

FACULTY OF PHILOSOPHY
UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD



PHILOSOPHY LECTURE PROSPECTUS

TRINITY TERM 2024

NOTES:

- The normal duration of an event is one hour. Where the class or lecture lasts longer than an hour, the start time and end time will be given.
- By convention, in-person lectures at Oxford begin at 5 minutes past the hour and end at 5 minutes before the hour.
- Unless otherwise specified, the lectures and classes are given for all of weeks 1 to 8.
- Every effort is made to ensure that the information contained in this Prospectus is accurate at the start of term, but sometimes errors persist. If you think you have found a mistake, please contact James Knight (james.knight@philosophy.ox.ac.uk).

Lectures for the First Public Examination

Students preparing for their First Public Examination (Prelims or Mods) should attend the following lectures this term:

PPE, Philosophy and Modern Languages, Philosophy and Theology, Psychology and Philosophy: Moral Philosophy, and General Philosophy

Mathematics and Philosophy, Physics and Philosophy, Computer Science and Philosophy: Elements of Deductive Logic, and General Philosophy

Literae Humaniores: any listed Prelims/Mods lecture that corresponds to their chosen Philosophy option for Mods

Alan Turing on Computability and Intelligence

Prof Peter Millican – T. 11 – 1 (weeks 2 to 5), Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

These lectures, designed for the first year course in Computer Science and Philosophy, start with the background to Alan Turing's 1936 paper "On Computable Numbers", including Hilbert's programme, Gödel's incompleteness theorem, and Cantor's results concerning the countability of infinite sets. They then work in detail through the 1936 paper, using Charles Petzold's book *The Annotated Turing* (which contains the entire paper, together with comprehensive discussion) as a basis. Finally, the last three lectures will turn to Turing's 1950 paper "Computing Machinery and Intelligence", discussing some of the philosophical issues arising from the Turing Test and Searle's Chinese Room thought-experiment.

Frege: Foundations of Arithmetic

Prof James Studd – M. 11 – 1 (weeks 1 to 4), Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

These are the core lectures for first-year mathematics and philosophy students. We'll consider, among other things, Frege's attack on Mill's empiricism, Frege's views on number ascriptions, the 'Julius Caesar' problem, and Frege's attempt at a logicist reduction of arithmetic to Hume's Principle, and ultimately to his ill-fated theory of extensions.

Set Text: Frege, *Foundations of Arithmetic* (trans. J. L. Austin)

The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence

Prof Christopher Timpson – F. 12 (weeks 1 to 5 – the week 5 session will be two hours) – Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

This course will introduce the centuries-old debate about the nature of space and time. One main question will be whether space is absolute or relative; and indeed what are the various meanings of these two words. A key text in this debate is the correspondence between Samuel Clarke---representing the ideas of Isaac Newton---and Gottfried Leibniz. We will start with the background to the debate in the works of Galileo and Descartes. We will then see how both Newton and Leibniz responded to this background; and finally, we will contrast

their arguments, while investigating Leibniz's metaphysical views in more detail. The course is primarily aimed at Physics & Philosophy students, but all are welcome.

Lectures for the Honour Schools

Lectures listed in this section are **core lectures** for the papers in the Honour Schools: that is, these are lectures intended especially for students taking those papers at Finals. Questions set in Finals papers usually take the content of core lectures into account to some extent. It is therefore very much in your interest if you are a finalist to attend as many relevant core lectures as your schedule permits.

Students should also refer to the section *Other Lectures*, following. Lectures listed there are not official core lectures, but sometimes cover topics of relevance to the Finals papers.

104 Philosophy of Mind

Prof Will Davies – W. 10 (*starting in week 2 – a recording will be made for week 1*),
Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

Please refer to the Philosophy FHS Lectures Canvas pages.

109 Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Criticism

Prof Louise Hanson – ~~W. 12 (weeks 1 to 4), Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)~~

This series is cancelled.

Other Lectures (suitable for all audiences)

The 2024 John Locke Lectures: *Seeing in Sanskrit*

Prof Jonardon Ganeri – W. 5 – 7 (weeks 1 to 5), Keble College (25 Banbury Road)

The Faculty is delighted to welcome the 2024 John Locke lecturer, Prof Jonardon Ganeri (Toronto).

My plan for this series of lectures is as follows. In the first lecture I will offer a fresh reading of a key early Nyāya text. My aim will be to demonstrate a way of understanding the text which frees it from a gloss put on it by later interpreters, a conceptualist gloss that eventually binds it to a thesis incompatible with naïve realism or relationalism. In the second lecture I will examine key Nyāya arguments for Nyāya realism, the most important of which is that amodal perception of wholes is better explained with its framework than within Buddhist representationalism. I then turn to three forms of experience that enrich the picture. The first is illusion, and my argument in the third lecture will be that neither disjunctivism nor objective looks theory is more compelling than the Nyāya's own explanation of perceptual error. This explanation draws on synaesthetic phenomena to defend the existence of anomalous relations of acquaintance with absent features. The second case is absence experience, the best noninferential theory of which concedes a role to mental imagery. Even a dogged commitment to absence realism cannot help Nyāya here. The view I defend is a non-disjunctivist version of naïve realism, one in which the relation of presentation is enriched to include both the presentation-as-present of absent features and the presentation-as-absent of absences through mismatch with mental imagery. The third case is the spectatorial experience of artworks. A sophisticated Indian analysis of such experience, as it relates to audience engagement in theatre (*rasa*), leads me to a threefold analysis in which the perception of an artwork incorporates elements both of virtual acquaintance and absence experience (prominent in aniconic representation). In all this my aim is to reprise Wollheim's "two perceptual projects" hypothesis but in a different form. What replaces the distinction between seeing face-to-face and seeing-in is an orthogonal one, between what is presented-as-present and what is presented-as-absent. I will focus on the relationship between perceptual experience and attention. We have been taught by Richard Wollheim that the perceptual experience of an artwork consists in a twofold attention, and by Krishnacandra Bhattacharyya that the perceptual experience of absence consists in a negative attention (a figure-ground structure with an empty figureposition). Attention explains how we can experience wholes and why there are illusions, and I want to resist the view that what does the explanatory work is the thesis that perceptual experience is saturated by concepts and conceptualisation. So I will argue that a suite of Sanskrit ideas are better understood as matters of attention rather than conceptualisation: *savikalpaka-pratyakṣa* (the idea of perceptual structure), *avayavi-pratyakṣa* (perceptual completion in the perception of whole objects), *viparyaya* (the idea of perceptual error and illusion), *abhāva-pratyakṣa* (absence perception), and finally *rasa* (aesthetic experience as perceptual). The key concepts I will draw

upon from the psychology and philosophy of attention are: the distinction between selection and access, the idea of a perceptual chunk, feature-binding, the figure-ground distinction, and simultaneous divided attention. So I argue for a non-disjunctivist version of naïve realism, inspired by the work of Bimal Matilal but extending it. In an update of the empiricist project it is to Nyāya rather than Locke that we should look.

Lecture 1: Seeing Face-to-Face: Nyāya Realism

In the first lecture I reflect on Bimal Matilal's brilliant reconstruction of Nyāya philosophy of perception as a version of naïve realism, and I offer a new interpretation of a foundational statement in the philosophy of perception in classical India: Nyāya-sūtra 1.1.4.

