks better art?

Or, is Oscar Wilde right to say that 'virtue and wickedness are, to [an artist] simply what the colours on his palette are to the painter. They are no more and they are no less. He sees that by their means, a certain artistic effect can be produced, and he produces it'?

## **Definition of Art**

What is art? Some philosophers have argued that there is something about art that makes it impossible to define.

They point to the lack of an obvious common thread between all the different things that count as art. But it is also argued that art's creativity makes it impossible to define; that defining it would place limits on the creative freedom of artists.

Do these arguments succeed in showing that art can't be defined? We will talk through some early definitions, as well as some more recent, more sophisticated proposals for how to define art that seeks to accommodate these features.

## **Forgeries**

Are forgeries less good art than their corresponding originals? The art world certainly seems to treat works differently once they have been revealed to be forgeries - removing them from display, art critics re-evaluating them, sometimes retracting their earlier praise. Is this justified, and if so, how?

Reflecting on the question of forgeries is often thought to potentially shed light on the nature of artistic value. If forgeries are less good art, does this show that originality is an artistic merit? Or that derivativeness is an artistic demerit? Or something else? What if anything does this tell us about appropriation art?

## **Intention**

What is the relationship between an artwork's meaning, and the intentions of the artist? Can an artist be wrong about their work's meaning? Can artworks have unintended meanings? Can multiple incompatible interpretations of the same work all be right?

If the artist's intentions don't determine meaning, does that mean that anything goes, and that any interpretation of an artwork is as good as any other? If not, what sets the limits of reasonable interpretation?

## **Realism and Antirealism**

Is beauty in the eye of the beholder? Is it entirely subjective? Are there facts about beauty?

Most people seem to be inclined towards a version of subjectivism, or at least mind-dependence, about beauty. But is there scope to be a robust realist about beauty? Is there scope to hold that beauty is mind-independent, or is that view simply a non-starter?

One way to draw out intuitions about whether beauty is mind-dependent or mind-independent, is to pose a version of the Euthyphro question: 'is it that we like beautiful things because they are beautiful, or is it that they are beautiful because we like them?'

I'll outline some of the most compelling arguments for mind-dependence about beauty, and explore some of the ways in which a mind-independence theorist could respond.

## **110 Medieval Philosophy: Aquinas**

Prof Cecilia Trifogli

Weeks 1-8 / Wednesdays/ 10:00-11:00

Location: Schwarzman Centre - Lecture Theatre L1 (10.300)

I will present the following topics from Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, qq. 2-11, 75-89; II.I, qq. 1-10, 90-97: (1) Existence of God (I, q. 2); (2) Nature of God (I, q. 3); (3) Soul (I, qq. 75-76); (4) Cognition (I, qq. 79, 84-86); (5) Will (I, qq. 80, 82-83; II.I, qq. 8-10); (6) Happiness (II.I, qq. 1-5); (7) Voluntary Actions (II.I, q. 6).

For the Program, Reading list, and Handouts, see the Canvas page for these lectures.

## **112 The Philosophy of Kant**

Prof Anil Gomes

Weeks 1-8 / Wednesdays/ 11:00-12:00

Location: Schwarzman Centre - Lecture Theatre L1 (10.300)

These lectures will provide an introduction to some of the central ideas in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), one of the most important and influential thinkers in the western philosophical tradition. They are primarily intended for those taking the Philosophy of Kant paper (112), but anyone who is interested in the material is welcome to attend. The main focus will be Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (1781/ 1787), a work which aims to mark the boundaries to our knowledge and to explain the possibility of metaphysics, natural science, and mathematics. We will cover, amongst other topics, the nature of Kant's critical project; space and time in the first Critique; the Transcendental Deduction; the rejection of transcendent metaphysics; transcendental idealism. Our primary aim will be to try and get an overall sense of Kant's work in theoretical philosophy, partly as a way of understanding why it has exerted such influence and why it continues to attract such fascination. Details of translations and other readings can be found on the Faculty Reading list.

## **113 Post-Kantian Philosophy: Nietzsche**

Prof Peter Kail

Weeks 1-8 / Fridays/ 10:00-11:00

Location: Schools (Room 8)

These lectures provide a general introduction to Nietzsche's philosophy, with particular emphasis on his naturalistic critique of modern Western morality. After a brief overview of his life and works, we shall turn to his *On the Genealogy of Morality* (GM) and work through that text. GM will serve as a springboard for a discussion of topics that will bring in material from other works from Nietzsche's so-called middle and late works, including *Beyond Good and Evil*, and *Twilight of the Idols*. The topics discussed include naturalism, genealogy, 'Christian' morality, self, agency and freedom. In preparation for these lectures, students are encouraged to read GM. Particular readings will be given at each lecture.

Week 1 Approaching Nietzsche  
Week 2 Genealogy and the *Genealogy*  
Week 3 The Slave Revolt  
Week 4 Bad Conscience  
Week 5 The Ascetic Ideals  
Week 6. Self and Morality (I)  
Week 7. Self and Morality (II)  
Week 8. Truth and Perspectivism

## **113 Post-Kantian Philosophy: Schopenhauer**

Prof Bill Mander  
Weeks 1-8 / Fridays/ 11:00-12:00  
Location: Schools (Room 8)

### **Schopenhauer – syllabus**

Week 1 – Three arguments for idealism  
Week 2 – Kant, and three objections to idealism  
Week 3 – The argument for the world as will  
Week 4 – Further exploration of the world as will  
Week 5 – Pessimism and the platonic ideas  
Week 6 – Aesthetic appreciation  
Week 7 – Pessimism, death, and suicide  
Week 8 – Character, free-will, ethics, and asceticism

### **Reading**

A. Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation*, translated by E. Payne  
Julian Young, *Schopenhauer*, Routledge, 2005

## **115 / 130 Plato: Republic**

Prof Luca Castagnoli  
Weeks 1-8 / Thursdays/ 10:00-11:00  
Location: School (Room 6)

The *Republic* is one of Plato's most celebrated and influential works. It opens with questions about the nature of justice and its role in a good life, leading into wide-ranging discussions of political philosophy, moral psychology, epistemology, the theory of Forms, the soul and its immortality, education, and the nature and social role of arts. Studying the *Republic* introduces us to many of Plato's central ideas and arguments.

These eight lectures will examine key passages, topics and arguments from Books 6-10 of the *Republic*. (Lectures on Books 1-5 were given by Prof. Bown in Michaelmas Term 2025; recordings and handouts are available on Canvas.) The aim is to identify and examine some of the main exegetical and philosophical questions, while drawing on other Platonic dialogues to support an informed reading of the *Republic*.

The lectures are intended primarily for students taking papers 115/130 in any of the Honour Schools, but anyone with an interest in Plato and the history of philosophy—including graduate students—is very welcome. Knowledge of ancient Greek is not required. Handouts will be available on Canvas in advance of each lecture. Attendees are encouraged to bring a copy of the text.

Provisional schedule of topics (Hilary Term):

- Week 1. True philosophers and the ship of state analogy (Book 6, 484a-502c)
- Week 2. The sun and line analogies (Book 6, 502c-511e)
- Week 3. The cave analogy and education (Book 7, 514a-521b)
- Week 4. The guardians' educational curriculum and dialectic (Book 7, 521b-540c)
- Week 5. The degeneration of states and souls (Book 7 540d - Book 8, 569c)
- Week 6. The tyrant, the ranking of characters/pleasures/lives, and Socrates' defence of justice (Book 9)
- Week 7. The attack on imitative art and poetry (Book 10, 595a-608a)
- Week 8. The immortality of the soul and the myth of Er (Book 10, 608b-621d)

## **116 / 132 Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics**

Prof Simon Shogry and Dr Stefan Sienkiewicz

Weeks 1-8 / Wednesdays and Thursdays/ 12:00-13:00

Location: Schwarzman Centre - Lecture Theatre L1 (10.300)

These lectures are primarily intended for undergraduates taking the *Nicomachean Ethics* paper in Greek or in translation, but other interested parties are welcome to attend. Topics covered will include Aristotle's account of the human good, the function argument, parts of the soul, habituation and the doctrine of the mean, voluntary and involuntary action, decision and deliberation, the ethical virtues, the intellectual virtues, *akrasia*, pleasure, friendship and the relationship between contemplation and *eudaimonia*.

## **120 Intermediate Philosophy of Physics: Special Relativity**

Prof Adam Caulton

Weeks 1-6 / Mondays and Tuesdays/ 11:00-12:00

Location: Schwarzman Centre - Seminar Room

Mondays

Weeks 1-3,5-6 (Room: 10.302)

Week 4 (Room: 10.303) - Mon 9 Feb

Tuesdays

Weeks 1-6 (Room: 10.302)

This series of 12 lectures pertains to the first half of the 120 Intermediate Philosophy of Physics paper, and is intended for second-year Physics and Philosophy students, though visitors are welcome. Knowledge of classical mechanics and special relativity will be assumed.

Topics covered in these lectures include the following (these are expected to be in order of presentation, but some topics may take more than one lecture to cover):

1. Newton's laws and neo-Newtonian spacetime structure
2. Einstein's 1905 derivation of the Lorentz transformations
3. Group theoretic perspectives on the Lorentz transformations
4. Experimental evidence for relativistic effects
5. The conventionality of simultaneity
6. Principle vs. constructive approaches to physical theories
7. Constructive approaches to special relativity: the geometrical vs. dynamical approaches
8. The twins paradox and the clock hypothesis
9. Bell's spaceship paradox and Bell's 'Lorentzian pedagogy'
10. The metaphysics of time

The following two books are recommended general reading for this course:

Brown, H. R., *Physical Relativity* (OUP, 2005) [Chapters 1-8].

Maudlin, T., *Philosophy of Physics: Space and Time* (Princeton University Press, 2012) [Chapters 1-5].

More specific readings will be recommended for each topic in lectures.

## 121 Advanced Philosophy of Physics

Prof Sam Fletcher (Weeks 1-4) and

Prof Adam Caulton (Week 5)

Location: Schwarzman Centre (Ryle Room)

These discussion-based classes will concern philosophical issues arising from the general theory of relativity. The intended audience is 4th years reading Physics and Philosophy, MMathPhys students taking this paper as an option, MSt Physics and Philosophy students, and BPhil and DPhil students with an interest in philosophy of physics. Topics will include:

1. Conceptual relations with special relativity and Newtonian gravitation
2. The ontology of gravity and of spacetime
3. The nature of energy
4. Time and causality

More detailed reading lists for each topic will be provided on Canvas. In preparation for the term, I recommend my *Foundations of General Relativity* (Cambridge, 2024), and for technical background, David Malament's *Topics in the Foundations of General Relativity and Newtonian Gravitation Theory* (Chicago, 2012).

## 127 Philosophical Logic

Prof James Studd

Weeks 1-8 / Tuesdays Weeks 1-2 11:00-13:00 Weeks 3-8 11:00-12:00/ 11:00-13:00

Location: Schwarzman Centre - Lecture Theatre L1 (10.300)

These are the core lectures for students taking FHS Paper 127. But they may also be of interest to others who want to learn about the technical details and philosophical applications of extensions to (and deviations from) classical logic.

There will also be two additional lectures in weeks 1 and 2 (immediately after the main one-hour lecture). These deal with the mathematical methods used in the course, and are primarily aimed at students who did not take the second logic paper, Philosophical Topics in Logic and Probability or Elements of Deductive Logic, for Prelims.

The paper is studied in conjunction with a set textbook, Theodore Sider's *Logic for Philosophy* (Oxford University Press). I recommend that you read the indicated sections of the book before attending the lecture each week.

The schedule for the main series of lectures is as follows:

### **Week 1. Classical propositional logic, variations, and deviations**

*LfP 2.1–2.4 (2.5 non-examinable), 3.1–3.4 (3.5 non-examinable)*

Review of syntax and classical semantics for PL; three-valued semantics; supervaluationism

### **Week 2. Modal propositional logic: semantics**

*LfP 6.1–6.3, 7.1–7.3 (7.4 non-examinable)*

Syntax of MPL; Kripke semantics for K, D, T, B, S4 and S5. Deontic, epistemic and tense logic.

### **Week 3. Modal propositional logic: proof theory**

*LfP 2.6, 2.8, 6.4*

Axiomatic proofs for PL. Axiomatic proofs for K, D, T, B, S4 and S5.

### **Week 4. Modal propositional logic: metatheory**

*LfP 2.7, 6.5 (Proofs in 2.9, 6.6 non-examinable)*

Soundness and Completeness for MPL. (Proof of completeness is non-examinable).

### **Week 5. Classical predicate logic, extensions, and deviations.**

*LfP 4, 5*

Review of the syntax and classical semantics of PC. Extensions of PC. Free logic.

### **Week 6. Quantified modal logic: constant domains**

*LfP 9.1–9.5, 9.7*

Semantics and proof theory for SQML.

### **Week 7. Quantified modal logic: variable domains, 2D semantics**

*LfP 9.6, 10*

Kripke semantics for variable domain K, D, T, B, S4, and S5. Two-dimensional semantics for @, X and F.

## **Week 8. Counterfactuals.**

*LfP 8*

Stalnaker's and Lewis's semantics for counterfactuals.

Lecture notes and problem sheets are available on Canvas.

