

FACULTY OF PHILOSOPHY  
UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD



PHILOSOPHY LECTURES PROSPECTUS:  
GRADUATE CLASSES

MICHAELMAS TERM 2024

## NOTES:

- The normal duration of an event is one hour. Where the class or lecture lasts longer than an hour, the start time and end time will be given.
- By convention, in-person lectures at Oxford begin at 5 minutes past the hour and end at 5 minutes before the hour.
- Unless otherwise specified, the lectures and classes are given for all of weeks 1 to 8.
- Teaching is now taking place in person.
- The Faculty Canvas site for graduate courses will contain a folder for each of these classes. If you are taking a class then please visit the Canvas site for further information. If there is no description in the published Prospectus, one is usually placed on Canvas nearer the term. Reading lists will often be available on ORLO.
- Every effort is made to ensure that the information contained in this Prospectus is accurate at the start of term, but sometimes errors persist. If you think you have found a mistake, please contact James Knight ([james.knight@philosophy.ox.ac.uk](mailto:james.knight@philosophy.ox.ac.uk)).
- Enquiries about class attendance may be address to [admin@philosophy.ox.ac.uk](mailto:admin@philosophy.ox.ac.uk).

# Graduate Classes

Graduate classes are, except where otherwise indicated, intended for the Faculty's BPhil and MSt students. Other students may attend, and are welcome, provided they first seek and obtain the permission of the class-giver(s).

## **BPhil Pro-Seminar: Theoretical Philosophy**

Various class-givers and times

The Pro-seminar introduces students to study, practice, and standards in graduate-level philosophy. Every starting BPhil student will attend four sessions with one class-giver, then change group midway through term for four sessions with another class-giver. Seminars in Michaelmas Term will cover key material in practical philosophy. Class-givers will contact their groups, specifying readings and confirming the class time, in advance of term.

### **Plato's *Phaedrus***

Prof Dominic Scott – T. 11 – 1, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

In this seminar we shall work through Plato's *Phaedrus*. Attention will be given to reading the dialogue as a whole, with due regard to its literary as well as its philosophical aspects. Topics to be discussed include:

- The unity of the dialogue—does it have a central, organising theme, e.g. love, rhetoric, or education?)
- Philosophical madness
- Recollection and forms
- The critique of writing

Although the focus is on a single dialogue, I shall also be drawing comparisons on specific themes with other dialogues, especially:

The philosophy of love, especially the value of the individual as the object of love (*Symposium*)

Moral Psychology—the divided soul (*Republic*)

Rhetoric (*Gorgias*)

I shall also discuss the place of the *Phaedrus* in the Platonic corpus: some features seem to connect it to the middle period dialogues (*Phaedo*, *Symposium* and *Republic*), others to the later period (especially in its discussion of philosophical method: collection and division).

As a translation of the *Phaedrus*, I shall mainly be using:

- Nehamas, A. and Woodruff, P. (1995) *Plato's Phaedrus*. Indianapolis (Hackett edition), which has a very useful introduction.

### **Ancient epistemology**

Prof Alex Bown and Prof Simon Shogry – Th. 9 – 11, Balliol College (Massey Room *except week 3*: Russell Room)

Consider a day at the beach. The breeze feels pleasant to me but uncomfortably strong to you; the water seems lukewarm to me but freezing to you. Are we both right in these perceptual judgements? If so, is this because the breeze and the water have changed in the course of being perceived by me and by you? Or, rather, are we not even perceiving the same mind-independent things but instead in touch with objects that are private to each perceiver? Or perhaps we are not making unqualified judgements about the breeze and water? The former is pleasant-to-me, not pleasant simpliciter, and this is compatible with it being uncomfortably-strong-to-you. Or perhaps the water *appears* lukewarm to me, just as it *appears* freezing to you, but neither of these judgements amounts to a claim about how the water *really is*?

In this seminar, addressed to students in the MSt in Ancient Philosophy and BPhil, we will investigate Plato's examination of the problem of conflicting appearances in the first section of the *Theaetetus* (up to 187a), where a relativist solution is explored and ultimately rejected. We will then consider how Plato's discussion sets the agenda for later engagement with related epistemological issues in Aristotle, Epicureanism, Stoicism, and Pyrrhonian Scepticism.