Texts: Nyāya-sūtra 1.1.4 & commentaries (Thakur 1997); Matilal 1986. Readings: Genone 2016, Steenhagen 2019, Logue 2012, Campbell 2014, Chadha 2024.

Lecture 2: Nyāya Arguments for Nyāya Realism

I identify two central Nyāya arguments in favour of their version of naïve realism, which I call the argument from selection and the argument from (amodal) completion. Of these the first serves to diffuse a Buddhist counter-argument in support of representationalism, while the second argues that naïve realism is the best explanation of our ability to perceive wholes.

Texts: Vaiśeṣika-sūtra 4.1.6–9 (Thakur 1985); Nyāya-sūtra 2.1.31-5 & commentaries (Thakur 1997). Readings: Matilal 2002c, Millar 2015, Briscoe 2018, Nanay 2010, Nanay 2022, Dunne 2020.

Lecture 3: Illusion as Mislocated Seeing

The two leading naïve realist accounts of illusion are disjunctivism and objective looks theory. I argue that Nyāya provides a third account of illusion, namely, that illusions result from feature-binding misfires involving relations of anomalous acquaintance with absent features. Insights about feature-binding will be drawn from the psychology of synaesthesia.

Texts: Nyāya-sūtra 4.2.35-7 & commentaries (Thakur 1997). Readings: Vaidya 2013, Dasti 2012, Antony 2011, Kalderon 2011, Brewer 2011, Genone 2014.

Lecture 4: Seeing Absence

What is the nature of our experience of absence? I draw on the work of Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya, and provide a new explication of his concept of negative attention. I reprise Wollheim's "two perceptual projects" hypothesis, between seeing face-to-face and seeing in, but reconfigure it in terms of a distinction between what is presented-as-present and what is presented-as-absent. Aniconic representation affords an example.

Text: Bhattacharyya 1930, ch.4. Readings: Farennikova 2013, Cavedon-Taylor 2017, Martin & Dokic 2013, Wollheim 1980.

Lecture 5: Seeing in the Theatre

Sanskrit aesthetics is, in the first instance, a theory of *rasa*: audience experience in theatre. Against the dominant view that such experience consists in noncognitive affect, I examine that of the philosopher Srī Śāṅkuka (fl. 859 CE), who offers instead an analysis of audience engagement as the perceptual experience of characters and staged emotions.

Text: Abhinava-bhāratī 1992, 276-82 (= Gnoli 1968). Readings: Lopes 2005, Nanay 2018, Pollock 2016: 77–83, Shulman 2012: 63-5, Nanay 2018, Wollheim 1998.

Ethics, Democracy and Technology

Prof Josiah Ober and Prof John Tasioulas – T. 2 – 4, Dorothy Crowfoot Hodgkin Building (Phase 2 Seminar Room)

April 23: Josiah Ober (Stanford) / John Tasioulas (Oxford)

April 30: Daron Acemoglu (MIT)

May 7: Paolo Carozza (Notre Dame / MIT Oversight Board)

May 14: Jeff Howard (UCL)

May 21: Linda Eggert (Oxford)

May 28: John Ober (Stanford) / John Tasioulas (Oxford)

June 4: Josiah Cohen (Apple) **to be confirmed**

June 11: Helene Landemore (Yale)

Meta-ethics: an introduction to reasons

Sasha Arridge – W. 11 (*weeks 5 to 8*), Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

Reasons are everywhere, and you encounter them all the time. The fact that the hob is hot is a reason not to touch it; the fact that your housemate's shoes are wet is a reason to believe that it's raining outside; and the fact that you can expect this lecture series to be interesting is a reason to come to it. But the hotness of hobs, your housemate's shoes, and your expectations are all very different: what makes them all *reasons*?

This lecture series, which introduces attendees to key topics in the theory of reasons, aims to engage everyone—graduate or undergraduate—with an interest in meta-ethics, and will be particularly useful for those studying the *Ethics* (103) module. No prior knowledge of the subject area is presumed; each lecture will come with a detailed handout and suggestions for further reading.

Lecture 1: Introduction—Why Reasons?

This lecture starts by arguing that reasons are the things we reach for when we try to overcome uncertainty about what to do, feel, or believe; given that such uncertainty is an unavoidable feature of our human experience, then so too are reasons. The second half of the lecture introduces attendees to contemporary work on the relation between reasons and motivation, and reasons and epistemic perspective, asking questions like: for the hotness of the hob to be a reason for you not to touch it, does it have to be possible for you to be motivated not to touch it? Do you have to know that the hob is hot? Does it have to be knowable to you?

Lecture 2: Reasons, Goodness, and Fittingness

What comes first, reasons or goodness? This lecture critically introduces attendees to value-first accounts of reasons, which attempt to analyse reasons in terms of goodness, and so-called “buck-passing” accounts of goodness, which attempt to analyse goodness in terms of reasons. The lecture then engages with the burgeoning contemporary literature on the relation between reasons and *fittingness*, where *fittingness* is the relation that obtains between, for example, desirable things and the attitude of desire.

Lecture 3: Reasons, Ought, and Obligation

This lecture introduces attendees to debates surrounding the relation between reasons and deontic normativity, including the central deontic notions of *ought* and *obligation*. It considers attempts to analyse reasons in terms of explanation and ought; analyses of ought in terms of reasons; and questions whether important deontic notions like *rights* are amenable to analysis in terms of reasons.

Lecture 4: Reasons and Supererogation

Sometimes it is morally permissible for you not to do what it would be morally best for you to do. For example: it would be morally best for you to give away most of your money, but it is morally permissible for you not to do so. Why? This lecture discusses extant attempts to explain the puzzling phenomenon of supererogation, focussing particularly on explanations in terms of reasons. The lecture finishes by sketching an account that brings together prerogative-based and reasons-based explanations, and which is built around the claim that, as the autonomous subjects of our wellbeing, we each have the normative power to determine how much our wellbeing matters.

The metaphysics of properties

Katherine Hong – T. 4 (*weeks 5 to 8*), Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

Please see the Canvas page for the course.

Graduate Classes

Graduate classes are, except where otherwise indicated, intended for the Faculty's graduate students. (The BPhil Pro-Seminar is restricted to first-year BPhil students.) Other students may attend Faculty graduate classes, and are welcome, provided they first seek and obtain the permission of the class-giver(s).

BPhil Pro-Seminar: History of Philosophy

Various class-givers and locations – F. 11 – 1

The Pro-seminar introduces students to study, practice, and standards in graduate-level philosophy. Every starting BPhil student will attend four sessions with one class-giver, then change group midway through term for four sessions with another class-giver. Seminars in Trinity Term will cover history of philosophy, from the ancient and early modern periods. Class-givers will contact their groups, specifying readings and confirming the class time, in advance of term.

Aristotle, Movement, and the Ontology of Action

Prof Ursula Coope – M. 2 – 4, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

In this seminar, we shall discuss Aristotle's views about movement and activity, and ask about some of the consequences of those views for modern philosophy of action.