## **128 Practical Ethics / 103 Applied Ethics**

Dr Emma Curran

Weeks 1-8 / Tuesdays/ 10:00-11:00

Location: Schools (Room 11)

In these lectures, we will continue our survey of issues within practical ethics. We will be focusing on the topics of *demands of affluence*, *effective altruism*, *the non-identity problem*, *health and disability*, and *self-defence*, alongside the distinctions between *intending and foreseeing* and *doing and allowing*. For those wishing to familiarise themselves with the topics, please consult the following indicative readings:

### **Background Reading.**

Jamieson, Dale. (2013). "Constructing Practical Ethics" in Roger Crisp (ed). *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Ethics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press

### **Week 1. Intending/Foreseeing and Doing/Allowing**

Quinn, Warren S. (1989). Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing, *Philosophical Review*, 98(3): 287-312

Quinn Warren S. (1989). Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Double Effect, *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 18(4): 334-51

### **Week 2. Demands of Affluence**

Singer, Peter. (1972). Famine, Affluence, and Morality, *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 1(3): 229-243

Kamm, Frances. (2000). Does Distance Matter Morally to the Duty to Rescue?, *Law and Philosophy*, 19(6): 655-81

### **Week 3. Effective Altruism**

MacAskill, William. (2015). *Doing Good Better*, Gotham Books: chs.2-7

Pummer, Theron. (2016). Whether and Where to Give, *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 44(1): 77-95

### **Week 4. Non-Identity I**

Parfit, Derek. (1986). *Reasons and Persons*, Oxford: Clarendon Press: ch.16

Roberts, Melinda. (2007). The Non-Identity Fallacy: Harm, Probability and Another Look at Parfit's Depletion Example, *Utilitas*, 19(3): 267-311

### **Week 5. Non-Identity II**

Hare, Caspar. (2007). Voices from Another World: Must We Respect the Interests of People Who Do Not, and Will Never, Exist?, *Ethics*, 117(3): 498-523

Wasserman, David. (2008). Hare on De Dicto Betterness and Prospective Parents, *Ethics*,

118(3): 529-35

### **Week 6. Health and Wellbeing**

McMahan, Jeff. (2005). Causing Disabled People to Exist and Causing People to Be Disabled, *Ethics*, 116(1): 77-99

Barnes, Elizabeth. (2014). Valuing Disability, Causing Disability, *Ethics*, 125(1): 88-113

### **Week 7. Self-Defence I**

Otsuka, Michael. (1994). Killing the Innocent in Self-Defense, *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 23: 74-94

Frowe, Helen. (2008). Equating Innocent Threats and Bystanders, *Journal of Applied Philosophy*, 25: 277-290

### **Week 8. Self-Defence II**

Quong, Jonathan. (2009). Killing in Self-Defense, *Ethics*, 119: 507-537

Hanna, Jason. (2012). The Moral Status of Nonresponsible Threats, *Journal of Applied Philosophy*, 29(1): 19-32

## **129 The Philosophy of Wittgenstein**

Prof Natalia Waights Hickman

Weeks 1-8 / Mondays/ 11:00-12:00

Location: Schwarzman Centre - Lecture Theatre L1 (10.300)

This lecture series focuses exclusively on Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* as set-text, although certain themes in focus are also critical to the interpretation of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. These include the conditions of (linguistic) meaning and understanding, the relationship between language/meaning and 'the given', the contrasts and connections between philosophical and scientific/substantive questions, and the nature and method(s) of philosophy.

As is also standard in tutorial reading lists, the lecture topics will broadly follow the order in which they feature in the set text, beginning in lecture one with a discussion of Augustine's passage at the opening, and of the work to which Wittgenstein puts it; and concluding in week eight with an examination of later Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy.

Throughout the lectures, the dialectic between two broad schools of interpretation will be brought to bear. These schools differ on two closely related points. One: What role do rules play in the constitution of linguistic meaning, and linguistic understanding? Two: What are the sources of philosophical confusion, and the proper philosophical methods for remedying it? Thus, although the topic of philosophical method as Wittgenstein conceives it will be the substantial focus only in week eight, the way methodological questions impinge on our interpretation will be considered as we address every topic in the series.

### Provisional List of Topics:

1. Augustine's passage and Wittgenstein's picture
2. Ostensive definition
3. Meaning, use, and 'language-games'
4. Family resemblance
5. Rules I: Rule-following and intentionality
6. Sensation language and privacy
7. Rules II: Grammar, necessity and 'forms of life'
8. The Nature and Method(s) of Philosophy

## 131 / 137 Plato on Knowledge, Language, & Reality in the *Theaetetus* & *Sophist*

Prof Michail Peramatzis

Weeks 1-6 / Thursdays/ **11:00-12:00 (new timeslot from week 3)**

Location: Schwarzman Centre - Lecture Theatre L1 (10.300)

The lectures cover some of the most fascinating and rewarding arguments in Plato's late epistemology, philosophy of language, and metaphysics on the basis of his dialogues *Theaetetus* and *Sophist*. The six lectures to be given in HT26 will focus on the *Sophist*, the dialogue where Plato attempts to define what a sophist is, and will examine the following six topics:

- (1) The method of definition by division.
- (2) The view that it is impossible to say or think 'what is not'.
- (3) The discussion of the number and nature of what there is.
- (4) The view of the so-called 'Late-Learners' and the communion of kinds.
- (5) The analysis of negative predication, the 'fragmentation' of the kind difference, and negative properties.
- (6) The analysis of falsehood.

In discussing these topics, we will examine issues of interpretative and philosophical significance.

These lectures are intended primarily for those undergraduate students who will sit paper 131 [Plato on Knowledge, Language, and Reality in the *Theaetetus* and the *Sophist* (in Greek)] or 137 [Plato on Knowledge, Language, and Reality in the *Theaetetus* and the *Sophist* (in translation)], and for students on the MSt in Ancient Philosophy who plan to write their Option A essay on Plato's *Theaetetus* or/and *Sophist*, but anyone with an interest in Ancient Greek Philosophy, Plato's theoretical philosophy, or the history of epistemology, metaphysics, and the philosophy of language is welcome to attend (knowledge of Greek is not required).

Greek Text:

*Platonis Opera I*, ed. by E. A. Duke, W. F. Hicken, W. S. M. Nicoll, D. B. Robinson, and J. C. G. Strachan, (Oxford, 1995).

Suggested English Translation:

*Theaetetus*, tr. Levett, revised by Burnyeat (Hackett, 1990).

*Sophist*, tr. White (Hackett, 1993).

NB: both of these translations are re-printed in J. Cooper's *Plato: Complete Works* (Hackett, 1997).

Hand-outs and further bibliographical suggestions will be given in the lectures.

## **133 / 138 Aristotle on Nature, Life and Mind**

Dr Janine Gühler

Weeks 1-8 / Mondays/ 13:00-14:00

Location: Schwarzman Centre (Ryle Room)

This series of lectures introduces some of Aristotle's most fascinating arguments and concepts in his theoretical philosophy. The primary texts are his *Physics*, *Parts of Animals* and *De Anima*. The discussions range over what we now call metaphysics, philosophy of science and philosophy of mind. We will lay the foundations by investigating his concepts of nature, matter, form, potentiality, actuality, and the four causes. This will equip us to tackle with his teleology, definitions of change, the concept of the infinite and his discussion of time. We will spend the remainder of the term investigating Aristotle's views on the soul, perception, understanding and imagination.

These lectures are primarily intended for those taking tutorials on Aristotle on Nature, Life and Mind (in Greek or translation) and Mst students in Ancient Philosophy who plan to write one of their essays on any of the listed topics. However, while these lectures may be especially relevant to those interested in ancient philosophy, they are open to all undergraduates and graduates, and everyone is welcome.

Week 1: Matter, form and nature

Week 2: The four causes and teleology

Week 3: Change, potentiality and actuality

Week 4: The infinite

Week 5: Time

Week 6: Soul

Week 7: Perception

Week 8: Understanding and imagination

## **140 Philosophy of Social Science**

Prof Alexander Prescott-Couch

Weeks 1-8 / Wednesdays/ 16:30-17:30

Location: Schwarzman Centre (Ryle Room)

Contemporary social science is extremely heterogeneous, with seemingly little consensus about methods and fundamental assumptions. While some social scientific projects take the form of causal analysis of large data sets, others primarily employ case studies or involve the construction of highly idealized models that bear only an indirect relation to real-world phenomena. Many anthropologists are interested less in causal questions and more in understanding the "meanings" of events or cultural practices. Some theorists believe that a deep understanding of society requires a functional analysis of key institutions, while other, more historically inclined researchers hold that understanding these institutions requires historical narratives or "genealogies."

How should we think about this heterogeneity? Are these differences superficial, masking a single underlying set of fundamental aims and a unitary logic of scientific inference? Or do they indicate deep disagreement about the correct approach to studying society? Moreover, if such deep disagreements do exist, to what extent should we look to the natural sciences as a model in order to resolve them?

The Philosophy of the Social Sciences lectures address these (and other) questions by examining classic debates in the philosophy of social science in light of contemporary social science and recent philosophy of science. Topics will include scientific explanation, the doctrine of *Verstehen*, idealization and modeling, functional explanation, historical narrative, critical theory and ideology, social metaphysics, and the role of values in science. The aim is to show how examining social science can provide a fuller picture of substantive and methodological commitments of the sciences as well as how philosophical analysis might inform methodological discussion within social science itself.

Here are the lecture topics:

1. Social Scientific Explanation
2. Causation in the Social Sciences
3. *Verstehen* and Interpretation
4. Modeling and Idealization
5. Functional explanation
6. Narrative and History
7. Social Metaphysics
8. Values in the Social Sciences

### **Plato Protagoras (for Second Classical Language)**

Dr Stefan Sienkiewicz

Weeks 1-4 / Mondays/ 12:00-13:00

Location: Schwarzman Centre - Seminar Room

Weeks 1-3 20.306

Week 4 20.340

These lectures are primarily intended for undergraduates doing the second classical language paper for Greats, in which the Protagoras features as one of the set texts, but other interested parties are welcome to attend. Topics covered will include the Platonic dialogue form, the teachability of virtue, Protagoras' political theory and the unity of the virtues.

## **Supplementary Subject in the History and Philosophy of Science: Philosophy of Science**

Dr Sophie Allen

Weeks 1-8 / Mondays/ 12:00-13:00

Location: Schools (Room 8)

This course introduces you to some general topics in the philosophy of science. What is science and can we distinguish science from other forms of enquiry? What are scientific theories about? Do scientists discover what there is in the world, or are scientific theories tools with which we predict and explain? Is there a scientific method, and what does it involve? How are scientific theories, models or hypotheses confirmed or rejected? What is the relationship between evidence and theory? Does science make progress? And if so, how does it progress? Is scientific enquiry free from social and cultural influences?

These lectures will not presuppose any prior study of philosophy. They support the options of *History and Philosophy of Science*, available in some Honour Schools in the natural sciences subjects, and the supplementary subject *Philosophy of Science* in the Honour School of Physics. Students considering taking these options are encouraged to come along.

Students should initially approach philosophy tutors in their own colleges in order to arrange tutorial teaching for this course (or ask their own subject tutors to do this for them), although there may also be the possibility of arranging some tutorial teaching at the lectures.

Interested students are referred to past papers for some idea of what is covered (search on SOLO exam papers for S00004W1).

# Other Lectures (suitable for all audiences)

## Introduction to Arabic Philosophy

Dr Ibrahim Safri

Weeks 1-8 / Mondays/ 14:00-15:00

Location: Schwarzman Centre - Seminar Room (30.025)

This course offers an introduction to the major themes of Arabic philosophy. We will examine how ancient Greek philosophy was appropriated and integrated within the Arabic philosophical discourse through the translation movement and the production of early commentaries on key works of Aristotle and Plato. Building on this tradition, philosophers in the Islamic world developed original philosophical theories, giving rise to a distinct philosophical tradition.

These lectures will introduce key notions from the Arabic philosophical tradition, including creation and causality, atomism and change, necessary existence, and mental existence. This will allow us to trace to what extent Arabic philosophers interacted with, adapted, and challenged their predecessors from the ancient Greek philosophical tradition. We will conclude our course by exploring the development of Arabic philosophy in its subsequent form, being distinctly an Islamic philosophical tradition rather than an extension of philosophy in late antiquity.

A significant segment of these lectures will focus on the philosophy of Avicenna (d. 1037), a seminal figure in the development of Arabic philosophy. This will be followed by a shift to the post-Avicennan philosophy period, particularly in relation to the Avicennan influence on al-Rāzī (d. 1210) and the so-called post-classical Islamic philosophy.

### Provisional schedule:

Week 1: Historical overview of Arabic philosophy

Week 2: Early Arabic philosophy: Ancient Greek philosophy in Arabic (translations and commentaries)

Week 3: al-Kindī's philosophy: Creation *ex-nihilo*

Week 4: Avicenna's philosophy: Necessary being

Week 5: Avicenna's philosophy: Mental existence

Week 6: Atomism in Islamic philosophy

Week 7: Motion in Islamic philosophy

Week 8: Time in Islamic philosophy

### Reading Materials:

Texts:

- Avicenna. *The Metaphysics of The Healing, A parallel English-Arabic text translated, introduced, and annotated by Michael E. Marmura. Islamic Translation Series.* Provo, UT: Brigham Young University Press, 2005.
- Avicenna, *The Physics of The Healing; a Parallel English-Arabic Text.* Translated by: Jon McGinnis. Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 2009.