### Texts

We will be using the Levett-Burnyeat translation of Plato's *Theaetetus*, which is inexpensive to purchase and available online [here](#). For the Greek, use the Oxford Classical Texts edition (available online [here](#)).

In Week 5, we will read some of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, Book Gamma. A recommended translation is the one by Kirwan of Books Γ–E in the Clarendon Aristotle series, available online [here](#). For the Greek, you should again use the Oxford Classical Texts edition ([here](#)).

In Weeks 6 and 7, on the Epicureans and Stoics, we will use Long and Sedley's collection of texts, which includes translation and commentary (available online [here](#)).

In Week 8 we will conclude with Sextus Empiricus' *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*. The Loeb translation, with facing Greek text, can be found [here](#). We also recommend the translation by [Annas and Barnes](#).

Student presentations are strongly encouraged. A provisional schedule is below. Please note the reading for Week 1 and try to complete it in advance of the first seminar. Check the course page on Canvas for PDFs of selected secondary readings.

## Provisional Schedule

### **Week 1: Prologue, Knowledge is perception, and Protagoras' "Measure Doctrine"**

Plato, *Theaetetus* 142a-160e (= pp. 259-284 in Levett-Burnyeat translation)

Fine, G. "Protagorean Relativisms", in her *Plato on Knowledge and Forms* (OUP, 2003), pp. 132-159.

### **Week 2: The "Secret Doctrine" and the Problem of Conflicting Appearances**

Plato, *Theaetetus* 151d-160e (= pp. 271-284 in Levett-Burnyeat translation)

Fine, G. "Conflicting Appearances: *Theaetetus* 153d-154b" in her *Plato on Knowledge and Forms* (OUP, 2003), pp. 160-183.

Lee, M. "The Secret Doctrine in Plato's *Theaetetus*", ch. 5 of her *Epistemology after Protagoras: Responses to Relativism in Plato, Aristotle, and Democritus* (OUP, 2005).

### **Week 3: Is Protagoras' "Measure Doctrine" Self-Refuting?**

Plato, *Theaetetus* 160e-172c (= pp. 284-299 in Levett-Burnyeat translation)

Fine, G. "Plato's Refutation of Protagoras in the *Theaetetus*", in her *Plato on Knowledge and Forms* (OUP, 2003), pp. 184-212

Castagnoli, L., 2004, "Protagoras Refuted: How Clever is Socrates' Most Clever Argument at *Theaetetus* 171a-c?", *Topoi* 23: 3-32.

### **Week 4: The Final Refutation of Knowledge as Perception**

Plato, *Theaetetus* 172c-187b (= pp. 300-318 in Levett-Burnyeat translation; focus especially on the passage from 184b-187b)

Lorenz, H. "Belief and Reason", ch. 6 of *The Brute Within* (OUP, 2006), pp. 74-94. (The discussion of *Theaetetus* 184b-187b begins on p. 76.)

Menn, S. 2020. "On the Digression in the *Theaetetus*". *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 57, 65-120.

### **Week 5: Aristotle on Protagoras**

Aristotle, *Met.* Γ 3-6 (esp. 5)

Wedin, M. V. 2004. "On the use and abuse of non-contradiction: Aristotle's critique of Protagoras and Heraclitus in *Metaphysics* Gamma 5", *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 26: 213-239. Lee, M. "Aristotle on Protagoras and the *Theaetetus*", ch. 6 of her *Epistemology after Protagoras: Responses to Relativism in Plato, Aristotle, and Democritus* (OUP 2005).

### **Week 6: Epicurus on perception**

Long, A.A. and Sedley, D. *The Hellenistic Philosophers* (CUP 1987), vol. 1, chapters 5, 7, 12, and 14-18.

Everson, S. "Epicurus on the truth of the senses", in *Companions to ancient thought 1: Epistemology*, ed. by S. Everson, Cambridge 1990: 161-183.

Bown, A. "Epicureans on truth and relativism", unpublished draft.

### **Week 7: Epicureans and Stoics on the contents of perception**

Long, A.A. and Sedley, D. *The Hellenistic Philosophers* (CUP 1987), vol. 1, chapters 14-18, 39-41, and 53.

Frede, M. 1994. "The Stoic Conception of Reason", in K.J. Boudouris (ed.), *Hellenistic*

*Philosophy* (Athens: International Center for Greek Philosophy and Culture, 1994), pp. 50–61. Schwab, W. and Shogry, S. 2023. “Epicureans and Stoics on the Rationality of Perception”. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 106 (1), 58-83.