In the first four meetings, we'll focus on certain key aspects of Aristotle's view:

- (i) His account of movement (*kinêsis*), and his claim that movement is distinctively incomplete.
- (ii) His distinction between movement and activity (*kinêsis* and *energeia*)
- (iii) His claim that nothing is moving in the now, and his response to Zeno's moving arrow paradox.
- (iv) His remarks about 'primary time'.

In the fifth class (v), we'll discuss Plotinus's criticisms of Aristotle's account of movement.

In the sixth and seventh sessions, we shall look at two modern types of account, both of which are inspired by Aristotle, but which are (I think) importantly different from Aristotle:

- (vi) Crowther and Hornsby's view that movement is constituted by activity
- (vii) Remarks on the nature of process in Stout, Steward and Charles.

In the final session, (viii) we shall turn to a puzzle about contingency and the present, and ask whether Aristotle's account of movement can help to answer it.

Hegel and Critical Theory

Dr Jack Wearing and Prof Paul Lodge – T. 11 – 1, Corpus Christi College (Seminar Room weeks 1, 4, 7; Rainolds Room other weeks)

Overview

In this course, we will pair readings from Hegel and the secondary literature on his work with readings from contemporary critical theory. The latter either take up Hegelian themes or look through a critical lens at aspects of modern society that Hegel himself sought to vindicate. The aim of the course is to familiarise students with the distinctive methods and concerns of Hegel's social and political philosophy, while also introducing ways in which thinkers in traditions of critical theory have built on Hegelian ideas to go beyond Hegel in their critiques of the modern social world. We understand 'critical theory' in a capacious sense, to include the Frankfurt School tradition as well as some Marxist, feminist, and post-colonial thinkers on the margins of that tradition.

In weeks 1-4, we will explore the normative foundations and methodological commitments of Hegel's – and Hegelian – approaches to social theory, covering the concepts of freedom, alienation, recognition, and immanent critique. In weeks 5-7 we will focus on aspects of Hegel's account of the three central moments of modern 'ethical life' (*Sittlichkeit*) – the family, civil society, and the state – as well as Marxist and other post-Hegelian critiques of these social institutions. In week 8, we will examine Hegel's theory of history and consider whether the notion of historical 'progress' has any role to play in critical social theory.

In advance of each class, please send at least one question regarding each of the core readings below to jack.wearing@philosophy.ox.ac.uk. We will anonymise these questions and use them to structure the discussion in class.

An ORLO list for this course including suggestions for introductory and further readings can be found here: <https://rl.talis.com/3/oxford/lists/224C5F9E-E326-0F8B-1C0D-AA47D4E53446.html?lang=en-GB&login=1>

Core Readings

Week 1 – Freedom

G.W.F. Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, trans. H.B. Nisbet, ed. A.W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), [Hegel's] Preface and Introduction. [**Note:** Please use the Cambridge University Press translation of this text. Nisbet's translation is more accurate than the Oxford University Press translation by T.M. Knox, and this edition also contains a useful editorial introduction and very helpful notes by Allen Wood.]

Frederick Neuhouser, *Foundations of Hegel's Social Theory: Actualizing Freedom* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), Introduction and ch. 1.

Axel Honneth, *Freedom's Right: The Social Foundations of Democratic Life* (Columbia University Press, 2014), Introduction and ch. 3.

Week 2 – Alienation and Reconciliation

Michael Hardimon, *Hegel's Social Philosophy: The Project of Reconciliation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), ch. 3.

[**Note:** If you have time, you may also find it useful to read chs. 1-2.]

Rahel Jaeggi, *Alienation*, trans. Frederick Neuhouser and Alan E. Smith (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014), chs. 1, 3, 4, and 10.

Week 3 – Recognition

G.W.F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit* trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon, 1977), §§166-196.

Frederick Neuhouser, 'Desire, Recognition, and the Relation Between Bondsman and Lord', in K.R. Westphal (ed.), *The Blackwell Guide to Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), pp. 37-54.

Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political–Philosophical Exchange* (London: Verso, 2000), chs. 1-2.

Week 4 – Immanent Critique

G.W.F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon, 1977), Introduction.

Rahel Jaeggi, *Critique of Forms of Life*, trans. C. Cronin (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018), chs. 5-6.

Rachel Fraser, 'The Limits of Immanent Critique', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 123, no. 2 (2023): 97–125.

Week 5 – Ethical Life I: The Family

G.W.F. Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, trans. H.B. Nisbet, ed. A.W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), §§142-181, esp. §§158-181.

Frederick Neuhouser, *Foundations of Hegel's Social Theory: Actualizing Freedom* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), ch. 5, esp. pp. 145-157.

Andreja Novakovic, 'No Utopia: Hegel on the Gendered Division of Labor', in Dean Moyar, Kate Padgett Walsh, and Sebastian Rand (eds.), *Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Critical Perspectives on Freedom and History* (London: Routledge, 2023), pp. 206-222.

Nancy Fraser, *Fortunes of Feminism: From State-Managed Capitalism to Neoliberal Crisis* (London: Verso Books, 2013), ch. 4.

Week 6 – Ethical Life II: Bourgeois Civil Society

G.W.F. Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, trans. H.B. Nisbet, ed. A.W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), §§182-248, esp. §§182-208 and §§235-248.

Frederick Neuhouser, *Foundations of Hegel's Social Theory: Actualizing Freedom* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), ch. 5, esp. pp. 157-174.

Karl Marx, 'Grundrisse', in David McLellan (ed.), *Karl Marx: Selected Writings*, 2nd edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 379-423.

Nancy Fraser and Rahel Jaeggi, *Capitalism: A Conversation in Critical Theory* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2018), ch. 3.

Week 7 – Ethical Life III: The State, the Individual, and War

G.W.F. Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, trans. H.B. Nisbet, ed. A.W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), §§257-270 and §§321-340.

Thom Brooks, *Hegel's Political Philosophy: A Systematic Reading of the Philosophy of Right*, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), ch. 8.

Judith Butler, *Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence* (London: Verso, 2004), ch. 2.

Judith Butler, *Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2015), ch. 3.

Week 8 – History and Progress

G.W.F. Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, trans. H.B. Nisbet, ed. A.W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), §§341-360.

Amy Allen, *The End of Progress: Decolonizing the Normative Foundations of Critical Theory* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016), chs. 1 and 3.

Amy Allen and Rahel Jaeggi, 'Progress, Normativity, and the Dynamics of Social Change: An Exchange between Rahel Jaeggi and Amy Allen (Conducted by Eva von Redecker)', in Amy Allen and Eduardo Mendieta (eds.), *From Alienation to Forms of Life: The Critical Theory of Rahel Jaeggi* (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 2018), pp. 156-187.

Topics in Indian philosophy of perception and aesthetics

Prof Monima Chadha – M. 11 – 1, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

This set of lectures concerns topics in Indian philosophy that complement the 2024 John Locke lectures. These Locke lectures, titled "Seeing in Sanskrit," will be about Nyāya philosophy of perception. In Nyāya epistemology, perception is thought of as the primary source of knowledge. To orient the discussion of perception, we begin, in Week 1, thinking about the concept of knowledge and that of a knowledge source in the Nyāya tradition. We then turn our attention to the Nyāya philosophy of perception.