- Calverley, Edwin, and James Pollock. *Nature, Man and God in Medieval Islam*: Volumes: 1-2. Boston: Brill, 2022.

Secondary literature:

- Adamson, Peter and Richard C. Taylor, ed. *The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy*. Cambridge University Press, 2005.
- Druart, Th.-A. 'Philosophy in Islam', The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Philosophy, Ch. 4. 'Greek into Arabic'. E13.
- Gutas, Dimitri. Greek Thought, Arabic Culture: *The Graeco-Arabic Translation Movement in Baghdad and Early 'Abbasid Society (2<sup>nd</sup> -4<sup>th</sup> /8<sup>th</sup> -10<sup>th</sup> centuries)*. London & New York: Routledge, 1998
- McGinnis, Jon, "Arabic and Islamic Natural Philosophy and Natural Science", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.)
- Wisnovsky, Robert. *Avicenna's Metaphysics in Context*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2018.
- Wolfson, Harry. *The Philosophy of the Kalām*. Harvard University Press, 1976.

## Probability and Philosophy

Prof Alexander Paseau

Weeks 1-3, 5-6 / Mondays/ 14:00-16:00

Location: Schwarzman Centre (Ryle Room)

This course consists of five two-hour lectures on the philosophy of probability. I will not lecture for the entire two hours, but will leave ample time for class discussion and questions.

Undergraduate students taking the FHS papers *Philosophy of Science* or *Philosophy of Science and Social Science* or the FPE paper *Philosophical Topics in Logic and Probability* are strongly encouraged to attend. The material will also be relevant to students taking FHS *Knowledge and Reality* or FPE *General Philosophy*. More generally, all students—undergraduate and graduate—postdocs, and academic visitors interested in epistemology and the philosophy of probability are welcome. Although the course has no formal prerequisites, some mathematical fluency will be helpful

The course will focus primarily on credences (degrees of belief). Topics covered include: the probability axioms; the ratio formula and conditional probability; the classical theory of probability; Dutch Book arguments for probabilism and their converses; accuracy arguments for probabilism; Expected Utility Theory and its empirical violations such as the Allais Paradox and the Reflection Effect; the Conjunction and Base Rate Fallacies; finite vs countable additivity; conditionalization and Jeffrey conditionalization; and Bayesianism, including Bayesian approaches to the problem of induction.

## Graduate Lecture: The Philosophy of Benedict Spinoza

Kenneth Novis

Weeks 1-4 / Wednesdays/ 13:00-14:00

Location: Schwarzman Centre (Ryle Room)

### Introduction

The early modern period in philosophy marks one of the greatest revolutions within the discipline since its origins in antiquity. Through a combination of scientific revolutions, religious controversies, economic deals and military conquests, the ground was laid for changes within philosophy that had not been seen for centuries, if not a whole millennium. Emerging from a dogmatically Christian intellectual world predominated by scholastic Aristotelianism, the great thinkers of this period are marked by their attempts to break free from inherited beliefs about the structure of the universe, the function of knowledge, the optimal organisation of society, and the true form of human flourishing.

For the sake of this course, I will be introducing the most radical opponent of the scholastic philosophy from this period: Benedict Spinoza. Before him, Descartes had tried to reestablish philosophy on the indubitable ground of the *cogito*. But, by building on Descartes' innovations, no other philosopher of the early modern period explored the implications of renouncing scholasticism as thoroughly as Spinoza did. In his case, this culminates in a radically monistic metaphysics, which rethinks all of the deepest questions of human existence by taking as its starting point a complete rejection of transcendence.

The aim of this lecture series will be to provide students with an introduction to Spinoza's philosophy through his masterpiece, the *Ethics*. For this purpose, I will focus on four core themes of the text: Spinoza's monism, the thesis of parallelism, the *conatus* doctrine, and his final views on freedom and salvation.

### Guidance

Spinoza is, simply put, one of the most difficult authors in the history of philosophy. Because of this, there is a wealth of resources that might be helpful for students grappling with his philosophy for the first time.

In the first place, many guides exist that will talk you through the *Ethics* in simpler language than Spinoza uses. These guides also often provide vital background information which Spinoza omits, as well as pointing to interpretive controversies among scholars. I recommend using any of the following guides:

- Beth Lord, *Spinoza's Ethics: An Edinburgh Philosophical Guide*, Edinburgh. [Henceforth 'Lord'].
- Steven Nadler, *Spinoza's 'Ethics': An Introduction*, Cambridge. [Henceforth 'Nadler'].
- Edwin Curley, *Behind the Geometrical Method: A Reading of Spinoza's Ethics*, Princeton. [Henceforth 'Curley'].

The *Ethics* is also a work of philosophy written in a 'geometric style.' Almost everything in the book refers back to somewhere else in the text. On a first reading, I advise you not to try following *all* of Spinoza's references. He will quite often repeat himself and summarise his

claims, and searching for the propositions he is appealing to for proof of his claims can sometimes throw you further off of understanding what he's saying than it can aid you.

There are at least five translations of Spinoza's *Ethics* currently in circulation: Edwin Curley's is the present academic standard, and it is the version that I will be relying on in my lectures. If you find a passage in the Curley translation particularly difficult, you may find it beneficial to consult one of the other, less literal translations.

## **Weekly Plan**

### Lecture 1: Spinoza's Monism

This lecture will focus on part I of the *Ethics*, up to proposition 14 and including the Appendix. We will begin by considering Spinoza's definitions of 'substance,' 'attribute,' 'mode' and 'God.' After that, we will focus on the opening propositions to *Ethics* part I. These propositions serve the dual purpose of justifying Spinoza's definition of God, and of proving 'substance monism' – the view that there is (and can be) only one substance. Substance monism provides the foundation of Spinoza's philosophy, and little that he does can be understood without a good grasp of it.

#### *Required readings:*

- Spinoza, ***Ethics***, Part I (including Appendix).
- Yitzhak Melamed, 'The Building Blocks of Spinoza's Metaphysics: Substance, Attributes and Modes,' in *The Oxford Handbook to Spinoza*, ed. Della Rocca.

#### *Optional readings:*

- Don Garrett, 'Ethics IP5: Shared Attributes and the Basis of Spinoza's Monism,' in Garrett, *Necessity and Nature in Spinoza's Philosophy*.
- Margaret Wilson, 'Spinoza's Causal Axiom (*Ethics* I, Axiom 4,' in *God and Nature: Spinoza's Metaphysics*, ed. Yovel.
- Lord, Chapter 1.1.
- Nadler, Chapter 3.
- Curley, Preface and Chapter 1.

### Lecture 2: The Doctrine of Parallelism

This lecture will focus on part II of the *Ethics*, but especially proposition 7, where Spinoza introduces his doctrine of parallelism. Parallelism offers one potential solution to the Cartesian interaction problem. But it also faces a variety of metaphysical issues, whose severity depends on how we think about substances and attributes. After considering some solutions to these issues, we will conclude this lecture by briefly describing Spinoza's 'three kinds of cognition' from part II, proposition 40s2.

#### *Required readings:*

- Spinoza, ***Ethics***, Part II.
- Olli Koistinen, 'Mind-Body Interaction and Unity in Spinoza,' in *Mind, Body, and Morality*, ed. Martina Reuter and Frans Svensson.

*Optional readings:*

- Margaret Wilson, 'Objects, Ideas, and 'Minds': Comments on Spinoza's Theory of Mind, in Wilson, *Ideas and Mechanism: Essays on Early Modern Philosophy*.
- Douglas Odegaard, 'The body identical with the human mind,' in *Spinoza: Essays in Interpretation*, ed. Freeman and Mandelbaum.
- Lord, Chapter 1.2.
- Nadler, Chapter 5.
- Curley, Chapter 2.

Lecture 3: Conatus and Emotion

In part III of the *Ethics*, Spinoza turns to the more obviously 'ethical' content of his system, beginning with the essence and behaviour of all finite things. The essence of any finite thing is its *conatus*, or striving to persevere in existence. After considering the *conatus* doctrine, we will see how Spinoza thinks that all emotions (or affects) are constructed out of modifications of the *conatus*. There are three primary ways in which our *conatus* can be modified, which Spinoza calls joy, sadness, and desire. In closing this lecture, we will look at Spinoza's comments on the content of moral language from EIIIp9s and EIIIp39s.

*Required readings:*

- Spinoza, ***Ethics***, Part III.
- Michael Lebuffe, 'The Anatomy of the Passions,' in *The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza's Ethics*, ed. Olli Koistinen.

*Optional readings:*

- Michael Della Rocca, 'Spinoza's Metaphysical Psychology,' in *The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza*, ed. Garrett.
- Pina Totaro, 'The Terminology of the Affects in Ethics Parts III through V,' in *Spinoza's Ethics: A Critical Guide*, ed. Melamed.
- Lord, Chapter 1.3.
- Nadler, Chapter 7.
- Curley, Chapter 3.

Lecture 4: Freedom and Happiness

In the last lecture, we will overview the final two parts of the *Ethics*, focussing on how the life of reason as Spinoza describes it helps us to secure our 'highest good': the knowledge of God. Contrary to many previous philosophical accounts of the good life, Spinoza resists rendering it one of solitary contemplation. The wise man, for Spinoza, is one who partakes of the joys of life in moderation, and through active involvement with the greater community of human beings whom they seek to draw into a condition of freedom as well.

*Required readings:*

- Spinoza, ***Ethics***, Parts IV-V.
- Jon Miller, 'Spinoza on Life According to Nature,' in *Essays on Spinoza's Ethical Theory*, ed. Kisner and Youpa.

*Optional readings:*

- Donald Rutherford, 'Salvation as a State of Mind: The Place of Acquiescentia in Spinoza's *Ethics*,' *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* (7:3).
- Susan James, 'Spinoza the Stoic' in *The Rise of Modern Philosophy*, ed. Sorrell.
- Lord, Chapters 1.4-5.
- Nadler, Chapter 8.
- Curley, Chapter 3.

## **Graduate Lecture: Aristotle on Accidentality, Chance, and Errors in Nature**

Setareh Seyedrezazad

Weeks 5-8 / Wednesdays/ 13:00-14:00

Location: Schwarzman Centre (Ryle Room)

In these lectures we will focus on the notion of accidentality in Aristotle's philosophy and its application in his physics and biology. We will examine how Aristotle defines accidentality, what he takes to be the causes of accidental outcomes, and how chance, luck, and error fit within his broader account of the accidental.

### **Lecture 1: What is Accidentality?**

In this lecture, we will explore Aristotle's notion of the accidental: items that come to be 'neither always nor for the most part'. The key questions are: are there different senses of accidentality in Aristotle's philosophy? If so, can they be unified? How should the notion of 'neither always nor for the most part' be understood?

Reading: *Metaphysics* E.2, *Posterior Analytics* I.4

### **Lecture 2: Accidental and Per Se Causes**

The second lecture will focus on the causes of the accidental. Aristotle distinguishes between per se and accidental causes, stating that the cause of the accidental is itself accidental. Some questions to be addressed are: what is the distinction between per se and accidental causes? Should the latter be called causes? Further, Aristotle thinks that accidental causes, unlike per se causes, are indefinite. How should we understand this indefiniteness?

Reading: *Metaphysics* E.2, *Physics* II.3

### **Lecture 3: Chance and Luck**

In the third session we will discuss luck and chance, which in Aristotle's view are accidents that *could* come to be for the sake of something, but in fact *do not*. We will address the following questions: how are chance and luck related to teleology? What is the difference between chance and luck? Does Aristotle's philosophy allow for the existence of bad luck?

Reading: *Physics* II. 4-6

### **Lecture 4: Errors in Nature and Craft**

In our final session, we will examine how errors arise in both nature and craft, and how Aristotle understands errors within his broader account of the accidental. In particular, we will focus on errors and anomalies in natural generation.

Reading: *Physics* II.8, *Generation of Animals* IV.3

# Graduate Classes

Graduate classes are, except where otherwise indicated, intended for the Faculty's BPhil and MSt students. Other students may attend, and are welcome, provided they first seek and obtain the permission of the class-giver(s).

## Philosophy of Physics

Prof Sam Fletcher

Prof Sam Fletcher (Weeks 1-4) and

Prof Adam Caulton (Week 5)

Location: Schwarzman Centre (Ryle Room)

These discussion-based classes will concern philosophical issues arising from the general theory of relativity. The intended audience is 4th years reading Physics and Philosophy, MMathPhys students taking this paper as an option, MSt Physics and Philosophy students, and BPhil and DPhil students with an interest in philosophy of physics. Topics will include:

1. Conceptual relations with special relativity and Newtonian gravitation
2. The ontology of gravity and of spacetime
3. The nature of energy
4. Time and causality

More detailed reading lists for each topic will be provided on Canvas. In preparation for the term, I recommend my *Foundations of General Relativity* (Cambridge, 2024), and for technical background, David Malament's *Topics in the Foundations of General Relativity and Newtonian Gravitation Theory* (Chicago, 2012).