Nyāya philosophers defend a version of direct or naïve realism. This view has many defenders but, unsurprisingly, also detractors in contemporary philosophy. We explicate the specific version of naïve realism developed by Matilal (2002c) by paying attention to the respective arguments offered by them. Like all naïve realists, the Naiyāyikas must face up to the argument from illusion. But there are other problems too that arise for the Nyāya brand of naïve realism because of their peculiar epistemic commitments: they believe that the self, universals, and even absences, can be perceived. We discuss whether perception of such unorthodox entities is consistent with naïve realism. Lastly, we look to test the philosophical case for naïve realism by asking whether we can generalise the theory beyond seeing.

A good general introduction to classical Indian discussions of some of these questions is Bimal Krishna Matilal's 1986 book, *Perception: An Essay on Classical Indian Theories of Knowledge* (OUP).

Primary text:

Dasti, Matthew and Phillips, Stephen trans. and eds. 2017. *The Nyāya-sūtra: Selections with Early Commentaries*, Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing.

Provisional Schedule and Readings:

W1. Nyāya on Knowledge and Sources of Knowledge

Essential

Dasti, Matthew and Phillips, Stephen trans. and eds. 2017. *The Nyāya-sūtra: Selections with Early Commentaries*, Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing. Chapter 1, pp. 11-19

Recommended

Matilal, Bimal Krishna. 2002a. On the Concept of Philosophy in India. *Mind, Language and World*, vol. ii of *The Collected Essays of Bimal Krishna Matilal*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, pp. 358-369.

Matilal, Bimal Krishna. 2002b. Knowledge Truth and Pramatva. *Mind, Language and World*, vol. ii of *The Collected Essays of Bimal Krishna Matilal*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, pp. 149-161

Ganeri, Jonardon 2018 Epistemology from a Sanskrit point of view, in *Epistemology for the Rest of the World*, edited by Masaharu Mizumoto, Stephen Stich and Eric McCready Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 12–21.

W2. Nyāya on Perception

Essential Reading

Dasti, Matthew and Phillips, Stephen trans. and eds. 2017. *The Nyāya-sūtra: Selections with Early Commentaries*, Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing. Chapter 1, pp. 20-27

Recommended Readings

Matilal, Bimal Krishna. 1986. *Perception: An Essay on Classical Indian Theories of Knowledge*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chapter 7, pp. 223-255

Matilal, Bimal Krishna. 1986. *Perception: An Essay on Classical Indian Theories of Knowledge*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chapter 8, pp. 255-292

Phillips, Stephen 2012. *Epistemology in Classical India: The Knowledge Sources of the Nyāya School*, London: Routledge, Chapter 3, pp. 41-58.

W3. A Nyāya Defence of Naïve realism

Essential Reading

Matilal, Bimal Krishna. 2002c. Naïve realism, Nyāya realism, and the causal theory. *Mind, Language and World*, vol. ii of *The Collected Essays of Bimal Krishna Matilal*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, pp. 97–113.

Recommended Readings

Matilal, Bimal Krishna. 2002d. A realist view of perception. *Mind, Language and World*, vol. ii of *The Collected Essays of Bimal Krishna Matilal*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, pp. 182–200.

Matilal, Bimal Krishna. 2002e. On the notion of the locative in Sanskrit. *Mind, Language and World*, vol. ii of *The Collected Essays of Bimal Krishna Matilal*. Delhi: Oxford University Press,

pp. 326–332.

Martin, M.G.F., 1998, “Setting Things Before the Mind”, in A. O’Hear (ed.) *Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Mind*, 157–80, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

W4. Objections to Nyāya Naïve realism: Hallucinations and Illusions

Essential Reading

Dasti, Matthew and Phillips, Stephen trans. and eds. 2017. *The Nyāya-sūtra: Selections with Early Commentaries*, Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing. Chapter 3, pp. 65-72

Recommended Readings

Dravid, N. S. (1996). The Nyāya-Vaisesika explanation of illusion. *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, 24(1), 37–48.

Vaidya, Anand Jayprakash. 2013. Nyāya perceptual theory: disjunctivism or anti-individualism? *Philosophy East & West* 63 (4): 562–85.

Phillips, Ian. 2016. [Naïve realism and the science of \(some\) illusions](#), *Philosophical Topics* 44(2), special issue on Perceptual Appearances, (eds) C. Hill & B. McLaughlin..

W5. Possible Objections to Nyāya Naïve realism: Absences

Essential Reading

Bhattacharyya, K. C. 1930. *The Subject as Freedom*. Chapter 4, Knowledge of Absence as a Present Fact, pp. 106-123

Recommended Readings

Beaulieu Jack [Gaṅgeśa on Absence in Retrospect](#) (2021). *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, 49(4): 603–639.

Vaidya, Anand, Bilimoria, Purushottama and Shaw, Jaysankar (2016) Absence: An Indo-Analytic Inquiry, with *Sophia Journal of International Philosophy and Traditions* Vol. 55.4: 491-513.

Farennikova, Anna. 2013. Seeing absence. *Philosophical Studies* 166 (3):429-454.

W6. Possible Objections to Nyāya Naïve realism: Universals

Essential Reading

Dasti, Matthew and Phillips, Stephen trans. and eds. 2017. *The Nyāya-sūtra: Selections with Early Commentaries*, Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing. Chapter 7 pp. 138-155.

Recommended Readings

Taber, J. (2015) A Road Not Taken in Indian Epistemology: Kumārila’s Defense of the Perceptibility of Universals,” in *Indian Epistemology and Metaphysics*, ed. Joerg Tuske, Bloomsbury Publishing.

Chadha, M. (2014). On Knowing Universals: the Nyāya Way. *Philosophy East and West*, 64(2), 287–302.

Armstrong, David M., 1986, “In Defence of Structural Universals”, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 64(1): 85–88.

W7. Possible Objections to Nyāya Naïve realism: Self

Essential Reading

Dasti, Matthew and Phillips, Stephen trans. and eds. 2017. *The Nyāya-sūtra: Selections with Early Commentaries*, Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing. Chapter 6, pp. 74-94

Recommended Readings

Matilal, Bimal Krishna. 2002e. The Perception of Self. *Mind, Language and World*, vol. ii of *The Collected Essays of Bimal Krishna Matilal*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, pp. 299–314.

Taber John (2012) “Uddyotakara’s Defense of a Self,” in *Hindu and Buddhist Ideas in Dialogue*, ed. Irina Kuznetsova, Jonardon Ganeri, and Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012), pp. 97-114

Chakrabarti, A. 1992. I Touch What I Saw, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 52/1: 103–16.

8. Generalising Naïve realism: Beyond Seeing

Essential Reading

Phillips I. ‘Hearing and hallucinating silence’, in F. Macpherson & D. Platchias (eds) *Hallucination*, MIT Press, 2013, pp. 333-360

Recommended Readings

Martin, M.G.F., 1992, “Sight and Touch”, in Crane (ed.) *The Contents of Experience*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 196–215.

Nanay, B. (2022) Amodal completion and relationalism. *Philosophical Studies* 179, 2537–2551

O’Callaghan, Casey. 2017. Synesthesia vs. crossmodal illusions. In Ophelia Deroy (ed.), *Sensory Blendings: New Essays on Synaesthesia*. Oxford: Oxford University Press: pp. 45-58.