## Stoic Psychology

Prof Marion Durand and Prof Simon Shogry

Weeks 1-8 / Tuesdays/ 11:00-13:00

Location: Schwarzman Centre (Ryle Room)

This seminar investigates the psychological theory of the ancient Stoics. No prior knowledge of Stoicism, ancient philosophy, or Greek is assumed, so we begin in week 1 with an overview of the Stoic philosophical system as a whole, which is divided into three parts: physics, logic, and ethics. Psychology arguably sits at the intersection of all three. In week 2, we consider the Stoic arguments for the corporeality of the soul, which rely on the principles of Stoic physics, as well as their theory of perception, on which it is a material alteration of the mind incited by contact with an external sense-object. In week 3, we turn to the interaction between Stoic psychology and Stoic logic and epistemology (itself a sub-branch of logic), with particular attention to the role of 'sayables' (*lepta*) in specifying the propositional content of psychological states; the Stoic theory of concept- and belief-formation; and their definition of the 'cognitive impression', the key posit of their epistemological theory. In week 4, we take up moral psychology and action theory, with a view to contextualising the Stoics' infamous account of the passions as harmful states categorically absent from the life of the wise. The remaining weeks will be given over to

more specialised topics, depending on student interest. These may include: the comparison of vice with insanity; the possibility of ‘positive’ passions that aid moral progress; the psychological dimensions of the Stoic ‘craft model’ of virtue; the details of the mechanisms of belief and concept formation; the formation and contents of non-perceptual impressions; or the psychology of god. Throughout the term, student presentations are highly encouraged. We will be studying the Stoic sources using Long and Sedley’s *The Hellenistic Philosophers* (CUP, 1987) and supplemental readings posted to Canvas.

Provisional schedule:

**Week 1 – overview of the Stoic philosophical system and its three parts.**

Text: Long and Sedley, section 26 ('The philosophical curriculum').

Recommended background readings:

- Sedley, D. “Stoicism” in the *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (<https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/stoicism/v-2>);
- Durand, M., Shogry, S. and Baltzly, D. “Stoicism” in the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (<https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/stoicism/>);
- Barnes, J. *Logic and the Imperial Stoa*. Brill, 2007. See Chapter One, ‘The Decline of Logic’.

**Week 2 – Stoic psychology and Stoic physics; arguments for the corporeality of the soul; theory of perception**

Text: Long and Sedley sections 43-45, 47, 53-54

Optional further reading:

- Brennan, T. *The Stoic Life* (OUP, 2005), ch. 5, "Impressions and Assent"
- Long, A.A. “Stoic Psychology” in *Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy* (CUP, 1999), pp. 560-84.
- Nawar, T. “The Stoic Theory of the Soul” in *The Routledge Handbook of Hellenistic Philosophy* (Routledge, 2020), pp. 148-159.

**Week 3 – Stoic psychology and Stoic logic: sayables, concept- and belief-formation, epistemology**

Text: Long and Sedley sections 33-34, 39-40

Optional further reading:

- Brennan, T. *The Stoic Life* (OUP 2005), ch. 6, “Belief and Knowledge”
- Frede, M. “The Stoic Conception of Reason” in K. Boudouris (ed.), *Hellenistic Philosophy* 50-63
- Frede, M. “Stoics and Skeptics on Clear and Distinct Impressions” in his *Essays in Ancient Philosophy* (Minnesota 1987), pp. 151-176.
- Ierodiakonou K. “The Stoics on Conceptions and Concepts”, in Betegh G, Tsouna V, eds. *Conceptualising Concepts in Greek Philosophy*. (CUP 2024): 237-258
- Shogry, S. “What do our impressions say?” *Apeiron* 52 (1), 29-63.

**Week 4 – Stoic moral psychology: impulse, virtue and vice, and the passions**

Text: Long and Sedley sections 56-61, 63, 65

Optional further reading:

- Brennan, T. *The Stoic Life* (OUP 2005), ch. 7, “Impulses and Emotions”
- Brennan, T. “Stoic Moral Psychology” in *The Cambridge Companion to Stoicism* (CUP,

2003), pp. 257-294.

- Cooper, J. "Posidonius on the Emotions" in his *Reason and Emotion* (Princeton 1999), pp. 449-484 [focus on the section on Chrysippus]
- Kamtekar, R. 'Stoic Emotion: The Why and the How of Eliminating All Emotions', in *The Oxford Handbook of Hellenistic Philosophy* (OUP 2025), pp. 426-446.

### **Weeks 5-8: topics TBD, depending on student interest**

#### **Plato and Literature**

Prof Dominic Scott

Weeks 1-8 / Wednesdays/ 14:00-16:00

Location: Schwarzman Centre - Seminar Room (10.303)

In this seminar we shall look at Plato's attitudes to literature, specifically to poetry, tragedy and comedy. He is notorious for having banned almost all forms of poetry and drama from the ideal state in the tenth book of the *Republic*. So one task before us will be to understand the nature and quality of his arguments for this position. But we shall also be asking about what forms of literature he might still have deemed permissible. This question is especially pertinent given that he himself is often held up as a literary writer, and we shall be looking at some cases of this to ask how such literary escapes his own strictures in *Rep. X*. We shall also be looking at certain points in the reception of Plato's philosophy, two examples where well-known literary figures found their inspiration from Platonic philosophy. Given his attitude to literature in the *Republic*, this may initially strike one as ironic.

After a general introduction to the topic in the first session, we shall spend the next two analysing Plato's arguments for excluding poetry (Homer, tragedy and comedy) from the ideal state in *Republic* book X. In the following two sessions, we shall look at two points where Plato exhibits his literary side most clearly: his comic portrayal of the sophist Hippias in the *Hippias Major* and Socrates' famous speech about philosophical love in the *Phaedrus*, which was influenced by earlier literary works, including erotic poetry. In the rest of the seminar we shall turn to two novelists who were deeply influenced by Plato, Leo Tolstoy and Iris Murdoch, and examine how far their Platonism reaches into their fiction. In Murdoch's case we shall look at her novel *The Bell* alongside the philosophical essay 'The sovereignty of good'. In Tolstoy's case I shall concentrate on one of his shorter works, his novella *The Kreutzer Sonata*, along with another novella, *Master and Man*. I shall also make reference to his two most famous novels, *War and Peace* and *Anna Karenina*, to bring out the sheer extent of his Platonism, though there is no need to read these in advance of the seminar.

#### **Provisional Schedule:**

1. (21<sup>st</sup> Jan) Introduction: overview of Plato's discussions of literature (poetry and drama) in the *Ion*, *Republic II-III*, and *Laws II*.
2. (21<sup>st</sup> Jan) The critique of poetry in *Republic X*.
3. (4<sup>th</sup> Feb) The critique of poetry in *Republic X* (cont.).
4. (11<sup>th</sup> Feb) Comedy in the *Hippias Major*.
5. (18<sup>th</sup> Feb) The use of poetic imagery in the *Phaedrus*.
6. (25<sup>th</sup> Feb) Tolstoy's Platonism.
7. (4<sup>th</sup> Mar) Tolstoy's Platonism (cont.).

8. (11<sup>th</sup> Mar) Murdoch's Platonism: the case of *The Bell*.

## Reading

In the seminar, I shall maintain a focus on primary texts. From **Plato**, this will include:

- *Republic*, books II 377d–III 403c; book X, esp. 595a–608b (though the remainder of the book, 608c–621d (the myth of the after-life will be relevant to our interests).
- *Phaedrus*, esp. Socrates' second speech on love (244a–257b), but the opening of the work (227a–230e) is also important.
- *Ion*.
- *Hippias Major*.
- *Laws* II 652a–671a (on art and education), esp. 652a–657c; VII 814d–817e (on comedy and tragedy).

## Tolstoy

- *The Kreutzer Sonata*.
- *Master and Man*.

These can be found in: Tolstoy, L. (2010) *The Death of Ivan Ilyich and Other Stories*. Trans. R. Pevear and L. Volokhonsky. London: Vintage Books.

## Murdoch

- Murdoch, I. (2019) *The Bell*. London: Vintage.
- 'The sovereignty of good over other concepts'. This essay can be found in Murdoch, I. (1970) *The Sovereignty of Good*. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 75–101.

Further reading will appear on ORLO next term.

## Vacation reading

If you would like to get ahead on some reading over the vacation, I suggest focusing on:

- Plato: *Republic* X, 595a–608b and *Phaedrus* 244a–257b.
- Tolstoy: *Master and Man* or *The Kreutzer Sonata*.
- Murdoch: *The Bell*.

If you want some secondary reading on Plato over the vacation, you could try some of:

- Burnyeat, M. 'Culture and society in Plato's *Republic*'. This can be found in: Burnyeat, M., Atack, C., Schofield, M., & Sedley, D. (2022) *Explorations in Ancient and Modern Philosophy*. Vol. 3. Cambridge University Press, ch. 8:154–238.
- Moss, J. (2007) 'What is imitative poetry and why is it bad?' In G. Ferrari, (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Plato's Republic*. Cambridge University Press, 415–44.
- Scott, D. (2016) 'From painters to poets: Plato's methods in *Republic* X', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, vol. 116: 289–309.

## History and Totality

Prof Paul Lodge and Prof Alex Prescott-Couch

Weeks 1-8 / Thursdays/ 11:00-13:00

Location: Mansfield College (Seminar Room East)

**Summary:** This seminar considers the concept of “totality” in philosophy and social thought. Should societies be thought of as unified social wholes, or does such thinking obscure difference and plurality in human communities? Are there overarching narratives to be found in human history, or is there no deeper “sense” to be made of the past? How should these questions be understood, and what is at stake in them?

While the concept of “totality” has its roots in Western Marxism, the assumptions that society is or should be a unified whole can be found in parts of analytic political philosophy, as well as much social and historical thinking. The seminar will consider the above questions by considering both defenders and critics of “totalizing” social theories. Readings will include Hegel, Durkheim, Nietzsche, Benjamin, and some contemporary authors.

### Reading list:

#### **Week 1: Introduction**

- Martin Jay, *Marxism and Totality*, Introduction, Epilogue
- Rawls, *Justice as Fairness*, Part I, §1 (“Four Roles for Political Philosophy”)
- Gombrich, *In Search of Cultural History*, part I

#### **Week 2: Synchronic Totality: Hegel on Reconciliation**

- Hardimon, “The Project of Reconciliation: Hegel’s Social Philosophy,” *Philosophy and Public Affairs*
- Neuhouser, *Foundations of Hegel’s Social Theory*, chapter 4 (Objective Freedom, Part I The Self-Determining Social Whole)
- Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, selections

#### **Week 3: Diachronic Totality: Hegel on History**

- Pinkard, chapter 2 (“Building an Idealist Conception of History”) and chapter 4 (“Europe’s Logic”)
- Hegel, *The Philosophy of History*, selections

#### **Week 4: Social Pathology: Durkheim**

- Neuhouser, *Diagnosing Social Pathology*, Preface, chapter 1 and 2
- Durkheim, *The Division of Labour in Society*, selections

#### **Week 5: James Scott: Seeing Like a State**

- James Scott, *Seeing Like a State*, Introduction, Chapter 1, Chapter 4, Conclusion

#### **Week 6: Benjamin on History**

- Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History” and “Paris: Capital of the 19<sup>th</sup> Century”
- Gregory Marks “Reading Walter Benjamin’s Theses on the Concept of History”

### **Week 7: Nietzsche: Genealogy Against Totality**

- Nietzsche, *Genealogy of Morality*, Preface, GM I (skim rest if you haven't read it)
- Prescott-Couch, "Nietzsche and the Significance of Genealogy"
- Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History"

### **Week 8: Genealogy and Synoptic Understanding**

- Prescott-Couch, "Genealogy and Synoptic Understanding" (unpublished manuscript)

## **Philosophy of Science**

Dr Sophie Allen

Weeks 1-8 / Mondays / 14:00-16:00

Location: St Peter's College

In this BPhil seminar, we will discuss a variety of topics from the contemporary literature. The seminars are intended primarily for students doing the BPhil in Philosophy and the MSt in Philosophy of Physics, but all interested and engaged participants are welcome. Each week, the topic will be introduced with a short presentation given by one of the participants (with the convenor presenting for the first week).

Below are the proposed topics for the term in the anticipated order. Readings and topics might be adjusted to reflect the abilities and research interests of the class, but please do not skip seminars because you think that it will be on an area of science you know nothing about: specialisation is not required to come along and discuss philosophical problems.

Those attending the class should be sure to have read the essential reading(s) for each session in advance as the aim is to take a critical approach to topics raised in the readings below. Some background reading and some further reading might also be suggested. These seminars will be held weekly at St Peter's College but please make sure that the convenor has your email address to get updates on the programme.