Topics in epistemology

Prof Timothy Williamson – T. 9 – 11, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

The class will meet on Tuesdays, 9-11 a.m., in the Ryle Room (Rad. Hum.)

- | | |
|-------------------|--|
| Week 1 (23 April) | Verbal disputes and Frege puzzles
(paper to be presented by Elisabetta Sassarini) |
| Week 2 (30 April) | Is the <i>a priori</i> / <i>a posteriori</i> distinction superficial?
Paper with that title to be made available on TW’s webpage |
| Week 3 (7 May) | Epistemic ambivalence
https://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/files/dilemmaspdf |
| Week 4 (14 May) | Inferential evidence
Jeffrey Dunn, ‘Inferential evidence’, <i>American Philosophical Quarterly</i> , 51 (2014): 203-213
https://www.istor.org/stable/24475389
TW, ‘Knowledge-first inferential evidence: a response to Dunn’, <i>The Monist</i> , 106: 441-445
https://academic.oup.com/monist/article/106/4/441/7319395 |
| Week 5 (21 May) | Imagination’s cognitive function |

TW, 'Knowing by imagining', chapter 12 of TW and Paul Boghossian, *Debating the A Priori* (OUP, 2020)

Earlier version:

https://media.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/assets/pdf_file/0007/29941/kindfinal.pdf

TW, *Suppose and Tell* (OUP, 2020), chapter 2

- Week 6 (28 May) Is imagination too liberal for modal epistemology?
Derek Lam, 'An imaginative person's guide to objective modality'
<https://philpapers.org/archive/LAMAIP-2.pdf>
- Week 7 (4 June) Imagining being
Bernard Williams, 'Imagination and the self', in *Problems of the Self*
Dilip Ninan, 'Imagination and the self' in Amy Kind (ed.), *The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Imagination*
<http://www.dilipninan.org/papers/RoutImagWeb.pdf>
Shaun Nicholls, 'Imagination and the I', *Mind and Language* 2008
<https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1468-0017.2008.00356.x>
- Week 8 (11 June) Collective imagining
<https://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/sitefiles/collectiveimagining.pdf>

A topic in philosophy of mind

Prof Mike Martin – T. 11 – 1 (*weeks 1, 2, 4 to 9*), Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)
except week 9: TBD

Please consult the Canvas pages for graduate classes.

The philosophy of mental health and mental illness

Prof Edward Harcourt – W. 11 – 1, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

The main purpose of the class will be to introduce and evaluate key themes from the anti-psychiatry movement and its intellectual descendants, including contemporary champions of service user voice, mad pride and related tendencies. We will ask to what extent the practice of psychiatry is vitiated by asymmetries of power and prestige; to what extent such asymmetries are inescapable (for example if psychiatry's mainstream self-conception as treating diseases of the brain is correct); and to what extent they float free of any particular conception of mental illness. The starting point will thus be located more in ethics and epistemology than in the metaphysics of mind, with coverage of concepts such as epistemic injustice and expertise by experience. So certain familiar topics such as 'are delusions beliefs?' will not be dealt with, though others – e.g. are mental disorders diseases of the brain? – will be.

The Philosophy of Time Travel

Prof Alex Kaiserman – W. 9 – 11, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

This class will provide an introduction to the main philosophical questions arising from the (alleged) possibility of time travel.

All are welcome, even those without any prior background in metaphysics. I will aim to begin each class at a fairly introductory level, before delving further into the details. There are only two conditions on attendance:

- You must do the compulsory reading each week. There is very little compulsory reading – sometimes only a few pages – but it is compulsory.
- You must come to the class with a question on the reading that you've done that week. The question can be substantive ('How would the author respond to this objection?'), but can also be clarificatory ('What does the author mean by this?'); indeed, clarificatory questions are especially welcome. I may call on you to ask your question, so come prepared.

Week 1: What is time travel?

Travelling through space involves being in different places at different times. By analogy, then, travelling through time should involve being at different times at different times. But if you think about it, this is either trivial or sheer nonsense. Sure, I was at 11am at 11am, at 12pm at 12pm, and so on; but that's not normally what we have in mind by time travel. What we want to say about a time-traveller is something like this: right *now* they're in the present, but they *will* soon be in the *past*; they will travel many hundreds of years in just a few minutes. But really this is no better than saying that in London I'm in London but in Oxford I'm in Lisbon, or that I've travelled hundreds of miles in a few centimetres.

This is known as the 'time-discrepancy paradox', and it has persuaded more than one philosopher that the very idea of time travel makes no sense to begin with. There are two main solutions to the time-discrepancy paradox. We'll encounter one of them in week 5. But this week we'll focus on David Lewis's well-known solution, which defines time travel as a discrepancy between two different ways of assigning co-ordinates to the temporal parts of an object, what Lewis calls 'personal time' and 'external time'.

Compulsory reading:

- Lewis, David (1976). The paradoxes of time travel. *American Philosophical Quarterly* 13(2), 145-152. **Read from the beginning until "So the case of Fred and Sam is rightly disqualified as a case of personal identity and as a case of time travel", about halfway through.**

Further reading:

- Pitkin, Walter B. (1914). Time and pure activity. *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods* 11, 521-526. **Section 4 (on pp. 523-525).**
- Donald C. Williams (1951). The myth of passage. *Journal of Philosophy* 48(15), 457-472.
- Wasserman, Ryan (2018). *Paradoxes of Time Travel*. Oxford: OUP. **Chapter 1, sections 1 and 2.**

Week 2: The grandfather paradox

Could a time-traveller go back in time and kill their own grandfather? On the one hand, it seems like they could – what’s stopping them, exactly? – but on the other, it seems like they couldn’t – Grandfather has to survive in order for the time-traveller to be born in the first place. This is the grandfather paradox, and it goes back to the very earliest philosophical discussions of time travel, in the letter pages of pulp fiction magazines like *Amazing Stories*. We will once again focus on David Lewis’s proposed resolution of the paradox and subsequent critiques of it, thinking in particular about whether the same considerations apply to *any* attempt to change the past (or for that matter, the future).

Compulsory reading:

- Lewis, David (1976). The paradoxes of time travel. *American Philosophical Quarterly* 13(2), 145-152. **Read from “I have argued so far...” until the end of the penultimate paragraph (“...contradictions would have been true”).**

Further reading:

- Vihvelin, Kadri (1996). What time travelers cannot do. *Philosophical Studies* 81(2-3), 315-330.
- Sider, Theodore (2002). Time travel, coincidences, and counterfactuals. *Philosophical Studies* 110, 115-138.
- Wasserman, Ryan (2018). *Paradoxes of Time Travel*. Oxford: OUP. **Chapter 4.**

Week 3: Causal paradoxes

Backwards time-travel on Lewis’s model inevitably involves backwards causation – the past is the way it is in part because of my present intentions to travel back in time. But some time-travel stories also involve the existence of *closed causal loops*; imagine, for example, that an older person with a suspiciously familiar face hands me the blueprints to a time machine, which I build over many years, before going back in time and handing the blueprints to my past self. Stories like this raise questions – like ‘Where did the blueprints *originally* come from?’ – which don’t seem to have any obvious answers. We will examine what such cases can teach us about the metaphysics of causation.

Compulsory reading:

- Lewis, David (1976). The paradoxes of time travel. *American Philosophical Quarterly* 13(2), 145-152. **Read from “We might expect that when a time traveller visits the past...” until “Then if these are possible, why not also the inexplicable causal loops that arise in the time travel?”).**

Further reading:

- Meyer, U. (2012). Explaining causal loops. *Analysis* 72 (2):259-264.
- Rennick, Stephanie (2021). Self-fulfilling prophecies. *Philosophies* 6(3), 78.
- Wasserman, Ryan (2018). *Paradoxes of Time Travel*. Oxford: OUP. **Chapter 5.**

Week 4: Self-visitation paradoxes

Time travel permits people to visit, and interact with, their former or future selves. This raises several questions: Are such people both young and old at the same time? How is that possible,

given that being young and being old are (apparently) incompatible properties? If a time machine travels *continuously* backwards in time, how does the traveller avoid hitting their past self going the other way? If a brick is sent back in time over and over again and used to build a wall, is the brick then a part of itself? We will examine what these questions can teach us about the metaphysics of persistence and parthood.

Compulsory reading:

- John W. Carroll (2011). Self visitation, traveler time, and compatible properties. *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 41(3), 359-370. **If you're pushed for time, read this blog post instead:** <http://timetravelphilosophy.net/topics/self/>

Further reading:

- Bernstein, Sara (2015). Nowhere man: Time travel and spatial location. *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* 39(1), 158-168.
- Miller, Kristie (2006). Travelling in time: How to wholly exist in two places at the same time. *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 36(3), 309-334.
- Effingham, Nikk and Robson, Jon (2007). A mereological challenge to endurantism. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 85(4), 633-640.
- Wasserman, Ryan (2018). *Paradoxes of Time Travel*. Oxford: OUP. **Chapter 6.**

Week 5: Two-dimensional models

On the model of time travel we have been assuming so far, time travellers cannot change the past – while they might cause the past to be the way that it is, they can never make the past *different* from how it (now) is. But many time travel stories, of course, don't play by these rules – they have their protagonists do all kinds of things in the past which, *according to those very same stories*, never actually happened. Over the next three weeks we will examine alternative models of time travel that purport to make sense of such past- (and indeed future-) alteration. First up is the two-dimensional model, which postulates two dimensions of time – call them time and *hypertime* – such that what is true at a time can be different at different hypertimes. We'll examine different versions of this view, according to whether the present moment travels back *with* the time traveller, and whether the past changes 'all at once' or gradually, like a video tape being overwritten.

Compulsory reading:

- G.C. Goddu (2003). Time travel and changing the past (or how to kill yourself and live to tell the tale. *Ratio* 16(1), 16-32.

Further reading:

- Meiland, Jack W. (1974). A two-dimensional passage model of time for time travel. *Philosophical Studies* 26(3-4), 153-173.
- Bernstein, Sara (2017). Time travel and the movable present. In John Keller (ed.), *Being, Freedom, and Method: Themes from the Philosophy of Peter van Inwagen*, Oxford: OUP.
- Wasserman, Ryan (2018). *Paradoxes of Time Travel*. Oxford: OUP. **Chapter 3, section 4.**

Week 6: Branching models

By far the most popular model of past-alteration in popular discussions of time travel is the *branching* model, whereby time-travellers to the past create 'new' timelines, branching off

from the 'old' timeline, in which the altered past can play out. If we're to avoid appealing to hypertime, the adjectives 'new' and 'old' here must be understood relative to the time-traveller's personal time – from the perspective of external time, both branches timelessly exist. We will drill down into the consequences of the model, and discuss to what extent it can really claim to be a model in which the time-traveller *changes the past*.

Compulsory reading:

- Lewis, David (2023). The paradoxes of time travel: The Gavin David Young Lectures at the University of Adelaide (1971). In Frederique Janssen-Lauret and Fraser Macbride (eds.), *Philosophical Manuscripts: David Lewis*, Oxford: OUP. **Section 6 ('Changing the Past: Success')**.

Further reading:

- Effingham, Nikk (2012). An unwelcome consequence of the multiverse thesis. *Synthese* 184, 375-386.
- Wasserman, Ryan (2018). *Paradoxes of Time Travel*. Oxford: OUP. **Chapter 3, section 3.**

Week 7: 'Split time' models

Past-alteration scenarios violate two important theorems of standard tense logic: *linearity in the past* – roughly, that whatever will have been the case is sometime the case – and *immutability in the future* – roughly, that whatever is the case will always have been the case. (Future-alteration, conversely, violates *linearity in the future* and *immutability in the past*.) An alternative approach to making sense of past-alteration, then, involves trying to construct tense logics which permit violations of these principles. On the resulting view, past-alteration is possible as long as it's possible for time to be 'backwards branching' in structure and for precedence to 'come apart' from succession. We'll look at different ways of interpreting these models, and examine how they lead to 'explanatory gaps', where by changing the past, time-travellers also change that which now explains why the past will soon be different.

Compulsory reading:

- Kaiserman, Alex (2023). The logic of past-alteration. In Karen Bennett and Dean Zimmerman (eds.), *Oxford Studies in Metaphysics: Volume 13*, Oxford: OUP.

Further reading:

- Meyer, Ulrich (2024). The future of the present. *Erkenntnis* 89, 463-478.
- Effingham, Nikk (2021). Vacillating time: A metaphysics for time travel and Geachianism. *Synthese* 199, 7159-7180.

Week 8: The ethics of time travel

Time travel stories are replete with ethical dilemmas, cautionary tales, and warnings of disastrous consequences if time travellers don't stick to the rules. In this final week we'll ask whether time travellers do indeed face any distinctive ethical challenges, and to what extent this depends on which model of time travel one adopts.

Compulsory reading:

- Bernstein, Sara (forthcoming). Ethical puzzles of time travel. In Nina Emery (ed.), *Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Time*.

Further reading:

- Faraci, David (2009). Heroes and the ethics of time travel: Does the present matter? In D. Johnson and W. Irwin (eds.), *Heroes and Philosophy*, Wiley.

The metaphysics of relations

Prof Nicholas Jones and Prof Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra, M. 2 – 4, Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

Please see the Canvas page for the course.

Formal Semantics

Prof Paul Elbourne – F. 2 – 4, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

Much work by contemporary philosophers of language uses the tools of formal semantics. This course trains students in the craft of doing formal semantics. It introduces Frege's hypothesis that functional application is the mechanism by which the meaning of a complex phrase is composed from the meanings of its constituent parts. It applies this insight to the analysis of a variety of core semantic phenomena, including argument structure, adjectival modification, definite descriptions, relative clauses, binding, and quantification. Emphasis throughout is on training students to be able to produce explicit detailed analyses of novel data.

We will be using the following textbook: Irene Heim and Angelika Kratzer, 1998, *Semantics in Generative Grammar*, Blackwell. Students intending to follow this course should acquire a copy.

Before the first session, participants are requested to read the first three chapters of the textbook and to do Exercises 3a and 3d on pages 32-4; for Exercise 3a, please use the lambda notation as defined on pages 34-8.