### **1. Reference over theory-change**

Essential readings:

- Stein, H. 1989. Yes, but... Some skeptical remarks on realism and anti-realism. *Dialectica* 43: 47–65. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/42970610>
- Myrvold, W. 2019. “—It would be possible to do a lengthy dialectical number on this;” Preprint (2019), available at: <http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/16675/>

### **2. Varieties of reduction**

Essential readings:

- Lewis, D. K., 'How to define theoretical terms', *Journal of Philosophy* 67 (1970), pp. 427–446. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2023861>
- Dizadji-Bahmani, F., Frigg, R. & Hartmann, S. 2010. Who's afraid of Nagelian reduction? *Erkenntnis* 73: 393–412. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-010-9239-x>

Background:

- Schaffner, K. F. 1967. Approaches to reduction. *Philosophy of science* 34: 137–147.  
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/186101>

### 3. Data vs. phenomena

Essential readings:

- Bogen, J. & Woodward, J. 1988. Saving the phenomena. *The Philosophical Review* 97: 303–352. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2185445>
- Glymour, B. 2000. Data and Phenomena: A Distinction Reconsidered. *Erkenntnis* 52: 29–37. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20012966>

### 4. Theoretical equivalence

Essential readings:

- Glymour, C. 1970. Theoretical realism and theoretical equivalence', *PSA: Proceedings of the biennial meeting of the philosophy of science association*. Vol. 1970. (D. Reidel Publishing, 1970). <https://www.jstor.org/stable/495769>
- Coffey, Kevin (2014). Theoretical Equivalence as Interpretative Equivalence. *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 65 (4): 821-844.  
<https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.1093/bjps/axt034>

### Additional Reading

- Barrett, T. W. and Halvorson, H. 2016. Glymour and Quine on theoretical equivalence. *Journal of Philosophical Logic* 45(5): 467-483.  
<https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10992-015-9382-6>
- Teitel, Trevor. 2021. What Theoretical Equivalence Could Not Be. *Philosophical Studies* 178 (12): 4119-4149. <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-021-01639-8>

### 5. Structural Realism

Essential Reading:

- Ainsworth, P M. 2010. What is Ontic Structural Realism? *Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics* 41: 50–57.  
<https://doi-org.ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/10.1016/j.shpsb.2009.11.001>
- Chakravarthy, Anjan. 2004. Structuralism as a form of Scientific Realism. *International Studies in the Philosophy of Science* 18: 151-171.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/0269859042000296503>

Background:

- Worrall, J. 1989. Structural Realism: The Best of Both Worlds? *Dialectica* 43: 99-124.  
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/42970613>
- Ladyman, James and Don Ross (with John Collier and David Spurrett). 2007. *Every Thing*

*Must Go*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Especially chapters 2 and 3.  
[https://solo.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/permalink/44OXF\\_INST/35n82s/alma991022131312107026](https://solo.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/permalink/44OXF_INST/35n82s/alma991022131312107026)

## 6. Natural Kinds, Interactive Kinds and Property Clusters

Essential reading:

- Boyd, R. 1991. Realism, anti-foundationalism, and the enthusiasm for natural kinds. *Philosophical Studies* 61: 127–148. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/4320174>
- Khalidi, M. A. 2010. Interactive kinds. *The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 61: 335–60. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/40664352>

## 7. Evolution

Essential reading:

- Lewens, Tim. The Extended Evolutionary Synthesis: what is the debate about, and what might success for the extenders look like?, **Biological Journal of the Linnean Society**, Volume 127, Issue 4, August 2019, Pages 707–721, <https://doi.org/10.1093/biolinnean/blz064>

## 8. Nancy Cartwright: Fundamentalism vs the Patchwork of Laws

Essential reading:

- Cartwright, Nancy 1999. Fundamentalism vs the Patchwork of Laws, which is chapter 1 in: *The Dappled World: A Study of the Boundaries of Science*. Cambridge University Press. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4545199>

Additional Reading:

- Strevens, Michael. 2017. Dappled Science in a Unified World. In *Philosophy of Science in Practice*. Springer Verlag. (PDF available at: <http://www.strevens.org/research/lawmech/dappellation.shtml>)
- McArthur, Dan. 2006. Contra Cartwright: Structural Realism, Ontological Pluralism and Fundamentalism About Laws. *Synthese* 151 (2): 233-255.
- Hoefer, Carl. 2003. For fundamentalism. *Philosophy of Science* 70 (5):1401–1412.

## Epistemology

Prof Bernhard Salow

Weeks 1-8 / Thursdays/ 09:00-11:00

Location: Schwarzman Centre (Ryle Room)

We will read and discuss a selection of recent work on knowledge, inquiry, and belief. One overarching question is whether there is an important sense in which inquiry or belief *aim at* knowledge. Another thematic question is whether there are epistemically important knowledge-like states (such as certainty, iterated knowledge, or a particular form of rational belief) which knowledge does not guarantee.

Here is a provisional schedule for the term:

**Week 1:** Christoph Kelp (2021) *Inquiry, Knowledge, and Understanding*, chapter 1; Jane Friedman (2017) “Why Suspend Judging?” *Noûs* 51 (2):302-326

**Week 2:** Elise Woodard (2024) “Why Double-Check?” *Episteme* 21 (2):644-667

**Week 3:** Jeremy Goodman and Ben Holguín (2022) “Thinking and Being Sure” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 106 (3):634-654

**Week 4:** Sam Carter and John Hawthorne (2024) “Dogmatism and Inquiry” *Mind* 133 (531):651-676

**Week 5:** Bernhard Salow (forthcoming) “Iterated Knowledge isn’t Better Knowledge” *Journal of Philosophy*

**Week 6:** Jane Friedman (2024) “The Aim of Inquiry?” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 108 (2):506-523

**Week 7:** Julien Dutant and Clayton Littlejohn (2024) “What is Rational Belief?” *Noûs* 58 (2):333-359

**Week 8:** Maria Lasonen (2025) “Knowledge-Conducive Dispositions: How to do Consequentialist Epistemology” *Synthese* 205 (3):1-23

## Distinctions in Theoretical Philosophy

Prof Ofra Magidor and Prof Nick Jones

Weeks 1-8 / Wednesdays/ 11:00-13:00

Location: Schwarzman Centre (Ryle Room)

Philosophical progress often arises from making new distinctions between notions that were previously run together. In this class we will examine a range of interesting and potentially fruitful distinctions in theoretical philosophy. A tentative list of topics and suggested readings for each appears below. (Students are not expected to read all of the proposed papers, but having a look at least one item before each class will help students make more effective use of the time.)

In the final meeting, students will work in pairs to give a short introduction to a philosophical distinction of their choice. These distinctions may come from any area of philosophy.

### **Week 1: Varieties of Worlds**

- Stalnaker, Robert C. (1976). 'Possible Worlds'. *Noûs* 10: 65-75. Reprinted as ch. 1 of his *Ways a World Might Be*
- Salmon, Nathan (1989). 'The Logic of What Might Have Been', *Philosophical Review* 98: 3-34.
- Stalnaker, Robert C. (2010). 'Merely Possible Propositions', in Bob Hale & Aviv Hoffmann (eds.), *Modality: Metaphysics, Logic, and Epistemology*. Oxford University Press. pp. 21-32.

### **Week 2: Varieties of Meaning**

- Strawson, P.F (1950), 'On referring', *Mind* 59: 320-344.
- Sections I-VI of Kaplan, D. (1989), 'Demonstratives: an essay on the semantics, logic, metaphysics and epistemology of demonstratives and other indexicals', In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.) *Themes From Kaplan*, Oxford University Press. pp. 481-563.
- Abrusán, M. (2022), 'Presuppositions', In Daniel Altshuler (ed.), *Linguistics meets philosophy* Cambridge University Press.

### **Week 3: Varieties of Belief**

- Gendler, Tamar (2008). 'Alief and Belief', *Journal of Philosophy* 105: 634-663.
- Goodman, Jeremy (2023). 'The Myth of Full Belief', *Philosophical Perspectives* 37: 164-171.
- Jackson, Elizabeth G. (2020). 'The Relationship Between Belief and Credence', *Philosophy Compass* 15: 1-13.

### **Week 4: Varieties of Indeterminacy**

- Williams, J. Robert G. (2008). 'Ontic Vagueness and Metaphysical Indeterminacy', *Philosophy Compass* 3: 763-788.
- Field, Hartry (1994). 'Disquotational Truth and Factually Defective Discourse', *Philosophical Review* 103: 405-452. Reprinted as ch. 8 of Field, Hartry (2001), *Truth and the Absence of Fact*. Oxford University Press.
  - For a shorter read, finish at the end of section 3, "Non-Factual Discourse: Introduction".

### **Week 5: Varieties of Reasons**

- Hawthorne, J. and Magidor, O. (2018). 'Reflections on the Ideology of Reasons', in Star. D. (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity*, OUP: 113-140.
- Reisner, A. (2018). 'Pragmatic Reasons for Belief', in Star. D. (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity*, OUP: 705-728.

### **Week 6: Varieties of Supervenience**

- Kim, Jaegwon (1990). 'Supervenience as a Philosophical Concept'. *Metaphilosophy* 21: 1-27. Reprinted with additional postscripts as ch. 8 of Kim, Jaegwon (1993), *Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophical Essays*. Cambridge University Press.
- Leuenberger, S. (2008). 'Supervenience in Metaphysics', *Philosophy Compass* 3: 749-762.
- Shagrir, O. (2013). 'Concepts of Supervenience Revisited', *Erkenntnis* 78: 469-485.

### **Week 7: Varieties of Metaphysical Structure**

- Raven, Michael J. (2015). 'Ground', *Philosophy Compass* 10: 322-333.
- Fine, Kit (2012). 'Guide to Ground', In Fabrice Correia & Benjamin Schnieder (eds.), *Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the Structure of Reality*. Cambridge University Press. pp. 37-80.
  - For a shorter read, skip pp. 54-74 on the logic and semantics of ground.

### **Week 8: Varieties of Distinctions**

Distinctions to be introduced by students.

## **Advanced Topics in Normative Ethics**

Prof Hilary Greaves

Weeks 1-8 / Mondays/ 14:00-16:00

Location: Schwarzman Centre - Seminar Room (10.303)

This seminar will read and discuss key literature on a selection of advanced topics in ethics, including both "normative ethics proper" and more structural topics. The seminar is likely to be especially of interest to students specialising in ethics (and others aiming to write papers in ethics), but every effort will be made to make the seminar also accessible to non-specialists.

The following outline is provisional and subject to change; please consult Canvas for the final week-by-week list of topics and readings.

Week 1: Objective and subjective "ought"s

Week 2: Beyond "naive" act-consequentialism: Rule-, two-level and global consequentialism

Week 3: Paternalism

Week 4: Willing servitude and the ethics of artificial intelligence

Week 5: Kamm's "intransitivity paradox" and related puzzles

Week 6: Justifying and requiring reasons

Week 7: Betterness and preferences

Week 8: The "reasons turn" in ethics

Meetings of the seminar will presuppose that attendees have pre-read the materials that are designated as required reading for the session in question. Students attending the session for Week 1 should consult Canvas ahead of time for the reading list for that week.

## **Ethics and Intimacy**

Prof Jeremy Fix

Weeks 2, 4-8 / Tuesdays/ 14:00-16:00

Location: Schwarzman Centre (Ryle Room)

Weeks 1, 3 TBC

We shall look at some recent essays on the nature of intimate relationships (friendship and romance) and its relationship to morality. Authors may include Sandy Diehl, Daniela Dover, Kyla Ebels-Duggan, Barbara Herman, Niko Kolodny, Christine Korsgaard, Onora O'Neill, Kieran Setiya, Amia Srinivasan, David Velleman, and Quinn White.

No previous experience required.

Please note that I will be travelling in first and third weeks and will need to reschedule those meetings of the seminars as works with the schedules of the attendees. The first meeting of this seminar will be in second week.

## **Authoritative Normativity**

Dr Lewis Williams

Weeks 1-3, 6-8 / Fridays / 14:00-16:00

Week 5 Thursdays / 16:00-18:00

Location: Schwarzman Centre (Ryle Room)

### Overview

#### **Course Description**

Moral norms prohibit murder. Norms of etiquette prohibit teacups being held with the pinky finger extended at afternoon tea. The former seem to matter in a way that the latter do not. Contemporary meta-ethicists have attempted to explain this difference by distinguishing between “authoritative” and merely “formal” normativity—moral norms are authoritative, whereas norms of (e.g.,) etiquette are merely formal. This class will critically examine the concept of authoritative normativity. The class will begin by evaluating attempts to make sense of authoritative normativity, and later classes will investigate the relationship between authoritative normativity, deliberation, and first-order normative theorizing.

### Schedule

#### **Week 1: Over-Ridingness (featuring a Q&A with Prof. Dale Dorsey)**

Core readings:

- Sarah Stroud, “Moral Overridingness and Moral Theory”.
- Dale Dorsey, “Weak Anti-Rationalism and the Demands of Morality”.

Further readings:

- Dale Dorsey, “The Limits of Moral Authority”.

#### **Week 2: Deflationism**

Core readings:

- Philippa Foot, “Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives”.
- Derek Baker, “Skepticism about Ought Simpliciter”.

Further readings:

- David Copp, “The Ring of Gyges: Overridingness and the Unity of Reason”.
- Evan Tiffany, “Deflationary Normative Pluralism”.

#### **Week 3: Characterizing Authoritative Normativity**

Core readings:

- Tristram McPherson, “Authoritatively Normative Concepts”.
- Daniel Wodak, “Mere Formalities: Fictional Normativity and Normative Authority”.

Further readings:

- Tristram McPherson and David Plunkett, “The Fragmentation of Authoritative Normativity”.

## **Week 4: No Class**

### **Week 5: Deliberative Indispensability (*featuring a Q&A with Prof. David Enoch*)**

Core readings:

- David Enoch, “Taking Morality Seriously”. Chapter 3 and Section 5.1 (pp. 100-109) only.
- James Lenman, “Deliberation, Schmeliberation: Enoch’s Indispensability Argument”.
- David Enoch, “In defense of Taking Morality Seriously: reply to Manne, Sobel, Lenman, and Joyce”. Section 3 (pp. 859-861) only.