We will simply be working through the textbook chapters in order. A tentative schedule is as follows:

Week One 1-3

Week Two 4

Week Three 5

Week Four 6

Week Five 7-8

Week Six 9

Week Seven 10

Week Eight 11

Philosophy of Mathematics

Prof Ian Rumfitt and Dr Chris Scambler – W. 11 – 1 *except week 5: W. 2 – 4*, All Souls College

This class will address questions related to indefinite extensibility and modality in the foundations of mathematics.

In the first half we will look at various proposals for roles that modality might (or might not) play in mathematical foundations, including those involving indefinite extensibility. In the second half we turn to more general foundational issues, including the question of the extent to which linguistic considerations encourage Platonism in mathematics, and the question of what foundations of mathematics is for in the first place.

The class will be divided into four ‘themes’, each guided by a main reading.

Theme A: Indefinite Extensibility and Potentialism

Week 1: Michael Dummett, 'What is Mathematics About?' (in *the Seas of Language*, OUP)

Week 2: Oystein Linnebo & Stewart Shapiro, 'Actual and Potential Infinity' (Nous 53(1), 2019)

Theme B: Mathematics and modality

Week 3: Hartry Field, 'Realism, Mathematics, and Modality' (Philosophical Topics, 16(1), 1988)

Week 4: John Hawthorne & Juhani Yli-Vakkuri, 'The Necessity of Mathematics' (Nous, 54(3), 2020)

Theme C: (Apparent) singular reference in maths

Week 5: Richard Pettigrew, 'Platonism and Aristotelianism in Mathematics' (Philosophia Mathematica, 16(3) 2008)

Week 6: Harold Hodes, 'Where Do the Natural Numbers Come From?' (Synthese, 84(3), 1990)

Theme D: Foundations

Week 7: Penelope Maddy, 'What do we want a foundation to do?' (in *Reflections on the Foundations of Mathematics*, 2019)

Week 8: Salvatore Florio & Graham Leach-Krouse, 'What Russell Should Have Said to Burali-Forti' (RSL, 10(4), 2019)

Philosophy, AI and Innovation

Prof Philipp Koralus and Brendan McCord – M. 4 – 6, St Catherine’s College (Top Floor, Porter’s Lodge)

Description: The seminar will explore issues at the intersection of philosophy, AI, and technological innovation, co-taught by a philosopher and a technologist. The seminar will welcome a variety of visiting discussants from the technology industry throughout term, coming to us from places including Midjourney, Imbue, Stripe, Story Protocol, and ex/ante venture capital. The focus will be on how a concern for human flourishing can be embedded in the global technology development pipeline from the ground up, and on exploring how broader bridges can be built between philosophy and technology. The seminar is primarily aimed at philosophy graduate students and computer science graduate students but participants from other areas are welcome.

Prerequisites: please email philipp.koralus@philosophy.ox.ac.uk no later than April 15th with a (very) brief explanation of your interest in the seminar to reserve a spot. Space limited to maintain quality of discussion.

Decision Theory

Prof Jean Baccelli – Th. 11 – 1 Radcliffe Humanities, (Ryle Room *except week 2*: Lecture Room)

This graduate class will introduce to selected technical and conceptual topics in the contemporary theory of individual decision-making. The short reading list below is accessible online at <https://rl.talis.com/3/oxford/lists/66C53D4F-D529-7E74-61C1-93B972E4FA70.html?lang=en&login=1>

1. Preference

Simon French. *Decision Theory: An Introduction to the Mathematics of Rationality*. Chichester: Ellis Horwood Limited, 1986. Chapter 3 (“Preference Orders and Value Functions”).

Paul Anand. Rationality and Intransitive Preference – Foundations for the Modern View. In Paul Anand, Prasanta Pattanaik, and Clemens Puppe, editors, *The Handbook of Rational and Social Choice*, 156–172. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.

John Broome. Utility. *Economics and Philosophy*, 7(1):1–12, 1991.

2. Choice

Christopher Chambers and Federico Echenique. *Revealed Preference Theory*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016. Chapter 2 (“Classical Abstract Choice Theory”).

Amartya Sen. Behaviour and the Concept of Preference. *Economica*, 40 (159):241–259, 1973.

Amartya Sen. *Internal Consistency of Choice*. *Econometrica*, 61(3):495–521, 1993. Sections 2 (“Choice, Correspondence and Consistency”) and 3 (“What is the Problem with Internal Consistency of Choice?”)

3. Expected Utility under Risk

Itzhak Gilboa. *Theory of Decision under Uncertainty*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009. Chapter 8 (“von Neumann-Morgenstern’s Theorem”).

Philippe Mongin. The Allais Paradox: What It Became, What It Really Was, What It Now Suggests to Us. *Economics & Philosophy*, 35(3):423–459, 2019.

4. Expected Utility under Uncertainty

Itzhak Gilboa. *Theory of Decision under Uncertainty*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009. Chapters 10 (“Savage’s Theorem”) and 12 (“A Critique of Savage”).

Mark Machina. Event-Separability in the Ellsberg Urn. *Economic Theory*, 48(2-3):425–436, 2011.

5. Non-Expected Utility

John Quiggin. Non-Expected Utility Models Under Objective Uncertainty. In Mark Machina and William Viscusi, editors, *Handbook of the Economics of Risk and Uncertainty*, volume 1, 701–728. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 2014.

Jürgen Eichberger and David Kelsey. Ambiguity. In Paul Anand, Prasanta Pattanaik, and Clemens Puppe, editors, *The Handbook of Rational and Social Choice*, 113–139. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

6. Dynamic Consistency

Peter Wakker. Justifying Bayesianism by Dynamic Decision Principles. Unpublished note, accessible at <https://personal.eur.nl/wakker/pdf/alias.pdf>, 1999.

Mark Machina. Dynamic Consistency and Non-Expected Utility Models of Choice under Uncertainty. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 27(4):1622–1668, 1989.

Paolo Ghirardato. Revisiting Savage in a Conditional World. *Economic Theory*, 20(1):83–92, 2002.

7. Ignorance

Simon French. *Decision Theory: An Introduction to the Mathematics of Rationality*. Chichester: Ellis Horwood Limited, 1986. Chapter 2 (“Decision Theory under Strict Uncertainty”).

Wulf Gaertner. *A Primer in Social Choice Theory*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009 (Second Edition). Chapter 7 (“Distributive Justice: Rawlsian and Utilitarian Rules”).

Salvador Barbera, Walter Bossert, and Prasanta Pattanaik. Ranking Sets of Objects. In Salvador Barbera, Peter Hammond, and Christian Seidl, editors, *Handbook of Utility Theory, Volume II: Extensions*, 893–977. Boston: Kluwer Academic Press, 2004. Section 3 (“Complete Uncertainty”).

Non-realism in metanormativity and moral psychology

Dr Carlos Nunez Jimenez – W. 2 – 4, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

Course Description

Non-realist theories in metanormativity—theories like expressivism, contextualism or relativism—portray (or, in any case, seem committed to portraying) normative judgments as being either constituted or in central respects determined by certain non-cognitive states. In this course, we will explore the question of what such non-cognitive states should look like in order to play the role that such theories would need them to play. One central theme we will explore is whether, and how, non-cognitive states can account for relations of

agreement and disagreement, and how different non-realist theories might make use of such accounts to explain normative disagreement.