Further readings:

- Stan Husi, “Why Reasons Skepticism is Not Self-Defeating”.
- Tristram McPherson and David Plunkett, “Deliberative Indispensability and Epistemic Justification”.

### **Week 6: Deliberating without Normativity**

Core readings:

- Olle Risberg, “Ethics and the Question of What to Do”.
- Lewis Williams, “Deliberative Extra-Normativism”.

Further readings:

- Matti Eklund, “Choosing Normative Concepts”. Chapters 1-3.
- Justin Clarke-Doane, “Morality and Mathematics”. Chapter 6.

### **Week 7: Meta-Normative Uncertainty (*featuring a Q&A with Prof. Guy Kahane*)**

Core readings:

- Guy Kahane, “If Nothing Matters”.
- Lewis Williams, “Beyond Normativity”.

Further readings:

- Jacob Ross, “Rejecting Ethical Deflationism”.
- William MacAskill, “The Infectiousness of Nihilism”.

### **Week 8: Meta-Ethical Pluralism**

Core readings:

- Don Loeb, Michael Gill, and Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, chapter 7 of “Moral Psychology, Volume 2: The Cognitive Science of Morality: Intuition and Diversity”.

Further readings:

- Thomas Pötzler and Jennifer Cole Wright, “Empirical Research on Folk Moral Objectivism”.

## Philosophy of Intelligence

Prof Carlotta Pavese and Dr Raphaël Millière

Weeks 1-8 / Tuesdays / 16:00-18:00

Location: Schwarzman Centre - Lecture Theatre L1 (10.300)

### Course Overview

This seminar examines philosophical questions regarding the nature, measurement, and attribution of intelligence across humans, non-human animals, and artificial systems.

### Where and when

Tuesdays 16-18 Hilary Term 2026

Lecture Theatre 10100 L1

Schwarzman Center

Oxford

### Outline

Lecture 1 – What is intelligence? Conceptual Foundations (Carlotta Pavese)

Lecture 2 – Behaviorism, Functionalism, and Internal Processes (Raphaël Millière)

Lecture 3 – The Philosophy of Psychometrics (Carlotta Pavese)

Lecture 4 – Comparative Cognition Across Biological Minds and AI (Raphaël Millière)

Lecture 5 – Human Intelligence (Carlotta Pavese)

Lecture 6 – Artificial intelligence I (Raphaël Millière)

Lecture 7 – Intelligence and Skill (Carlotta Pavese)

Lecture 8 – The Jagged Frontier of AI (Raphaël Millière)

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### Lecture 1: What is Intelligence? Conceptual Foundations

This opening lecture offers an overview of the seminar and then goes on to address the fundamental question of how intelligence should be defined and whether it constitutes a coherent scientific category. We examine competing approaches: folk psychological conceptions that vary across cultures, behavioral characterizations designed for scientific integration, and questions about whether intelligence is a natural kind amenable to scientific investigation.

### Core Questions

What do ordinary people mean when they attribute intelligence?

Can we provide a scientifically useful characterization of intelligence that is species-neutral and origin-neutral?

Is intelligence a natural kind, a homeostatic property cluster, or something else entirely?

### Primary Readings

Curry, D.S. (2021). Street smarts. *Synthese*. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02641-z>

Coelho Mollo, D. (2022). Intelligent Behaviour. *Erkenntnis*. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-022-00552-8>

### Secondary Readings

Serpico, D. (2017). What Kind of Kind is Intelligence? *Philosophical Psychology*.

<https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2017.140170>

Hand, M. (2007). The concept of intelligence. *London Review of Education*, 5(1).

Ryle, G. (1949). Chapter 2 of The Concept of Mind.

Ryle, G. (1974). "Intelligence and the Logic of the Nature-Nurture Issue. Reply to JP White." *Journal of Philosophy of Education*, 8(1): 52–60.

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### **Lecture 2: Behaviorism, Functionalism, and Internal Processes**

This lecture examines whether intelligence can be characterized purely in terms of behavioral capacities or whether the internal processes generating behavior are essential to intelligence. We consider Turing's influential proposal for an operational test of machine intelligence and Block's argument that behavioral equivalence is insufficient—that genuine intelligence depends on the character of internal information processing.

#### *Core Questions*

Does the Turing Test adequately capture intelligence?

Can two systems be behaviorally identical yet differ in intelligence?

What role do internal computational processes play in constituting intelligence?

#### *Primary Readings*

Turing, A.M. (1950). Computing Machinery and Intelligence. *Mind*.  
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/2251299>

Block, N. (1981). Psychologism and Behaviorism. *The Philosophical Review*.  
<https://doi.org/10.2307/2184371>

#### *Secondary Readings*

Kipper, J. (2021). Intuition, intelligence, data compression. *Synthese*.  
<https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02118-8>

Dennet, D. (1996). Cow-sharks, magnets, and swampman. *Mind and Language*, 11, 76-77.

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### **Lecture 3: The Philosophy of Psychometrics**

This lecture critically reviews psychometric approaches to human intelligence. We examine the operationalist foundations of IQ testing, the question of what IQ tests actually measure, and whether correlational evidence can validate the claim that IQ tests measure intelligence. We then turn to heritability research, clarifying what heritability estimates do and do not tell us, addressing common misinterpretations, and considering the ethical responsibilities of researchers investigating sensitive questions.

#### *Core Questions*

What philosophical assumptions underlie IQ testing?

Can correlations between IQ and life outcomes validate IQ as a measure of intelligence?

What do IQ tests actually measure, if not (primarily) intelligence?

What does "heritability" mean, and what can we infer from heritability estimates?

Can within-group heritability tell us anything about between-group differences?

What are the ethical responsibilities of researchers investigating sensitive questions?

#### *Primary Readings*

Block, N.J. & Dworkin, G. (1974). IQ: Heritability and Inequality, Part 1. *Philosophy & Public*

Affairs. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2264953>

Block, N.J. & Dworkin, G. (1974). IQ, Heritability and Inequality, Part 2. *Philosophy & Public Affairs*. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2265104>

#### *Secondary Readings*

Curry, D. S. (2021). G as Bridge Model. *Philosophy of Science*, 88(5), 1067–1078.

<https://doi.org/10.1086/714879>

De Boeck, P., Robert Gore, L., Gonzalez, T., & San Martin, E. (2020). An Alternative View on the Measurement of Intelligence and Its History. In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), *The Cambridge Handbook of Intelligence*. Cambridge University Press.

<https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108770422>

Curry, D. S. (2025). On IQ and other sciencey descriptions of minds. *Philosophers' Imprint*.

Sternberg, R. J. (2015). Successful intelligence: A model for testing intelligence beyond IQ tests. *European Journal of Education and Psychology*, 8(2), 76-84.

Richardson, K. (2002). What IQ tests test. *Theory & Psychology*, 12(3), 283-314.

Gardner, H. (1987). The theory of multiple intelligences. *Annals of dyslexia*, 19-35.

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## **Lecture 4: Animal Intelligence**

This lecture examines intelligence in non-human animals, addressing both methodological foundations and substantive questions about animal minds. We examine Morgan's Canon—the principle that animal behavior should not be explained by appeal to higher faculties if explicable by lower ones—alongside the complementary danger of “anthropofabulation”. We then consider what we can reasonably infer about animal cognition given the underdetermination problem, and examine the evolutionary history of intelligence.

#### *Core Questions*

What justifies Morgan's Canon, and how should we understand “higher” and “lower” faculties?

What is anthropofabulation and how does it distort comparative research?

How can we overcome underdetermination in attributing cognition to animals?

Do animals reason about unobservable variables like mental states and causal forces?

What does evolutionary reconstruction tell us about animal intelligence?

#### *Primary Readings*

Sober, E. (1998). Morgan's Canon. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*.

Buckner, C. (2013). Morgan's Canon, meet Hume's Dictum: avoiding anthropofabulation in cross-species comparisons. *Biology & Philosophy*. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-013-9376-0>

#### *Secondary Readings*

Halina, M. (2024). *Animal Minds*. Cambridge Elements.

<https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009438636>

Andrews, K. & Monsó, S. (2021). Animal Cognition. *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2021/entries/cognition-animal/>

Bates, L.A. & Byrne, R.W. (2020). The Evolution of Intelligence. In Sternberg (Ed.), *Cambridge Handbook of Intelligence*.

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## Lecture 5: Human Intelligence

What makes human intelligence unique, if anything? This lecture examines the relationship between learning, cognitive development, and the distinctiveness of human cognition. We start with the proposal that learning serves as the fundamental criterion of intelligence. We review developmental evidence from infancy and childhood showing that humans are remarkable learners from the earliest stages of life. We also discuss competing explanations of the uniqueness of human intelligence: is it due from a qualitative change introduced by language, or to quantitative increases in information-processing capacity over time? What does it mean to say that human behavior is flexible or especially so? What kind of flexibility is, if at all, a mark of intelligence?

### Core Questions

- Is learning the fundamental criterion of intelligence?
- What do infant and child cognition reveal about the foundations of intelligence?
- Does language qualitatively transform human cognition, or is human uniqueness a matter of degree?
- Can quantitative differences in information-processing capacity explain the full range of human cognitive achievements?
- Is flexibility fundamental for intelligent behavior? How should we understand the flexibility of intelligent behavior?

### Primary Readings

- Fridland, E. (2015). Learning Our Way to Intelligence: Reflections on Dennett and Appropriateness. [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-17374-0\\_8](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-17374-0_8)
- Dennett, D.C. (1994). The Role of Language in Intelligence. In Khalfa (Ed.), *What is Intelligence?*
- Frensch, P. A., & Sternberg, R. J. (2014). Expertise and intelligent thinking: When is it worse to know better?. In *Advances in the psychology of human intelligence* (pp. 157-188). Psychology Press.

### Secondary Readings

- Bornstein, M.H. (2020). Intelligence in Infancy. In Sternberg (Ed.), *Cambridge Handbook of Intelligence*.
- Gelman, S.A. & DeJesus, J.M. (2020). Intelligence in Childhood. In Sternberg (Ed.), *Cambridge Handbook of Intelligence*. <https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108770422>
- Cantlon, J.F. & Piantadosi, S.T. (2024). Uniquely human intelligence arose from expanded information capacity. *Nature Reviews Psychology*. <https://doi.org/10.1038/s44159-024-00283-3>
- Gopnik, A., O'Grady, S., Lucas, C. G., Griffiths, T. L., Wente, A., Bridgers, S., ... & Dahl, R. E. (2017). Changes in cognitive flexibility and hypothesis search across human life history from childhood to adolescence to adulthood. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 114(30), 7892-7899.
- Kilov, D. (2021). The brittleness of expertise and why it matters. *Synthese*, 199(1), 3431-3455.
- Hauser, M. D., Chomsky, N., & Fitch, W. T. (2002). The faculty of language: what is it, who has it, and how did it evolve?. *science*, 298(5598), 1569-1579.

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## Lecture 6: Comparative Cognition Across Biological Minds and AI

This lecture examines methodological challenges that arise when comparing intelligence across humans, animals, and artificial systems.

### Core Questions

How can behavioral evidence constrain inferences about underlying cognitive mechanisms across biological and artificial intelligence?

How can the signature testing approach apply to artificial systems?

How do auxiliary task demands affect performance independently of competence?

What forms of anthropocentric biases affect comparisons between biological and artificial intelligence?

### Primary Readings

Taylor, A.H. et al. (2022). The signature-testing approach to mapping biological and artificial intelligences. *Trends in Cognitive Sciences*. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2022.06.002>

Millière, R. & Rathkopf, C. (2025). Anthropocentric bias in language model evaluation. *Computational Linguistics*. <https://doi.org/10.1162/COLI.a.582>

Harding, J., & Sharadin, N. (2024). What is It for a Machine Learning Model to Have a Capability? *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*.

### Secondary Readings

Halina, M. (2023). Methods in Comparative Cognition. *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2023/entries/comparative-cognition/>

Firestone, C. (2020). Performance vs. Competence in human–machine comparisons. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 117(43), 26562–26571. <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1905334117>

Frank, M. C. (2023). Baby steps in evaluating the capacities of large language models. *Nature Reviews Psychology*, 2(8), Article 8. <https://doi.org/10.1038/s44159-023-00211-x>

Hu, J. & Frank, M.C. (2024). Auxiliary task demands mask the capabilities of smaller language models. *OpenReview*. <https://openreview.net/forum?id=U5BUzSn4tD>

Lampinen, A. (2024). Can Language Models Handle Recursively Nested Grammatical Structures? A Case Study on Comparing Models and Humans. *Computational Linguistics*, 50(4), 1441–1476. [https://doi.org/10.1162/coli\\_a\\_00525](https://doi.org/10.1162/coli_a_00525)

Boyle, A. (2024). Disagreement & classification in comparative cognitive science. *Noûs*. <https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12480>

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## Lecture 7: Intelligence and Skills

This lecture discusses the relation between skills and intelligence. Should we understand intelligence in terms of skills and of intelligent behavior in terms of skillful behavior? What difficulties stand in the way of this reduction? Is skillful behavior uniformly intelligent? Or should we only consider *some* kind of skillful behavior as properly speaking intelligent? We discuss the view that intellectual skills have a privileged connection to intelligence over practical and embodied skills, and the role of the distinction between different kinds of knowledge in accounts of intelligence.

### Core Questions

Is there a principled distinction between "intellectual" and "practical" intelligence?  
Are theoretical skills more central to intelligence than embodied skills?  
Can reflexes be intelligent, and what does this reveal about the nature of intelligence?  
Does the automatization of skill through practice preserve or eliminate intelligence?  
What is the relation between skills and other intelligent capacities, such as intelligent reflex and intelligent habits? Are skills just well trained habits? Or should we think of skills and habits as different kinds of capacities?

### Primary Readings

Pavese, C. (2024). Intelligence Socialism. *Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind*.

Krakauer, J.W. (2019). The Intelligent Reflex. *Philosophical Psychology*.

<https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2019.1607281>

### Secondary Readings

Christensen, W., Sutton, J., & McIlwain, D. J. (2016). "Cognition in skilled action: Meshed control and the varieties of skill experience." *Mind & Language*, 31(1), 37-66.

Pavese, C. (forthcoming) Procedural Memory and Know-how. *Handbook of the Philosophy of Memory*.

Ryle (1949) Chapter 2 of the Concept of Mind.

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## Lecture 8: The Jagged Frontier of AI

This lecture addresses questions specific to artificial intelligence, with particular attention to the puzzling capability profile of state-of-the-art AI systems. Current AI models achieve or exceed human-level performance on an impressive range of benchmarks yet exhibit striking weaknesses on comparatively simple tasks that are trivial for humans. Given this "jagged frontier" of capabilities, should we conclude that these systems lack intelligence altogether, or that they occupy a new and previously unexplored region within a broader "intelligence space"? We also revisit insights from previous weeks by contrasting crystallized skill with adaptive intelligence, and evaluating whether AI models exhibit genuine generalization to new problems or merely sophisticated statistical interpolation within the boundaries of their training data. Finally, we consider new developments in embodied AI systems in light of our previous discussion of the relationship between embodied skills and intelligence.

### Core Questions

What should we conclude from the "jagged" capabilities of AI systems: striking performance on some tasks alongside brittle failure on others?

How should we operationalize and measure generalization, in a way that supports fair comparisons across systems with radically different training histories?  
Is “general intelligence” (and especially “AGI”) a coherent scientific target, or a moving label shaped by shifting definitions, incentives, and benchmark selection?  
What is the relationship between embodiment and intelligence in AI?

#### Primary Readings

Mollo, D. C. (2025). AI-as-exploration: Navigating intelligence space. *Theoria. an International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science*.  
<https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.25837>

Millière, R. & Buckner, C. (forthcoming). *Generative Artificial Intelligence*, Chapter 2 (“Generation and Generalization”), Cambridge University Press.

#### Secondary Readings

Chollet, F. (2019). On the Measure of Intelligence. *arXiv*. <https://arxiv.org/abs/1911.01547>

Dretske, F. (1993). Can Intelligence Be Artificial? *Philosophical Studies*.  
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/4320430>

Jones, C. R., Rathi, I., Taylor, S., & Bergen, B. K. (2025). People cannot distinguish GPT-4 from a human in a turing test. Proceedings of the 2025 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency, 1615–1639. <https://doi.org/10.1145/3715275.3732108>

Mitchell, M. (2024). The Turing Test and our shifting conceptions of intelligence. *Science*, 385(6710), eadq9356. <https://doi.org/10.1126/science.adq9356>

Mitchell, M. (2024). Debates on the nature of artificial general intelligence. *Science*, 383(6689), eado7069. <https://doi.org/10.1126/science.ado7069>

Mitchell, M. (2025). Artificial intelligence learns to reason. *Science*, 387(6740), eadw5211. <https://doi.org/10.1126/science.adw5211>

Jin, S., Xu, J., Lei, Y., & Zhang, L. (2024). Reasoning grasping via multimodal large language model. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2402.06798*.

Brohan, A., Chebotar, Y., Finn, C., Hausman, K., Herzog, A., Ho, D., ... & Fu, C. K. (2023, March). Do as i can, not as i say: Grounding language in robotic affordances. In *Conference on robot learning* (pp. 287-318). PMLR.

## Fundamentals of Decision Theory

Dr Andreas Mogensen and Dr Teruji Thomas

Weeks 1-8 / Fridays / 09:00-11.00

Location: Schwarzman Centre (Ryle Room)

What makes for a rational decision? This class will introduce students to the philosophical foundations of decision theory. It will cover the distinction between ignorance and risk, subjective probability, utility, representation theorems, diachronic consistency, risk aversion, causal versus evidential decision theory, and incompleteness. The course will be of interest to students with a wide range of philosophical interests, including ethics, epistemology, the philosophy of science, the philosophy of economics, and political philosophy.

Students who are interested in doing some preliminary reading that gives a broad overview of the key topics to be covered in the course should have a look at:

- Lara Buchak (2016) Decision theory. In Hajek and Hitchcock, eds. *The Oxford handbook of probability and philosophy* (pp. 789-814). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

The course presupposes no prior knowledge of decision theory and aims instead to provide students with a solid foundation. The early weeks of the course are therefore organised around Resnik's introductory textbook *Choices*, which covers a number of foundational topics with appropriate technical rigour for an introductory course. (Feel free to skip the problem exercises in the book; we won't cover them.) The course will also be of interest to students with prior knowledge of this area who wish to deepen their understanding of core topics.

While the material covered can be technical, we have tried to keep complex formalisms to a minimum. The readings should generally require no mathematical expertise or ability beyond a standard high school education. Don't feel discouraged if you find some of the formal stuff hard going. We do so too - especially Andreas! It's a good idea to read slowly and carefully here. If you're patient with the material, it should start to sink in. If there's something you find really impenetrable, you should feel free to ask us about it via email or in class.

To get the most out of the class, you should do the key reading for each week. However, you generally won't feel completely lost if you haven't. Each session will be focused around a presentation of key ideas and results, led by either Andreas or Teru, interlaced with group discussion of the key philosophical controversies that arise. These classes are therefore more like a mix of a lecture and a seminar discussion than most graduate classes. The more expository material we'll present will try to contextualize and clarify the key issues arising in the readings, as well as noting additional points relevant to the topic that might not have been covered by the key readings. Each week also comes with a list of further reading, which should be of interest to students who want to dig deeper into a given topic.

We will make time in week 8 for short student presentations if there is interest. A presentation could involve early-stage research, a report on some part of the literature, or even a teaching demo.

The reading for the first week is as follows:

Week 1: Decision making under ignorance

Key reading:

- Michael Resnik (1987) *Choices: an introduction to decision theory*. Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press - pp. 6-14, and pp. 21 – 40.
- Roger White (2009) Evidential symmetry and mushy credence. In *Oxford Studies in Epistemology* 3, 161-186.

Further reading:

- Miriam Schoenfield (2012) Chilling out on epistemic rationality. *Philosophical Studies* 158: 197-219.
- James Joyce (2011) A defence of imprecise credences in inference and decision making. *Philosophical Perspectives* 24, 281-323
- Adam Elga (2010) Subjective probabilities should be sharp. *Philosophers' Imprint*
- Susanna Rinard (2015) A decision theory for imprecise probabilities. *Philosophers' Imprint*
- Bas Van Fraassen (1989) *Laws and symmetry*. Oxford: Oxford University Press - pp. 293-317.
- Jeffrey Mikkelsen (2004) Dissolving the wine/water paradox. *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 55, 137-145.
- John Norton (2008) Ignorance and indifference. *Philosophy of Science* 75, 46-68.
- Richard Pettigrew (2016) Accuracy, risk, and the Principle of Indifference. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 92, 35-59.

## Practical Ethics

Dr Lisa Forsberg

Weeks 1-8 / Wednesdays/ 14:00-16:00

Location: Schwarzman Centre (Ryle Room)

### Week 1: Achievement

#### CORE READING

Bradford, Gwen (2016) 'Achievement, Wellbeing, and Value', *Philosophical Compass* 11(12): 795–803

Forsberg, Lisa and Skelton, Anthony (2020) 'Achievement and enhancement', *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 50(3): 322–338

Hirji, Sukaina (2019) 'Not Always Worth the Effort: Difficulty and the Value of Achievement', *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 100 (2): 525-548

von Kriegstein, Hasko (2017) 'Effort and Achievement', *Utilitas* 29(1): 27–51

#### FURTHER READING

Keller, Simon (2004) 'Welfare and the Achievement of Goals', *Philosophical Studies* 121 (1): 27–41

Portmore, Douglas W. (2007) 'Welfare, Achievement, and Self-Sacrifice', *Journal of Ethics and*

Social Philosophy 2 (2): 1–28

## **Week 2: Death**

### CORE READING

Black, Isra (2025) 'Dual or single gauge? Govert den Hartogh's 'dual-track' assisted death' (2024) 45(1) *Filosofie en Pratijk*: 27-44,

<https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.5117/FEP2024.1.005.BLAC/dual-single-gauge-govert-den-hartogh-dual-track-assisted-death-isra-black>

Feldman, Fred, (1994) *Confrontations with the Reaper: A Philosophical Study of the Nature and Value of Death* (Oxford University Press), chapters 8 and 9

McMahan, Jeff (2008) 'Eating animals the nice way', *Daedalus* 137: 1–11

Tannenbaum, Julie and Jaworska, Agnieszka (2018) 'The Grounds of Moral Status', *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*

### FURTHER READING

Broome, John, 'The Badness of Death and the Goodness of Life', in Ben Bradley, Fred Feldman, and Jens Johansson (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Death*, Oxford Handbooks, 218–233

Glover, Jonathan (1977) *Causing death and saving lives* (Penguin): chapters 3, 14, 15

McMahan, Jeff (2008) 'Animals', in R. G. Frey and Christopher Heath Wellman, *A Companion to Applied Ethics* (Wiley-Blackwell): 525–536

Sumner, Wayne (2025) 'What's So Special About Medically Assisted Dying?', *Canadian Journal of Bioethics/Revue canadienne de bioéthique* 8 (4):16-20

## **Week 3: Killing and harming**

### CORE READING

Kamm, Frances M. (2011) *Ethics for Enemies: Terror, Torture, and War* (Oxford University Press): chapters 2 and 3

Lazar, Seth (2010) 'The responsibility dilemma for killing in war: A review essay', *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 38(2): 180-213

McMahan, Jeff (2005) 'The basis of moral liability to defensive killing', *Philosophical Issues* 15(1): 386–405

### FURTHER READING

McMahan, Jeff (2024) 'Proportionality and Necessity in Israel's Invasion of Gaza, 2023–2024', *Analyse & Kritik* 46(2): 387-407

Statman, Daniel (2025) 'McMahan on the War Against Hamas', *Analyse & Kritik* 47(1): 179-207

McMahan, Jeff (2025) 'A Reply to Statman's Defense of Israel's War in Gaza', *Analyse & Kritik* 47(1): 209-236

#### **Week 4: Saving and sacrifice**

##### CORE READING

Berkey, Brian (2018) 'The Institutional Critique of Effective Altruism', *Utilitas* 30(2): 143-171

Fabre Cécile (2003) 'Justice and the Compulsory Taking of Live Body Parts', *Utilitas* 15(2): 127-150

Horton, Joe (2017) 'The All or Nothing Problem', *Journal of Philosophy* 114(2): 94-104

Singer, Peter (1972) 'Famine, affluence, and morality', *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 1(3): 229-243

##### FURTHER READING

Fabre Cécile (2004) 'Justice and the Coercive Taking of Cadaveric Organs', *British Journal of Political Science*

Lippert-Rasmussen, Kasper (2008) 'Against self-ownership: There are no fact-insensitive ownership rights over one's body', *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 36(1): 86–118

#### **Week 5: Consent and acting on consent**

##### CORE READING

Bromwich, Danielle, and Joseph Millum (2018) 'Lies, Control, and Consent: A Response to Dougherty and Manson', *Ethics* 128(2): 446–61

Crisp, Roger. "Medical Negligence, Assault, Informed Consent, and Autonomy." *Journal of Law and Society*, vol. 17, no. 1, 1990, pp. 77–89

Forsberg, Lisa, Douglas, Thomas, Savulescu, Julian (2025) 'Is consent to psychological interventions less important than consent to bodily interventions?', *The Philosophical Quarterly*, <https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqaf005>

##### FURTHER READING

Gardner, John, (2007) "The Wrongness of Rape", *Offences and Defences: Selected Essays in the Philosophy of Criminal Law* (Oxford University Press)

Kukla, Quill R. (2021) 'A Nonideal Theory of Sexual Consent', *Ethics* 131 (2):270-292

Manson, Neil C. (2015) 'Transitional Paternalism', *Bioethics*, 29(2): 66-73

O'Neill, Onora (2003) 'Some limits of informed consent', *Journal of Medical Ethics* 29(1): 4-7

Tilton, Emily C. R. & Ichikawa, Jonathan (2021) 'Not What I Agreed To: Content and Consent', *Ethics* 132(1): 127–154

**Week 6: Topic to be agreed in class**

**Week 7: Topic to be agreed in class**

**Week 8: Topic to be agreed in class**

## **Contemporary Political Philosophy**

Prof David Miller

Weeks 1-8 / Mondays/ 10:00-12:00

Location: Nuffield College (Conference Room)

The course will be taught by a weekly two hour class, which will meet from 10.00 to 12.00 on Monday mornings in the Conference Room on staircase L, Nuffield College. Students will be expected to give short introductions to the topics covered in the course, and encouraged to write one full length essay chosen from that list. I have kept the set of recommended readings relatively short, but can suggest further reading on particular topics if need be.