Helpful Background Readings (some chapters included as core readings)

- Allan Gibbard (1990), *Wise Choices, Apt Feelings* (esp. chs. 1-4,8-10), OUP.
- Allan Gibbard (2003), *Thinking How To Live*, (esp. chs. 1-4), OUP.
- Simon Blackburn (1998), *Ruling passions*, ([esp. ch. 3](#)), OUP.
- Stephen Finlay (2014), *Confusion of Tongues: A Theory of Normative Language*, (esp. chs. 2-3, 8) OUP.
- John MacFarlane (2014), *Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and its Applications*, (esp. chs. 1, 8-9), OUP.

Schedule (subject to minor changes)

Week 1 Gibbard on norm-acceptance and planning states

- Gibbard, A. *Wise Choices, Apt Feelings*, ch. 4, & pp. 164-173.
- Gibbard, A. *Thinking How To Live*, ch. 3.

Week 2 Gibbard's plan expressivism

- Gibbard, A. *Thinking How To Live*, pp. 60-82
- Bratman, M. E. (2006). *Thinking How to Live* and the Restriction Problem. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 72(3), 707 - 713.

Optional:

- Broome, J. (2008). Comment on Lecture I of "Comments on Allan Gibbard's Tanner Lectures." In *Reconciling Our Aims: In Search of Bases for Ethics*. Oxford University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195370423.003.0006>

Week 3 Negation problem

- Schroeder, M. (2008). How Expressivists Can and Should Solve Their Problem with Negation. *Noûs*, 42(4), 573-599.
- Baker, D., & Woods, J. (2015). How Expressivists Can and Should Explain Inconsistency. *Ethics*, 125(2), 391-424.

Week 4 Agent-centered judgments

- Dreier, J. (1996). Accepting agent centered norms: A problem for non-cognitivists and a suggestion for solving it. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 74(3), 409-422.

- Ayars, A., & Rosen, G. (2021). Noncognitivism and agent-centered norms. *Philosophical Studies*.

Week

5 Agent-centered judgments and disagreement

- Ayars, A. (2021). Deciding for Others: An Expressivist Theory of Normative Judgment. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*.
- Nunez, C. (forthcoming) "Expressivism, Moral Psychology and Direction of Fit," *The Oxford Handbook of Metaethics*. Copp, D. and Rosati, C. (eds.)

Week 6 Meta-linguistic negotiation and disagreement

- Plunkett, D., & Sundell, T. (2013). Disagreement and the semantics of normative and evaluative terms." Ann Arbor, MI: MPublishing, University of Michigan Library.
- Stroud, S. (2019). Conceptual Disagreement. *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 56(1), 15-27.

Week 7 Contextualism and Relativism

- MacFarlane, J. (2007). Relativism and disagreement. *Philosophical Studies*, 132(1), 17–31. <http://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-010-9626-9>
- Finlay, S. (2017). Disagreement Lost and Found. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), *Oxford Studies in Metaethics* 12. Oxford University Press. pp. 187-205.

Week 8 Contextualism and Relativism

- Broome, J. A linguistic turn in the philosophy of normativity?, *Analytic Philosophy*, 57 (2016), pp. 1-14
- Dreier, J. (2009). Relativism (and expressivism) and the problem of disagreement. *Philosophical Perspectives*, 23(1), 79-110.

Metaethics

Dr Umut Baysan – Th. 11 – 1, St Anne's College (Seminar Room 6 *except week 3*: Seminar Room 1)

In these classes, we will explore topics in metaethics, with a focus on *non-naturalist realism*. This is the metaethical view that moral properties (such as *being right, being wrong, being good, being bad*) exist objectively/mind-independently, and they are *sui generis* properties, irreducible to natural properties. While our focus will be on non-naturalist realism, through various arguments for and against this view, we will explore wider issues and debates in contemporary metaethics.

See below for a week-by-week breakdown of topics and readings. Please read the assigned material to attend that week's session.

Week 1: Introducing metaethics through non-naturalist realism

Russ Shafer-Landau, "Ethics as philosophy: a defense of ethical nonnaturalism", in *Metaethics after Moore* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), T. Horgan and M. Timmons, eds., pp. 209-232.

Week 2: Moore's non-naturalism

G. E. Moore, *Principia Ethica* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903). Chapter 1.

Nicholas Sturgeon, "Moore on ethical naturalism", *Ethics*, 2003.

Judith Jarvis Thomson, "The legacy of *Principia*", in *Metaethics after Moore* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), T. Horgan and M. Timmons, eds., pp. 233–254.

Week 3: The "just-too-different" intuition

David Enoch, *Taking Morality Seriously* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). Chapter 5, Section 1.

Hille Paakkunainen, "The 'just too different' objection to normative naturalism", *Philosophy Compass*, 2017.

David Copp, "Just too different: normative properties and natural properties", *Philosophical Studies*, 2020.

Nicholas Laskowski, "The sense of incredibility in ethics", *Philosophical Studies*, 2019.

Week 4: Non-naturalism and moral explanation

Samuel Baron, Mark Colyvan, Kristie Miller & Michael Rubin, "Non-naturalistic moral explanation", *Synthese*, 2021.

Gilbert Harman, "Ethics and observation", in his *Nature of Morality* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977).

- Reprinted in *Ethical Theory* edited by J. Rachels (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 85-91).

Nicholas Sturgeon, "Moral explanations", in D. Copp and D. Zimmerman (eds.), *Morality, Reason and Truth* (Rowman and Allanheld, 1985).

- Reprinted in various other collections: see: (i) A. Fisher & S. Kirchin (eds.), *Arguing About Metaethics* (Routledge, 2006); (ii) G. Sayre-McCord (ed.), *Essays on Moral Realism*, (Cornell, 1988); (ii) J. Rachels, (ed.), *Ethical Theory* (OUP, 1998).)

(I have an unpublished manuscript on this topic. Contact me if you are interested.)

Week 5: The reduction argument against non-naturalism

Bart Streumer, *Unbelievable Errors* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), Chapter 2.
David Enoch, *Taking Morality Seriously* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), Chapter 3, sections 3.6-3.7 and Chapter 6, section 6.2.
Justin Klocksiem, "Against reductive ethical naturalism", *Philosophical Studies*, 2019.

Week 6: The bruteness argument against non-naturalism

Tristram McPherson, "Ethical non-naturalism and the metaphysics of supervenience", *Oxford Studies in Metaethics*, vol. 7, 2012.
Alison Hills, "Supervenience and moral realism", in *Reduction, Abstraction, Analysis*, (Ontos Verlag, 2009).
Jamie Dreier, "Is there a supervenience problem for robust moral realism?", *Philosophical Studies*, 2019.

Week 7: Non-naturalism without supervenience

Anandi Hattiangadi, "Moral supervenience", *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, 2018.
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Gideon Rosen, "What is normative necessity?", in M. Dumitru (ed.), *Metaphysics, Meaning, and Modality: Themes from Kit Fine*, 2020.
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Week 8: Moral arguments against moral non-naturalism

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Max Khan Hayward, "Immoral realism", *Philosophical Studies*, 2019.
David Enoch, "Thanks, we're good: why moral realism is not morally objectionable", *Philosophical Studies*, 2021.
Camil Golub, "Is there a good moral argument against moral realism?" *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice*, 2021.

Current developments in Ethics

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Please see the Canvas page for the class.