In earlier years, I started the course with a week on methodology – how to do political philosophy. This year, however, I have made room for a final week on climate change in view of the importance of this issue, so I have dropped the methodology topic. M. Phil students have already been exposed to some of the debates in the Methods class in year 1. If any B. Phil students would like to pursue this, we can arrange a separate session. Some of the issues are raised in my paper on 'Doing Political Philosophy' which I will circulate to the class.

### **Week 1: Cosmopolitanism and its Critics**

S. Caney, *Justice Beyond Borders* (2005), ch. 4.

<https://doi.org/10.1093/019829350X.003.0004>

T. Pogge, 'Cosmopolitanism' in R. Goodin, P. Pettit and T. Pogge (eds.), *A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy* (2007).

<http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/oxford/detail.action?docID=320054>.

D. Miller, *National Responsibility and Global Justice* (2007), chs. 2-3.

<https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199235056.003.0002>

<https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199235056.003.0003>

S. Scheffler, 'Families, Nations, and Strangers' in S. Scheffler, *Boundaries and Allegiances* (2001). <https://doi.org/10.1093/0199257671.003.0004>

K.-C. Tan, *Justice Without Borders* (2004), chs. 7-9.

<https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511490385.008>

<https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511490385.009>

<https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511490385.010>

E. Beaton, M. Gadomski, D. Manson and K.-C. Tan, 2021, 'Crisis Nationalism: To What Degree Is National Partiality Justifiable during a Global Pandemic?', *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice*, 24 (2021), 285–300. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-021-10160-0>

## **Week 2: Justifying Human Rights**

J. Griffin, *On Human Rights* (2008), chs. 2, 3, 11.

<https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199238781.003.0003>

<https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199238781.003.0004>

<https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199238781.003.0012>

J. Nickel, *Making Sense of Human Rights*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (2007), chs. 4-5.

C. Beitz, 'Human Rights as a Common Concern', *American Political Science Review*, 95 (2001), 269-82, and/or C. Beitz, *The Idea of Human Rights* (2009), chs. 3 and 5.

<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055401992019>

J. Raz, 'Human Rights without Foundations' in S. Besson and J. Tasioulas (eds.), *The Philosophy of International Law* (2010).

<https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/oxford/detail.action?docID=510297>

A. Buchanan, 'The Egalitarianism of Human Rights', *Ethics*, 120 (2010), 679-710 reprinted in R. Crisp (ed.), *Griffin on Human Rights* (2014). <https://doi.org/10.1086/653433>

D. Miller, 'Grounding Human Rights', *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy*, 15 (2012), 407-27. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2012.699396>

## **Week 3: Republicanism and Freedom**

P. Pettit, 'Republican Freedom: Three Axioms, Four Theorems' in C. Laborde and J. Maynor (eds.), *Republicanism and Political Theory* (2008).

<https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/oxford/reader.action?docID=320101&ppg=112&c=UERG>

Q. Skinner, 'Freedom as the Absence of Arbitrary Power' in C. Laborde and J. Maynor (eds.), *Republicanism and Political Theory* (2008).

<https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/oxford/reader.action?docID=320101&ppg=93&c=UERG>

I. Carter, 'How are Power and Unfreedom Related?' in C. Laborde and J. Maynor (eds.), *Republicanism and Political Theory* (2008).

<https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/oxford/reader.action?docID=320101&ppg=68&c=UERG>

## RG

C. List and L. Valentini, 'Freedom as Independence', *Ethics*, 126 (2016), 1043-74.  
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/26540894>

T. Simpson, 'The Impossibility of Republican Freedom', *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 45 (2017), 27-53. <https://doi.org/10.1111/papa.12082>

F. Lovett and P. Pettit, 'Preserving Republican Freedom: a reply to Simpson', *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 46 (2019), 363-83. <https://doi.org/10.1111/papa.12126>

### **Week 4: The Democratic Boundary Problem**

F. Whelan, 'Democratic Theory and the Boundary Problem', *Nomos 25: Liberal Democracy* (1983) <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24219358>

R. Goodin, 'Enfranchising All Affected Interests, and its Alternatives', *Philosophy and Public Affairs* (2007) <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1088-4963.2007.00098.x>

S. Song, 'The Boundary Problem in Democratic Theory: Why the Demos should be Bounded by the State', *International Theory* (2012) <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1752971911000248>

B. Saunders, 'Defining the Demos', *Politics, Philosophy and Economics* (2012)  
<https://doi.org/10.1177/1470594X11416782>

D. Miller, 'Reconceiving the Democratic Boundary Problem', *Philosophy Compass* (2020)  
<https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12707>

### **Week 5: Self-Determination**

C. Wellman, *A Theory of Secession: The Case for Political Self-Determination* (2005), ch. 3.  
<https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511499265.004>

A. Stilz, 'The Value of Self-Determination' in D. Sobel, P. Valentine and S. Wall (eds.), *Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy*, vol 2 (2016) or A. Stilz, *Territorial Sovereignty* (2019), chs. 4-5.  
<https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198759621.003.0005>

J. Waldron, 'Two Conceptions of Self-Determination' in S. Besson and J. Tasioulas (eds.), *The Philosophy of International Law* (2010), pp. 397-413.  
<http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/oxford/detail.action?docID=510297>

D. Miller, 'Neo-Kantian Theories of Self-Determination: a Critique', *Review of International Studies*, 42 (2016), 858-75. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210516000115>

A. Margalit and J. Raz, 'National Self-Determination', *Journal of Philosophy*, 87 (1990), 439-61. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2026968>

A. Buchanan, *Justice, Legitimacy and Self-Determination* (2004), ch. 8.  
<https://doi.org/10.1093/0198295359.003.0008>

## Week 6: Territorial Rights

A.J. Simmons, *Boundaries of Authority* (2016), chs. 4-6.

<https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190603489.003.0005>

<https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190603489.003.0006>

<https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190603489.003.0007>

A. Stilz, *Territorial Sovereignty* (2019), chs. 2-3.

<https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198833536.003.0002>

<https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198833536.003.0003>

D. Miller, 'Territorial Rights: Concept and Justification', *Political Studies*, 60 (2012), 252-68.

<https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2011.00911.x>

C. Nine, 'A Lockean Theory of Territory', *Political Studies*, 56 (2008), 148-65.

<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2007.00687.x>

M. Moore, 'Natural Resources, Territorial Rights, and Global Distributive Justice', *Political Theory*, 40 (2012), 84-107 or M. Moore, *A Political Theory of Territory* (2015), ch. 3.

<https://doi.org/10.1177/0090591711426999>

Symposium on A. J. Simmons, *Boundaries of Authority* (Nine, Miller, Stilz), *Politics, Philosophy and Economics*, 18 (4) (2019).

<https://doi.org/10.1177/1470594X18788345>

<https://doi.org/10.1177/1470594X18779147>

<https://doi.org/10.1177/1470594X18779308>

## Week 7: Immigration

J. Carens, *The Ethics of Immigration* (2013), chs. 11-12.

<http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/oxford/detail.action?docID=1336461>

C. Wellman, 'Immigration and Freedom of Association', *Ethics*, 119 (2008-9), 109-41.

<https://doi.org/10.1086/592311>

D. Miller, *Strangers in Our Midst: the political philosophy of immigration* (2016), chs. 3-4.

<https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/oxford/detail.action?docID=4515684>

S. Fine, 'The Ethics of Immigration: Self-Determination and the Right to Exclude', *Philosophy Compass*, 8 (2013), 254-68. <https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12019>

K. Oberman, 'Immigration as a Human Right', in S. Fine and L. Ypi (eds.), *Migration in Political Theory: The Ethics of Movement and Membership* (2016).

<https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199676606.003.0003>

D. Miller, 'Is there a Human Right to Immigrate?' in S. Fine and L. Ypi (eds.), *Migration in Political Theory: The Ethics of Movement and Membership* (2016).

<https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199676606.003.0002>

### Week 8: Climate Change

K. Wyman, 'Ethical Duties to Climate Migrants' in B. Mayer and F. Crepeau (eds.), *Research Handbook on Climate Change, Migration and the Law* (2017).

<https://doi.org/10.4337/9781785366598.00023>

J. Draper, 'Responsibility and Climate-Induced Displacement', *Global Justice: Theory Practice Rhetoric*, 11 (2) 2019, 59-80. <https://doi.org/10.21248/gjn.11.02.182>

R. Buxton, 'Reparative Justice for Climate Refugees', *Philosophy*, 94 (2019), 193-219.

<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819119000019>

M. Blomfield, *Global Justice, Natural Resources and Climate Change* (2019), ch. 9.

<https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198791737.003.0009>

C. Heyward and J. Odalen, 'A Free Movement Passport for the Territorially Dispossessed' in C. Heyward and D. Roser (eds.), *Climate Justice in a Non-Ideal World* (2016).

<https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198744047.003.0011>

F. Dietrich and J. Wundisch, 'Territory Lost – Climate Change and the Violation of Self-Determination Rights', *Moral Philosophy and Politics*, 2 (2015), 83-105.

<https://doi.org/10.1515/mopp-2013-0005>

### Topics in Contemporary Political Philosophy

Prof David Enoch

Tuesdays

Weeks 1, 3, 5

15:00-17:00

Fridays

Weeks 1-5

09:00-11:00

Location: IECL Seminar Room, St Cross Building - Law Faculty

We will be discussing several topics in political philosophy (in the analytic tradition). I will choose the initial topics. Students will have input into the rest of the topics – both from the list that will be made available at the beginning of the term and by making some other suggestions.

Possible topics include:

- Rawlsian Public Reason (from a *very* critical perspective)
- Political Epistemology (including the epistemological commitments of Public Reason Liberalism, the Epistemic Justification of Democracy, Epistemology and free speech, and standpoint epistemology)

- Ideal and non-Ideal theory
- The value of autonomy: Its nature, its relation to flawed consent (coercion, exploitation, manipulation and nudging, false consciousness), its relevance to epistemology
- Shameless Liberalism (that is, my view...)

I plan to rely primarily on the texts in **bold letters**. The others are mostly for background or further reading.

The reading material, as well as the handouts, will be available on Canvas.

Students who have no access – you may need me to add you to this course in order to gain access. To do this, please send me an email at [David.Emerson@law.ox.ac.uk](mailto:David.Emerson@law.ox.ac.uk)

Note that this is not quite a schedule: Discussions will often take more than a "clean" session, and we'll play it by ear. This is also why there are only six topics here. (So in particular, if you consider coming to a discussion of a specific topic, you have to make sure you are updated about where we are in the plan.)

#### 1. Ideal and Non-Ideal Theory

- Laura Valentini, "Ideal vs. Non-Ideal Theory: A Conceptual Map", *Philosophy Compass* 7/9 (2012), 654-664.
- My "Against Utopianism: Noncompliance and Multiple Agents", <https://quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/p/pod/dod-idx/against-utopianism-noncompliance-and-multiple-agents.pdf?c=phimp;idno=3521354.0018.016;format=pdf>

#### 2. Against Rawlsian Liberalism

- Jonathan Quong, "Public Reason", *The Stanford encyclopedia of Philosophy*, <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/public-reason/>
- My "Against Public Reason", *Oxford Studies in Political Epistemology* vol. 1 (2015), 112-142.
- My "The Disorder of Public Reason", *Ethics* 124, 1-41-176 (2013).
- Gaus, "On Dissing Public Reason: A Reply to Enoch", *Ethics* 125, 1078-1095 (2015).

#### 3. For Shameless Liberalism

- My "Shameless Liberalism" (forthcoming)
- Excerpts from a trade-book that (I think) I'm working on.

#### 4. Democratic Theory

- Tom Christiano and Sameer Bajaj (2024), "Democracy", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/democracy/>, sections 1-2.
- My (2009) "On Estlund's Democratic Authority", *Iyyun* 58, 35-48.
- Estlund's reply: (2009), "Reply to Commentators", *Iyyun* 58, 73-78.
- Niko Kolodny, "Rule Over None: Social Equality and the Value of Democracy":
  - o Part I, *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 42 (2014), 195-229.
  - o Part II, *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 42 (2014), 287-336.

5. Epistemic Democracy, and Standpoint Epistemology

- Heidi Grasswick (2018), "Feminist Social Epistemology", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminist-social-epistemology/> section 2.
- Lidal Dror (2023), "Is There an Epistemic Advantage to Being Oppressed?", *Nous* 57, 618-640.
- Hélène Landemore (2012), *Democratic Reason: Politics, Collective Intelligence, and the Rule of the Many* (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

6. Shklarian Pessimistic Liberalism

- Shklar, J. N. (1989). The liberalism of fear. In N. L. Rosenblum (Ed.), *Liberalism and the moral life* (pp. 21–38) (Harvard University Press).
- My "Politics and Suffering", *Analytic Philosophy* 66, 1-21.