### **Week 8: Conflicting Appearances and the 10 Modes of Aenesidemus**

Sextus Empiricus, *Outlines of Pyrrhonism (PH)* 1.1-163 (skim from section 62 onwards)  
Morison, B. 2011. “The Logical Structure of the Sceptic’s Opposition”. *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 40, 265-295.

### **Kant**

Dr Luke Davies – W. 9 – 11, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

This seminar will focus on the system of duties that Kant presents in his late work of moral and political philosophy, the *Metaphysics of Morals*. We will consider broad topics such as the normative standing of Kant’s political philosophy and the dependence of some of our ethical duties on political institutions, in addition to looking at the content of specific duties in the Kantian system. Following two classes in which we will speak about some of the central themes of the *Metaphysics of Morals*, the duties we will look at are:

1. the prohibition on servility,
2. our duties to the destitute,
3. the duty of self-improvement in the context of biomedical enhancements, and
4. the duty of gratitude.

The topics of the last two meetings will be up for discussion.

**This class is primarily for students on the BPhil.** As such, no prior knowledge of Kant will be presupposed. However, if you have never encountered Kant’s moral philosophy, I recommend reading the following prior to the first meeting:

- Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, Sections I & II
- Reath, “Kant’s Moral Philosophy”, *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Ethics*
- O’Neill, “Kantian Ethics”, *A Companion to Ethics*

Those with more advanced knowledge of Kant are welcome to attend but are reminded that the discussion will remain at a level accessible to those coming at the material for the first time.

Each meeting will start with a structured discussion of the primary texts. This will be followed by a short (10 minutes *max.*) student presentation on the piece of secondary literature assigned in the core reading. We will then have a more open discussion of the textual and philosophical questions raised by the secondary literature.

### **Weeks 1 & 2 - Right and Ethics in the *Metaphysics of Morals***

The first two weeks will serve as an orientation to Kant’s *Metaphysics of Morals*. We will look at the distinction between Right and Virtue, and begin to examine the thorny question of how these two domains of morality relate to each other. For those who are unfamiliar with it, this

will also be an opportunity to get acquainted with some of the basic features of Kantian morality.

**Core reading:**

- Kant, Introduction to the *Metaphysics of Morals*, Introduction to the Doctrine of Right, and Introduction to the Doctrine of Virtue
- Wood “The Final Form of Kant’s Practical Philosophy”
- Willaschek “Which Imperatives for Right? On the Non-Prescriptive Character of Juridical Laws in Kant’s *Metaphysics of Morals*”

In weeks 3-6 we will discuss the different kinds of duties in Kant’s moral system. As we will see, each duty is either a duty of right or a duty of virtue, either perfect or imperfect, and either owed to oneself or owed to others.

**Week 3 - Duties of right to others**

In this week we will look at duties of right to others. This will continue the discussion of the way in which Kant’s political philosophy differs from and compliments his ethics. We will focus on the duties we owe to the destitute, which raise a puzzle for Kant’s political philosophy. Kant claims that all duties of right to others are negative and perfect, but duties of aid are usually considered positive and imperfect. How can there be duties of right to aid those in need?

**Core reading:**

- Kant, Doctrine of Right, §§1-9, §15, §§41-44, General Remark C (6:326-6328)
- Allais, “What Properly Belongs to Me: Kant on Giving to Beggars”

**Week 4 - Duties of right to oneself**

Given the way that Kant conceives of duties of right, it is puzzling that there are any duties of right to oneself. In this week, we try to get a clearer sense of what such duties might involve and ask what such duties add to our moral thinking more generally. We illustrate duties of right to oneself with the prohibition on servility.

**Core reading:**

- Kant, Doctrine of Right, Division of the Doctrine of Right A (6:236-37)
- Kant, Doctrine of Virtue, §§1-18
- Hill, “Servility and Self-Respect”

**Week 5 - Duties of virtue to ourselves**

Do we owe it to ourselves to seek to improve our physical capacities and our moral dispositions? Kant thinks we do, and we examine that claim in this class. We also ask whether the Kantian requirement to perfect one’s talents is compatible with available and possible forms of biomedical enhancement. Would we contribute to satisfying the duty by, for example, biomedically stopping ourselves from feeling envy?

**Core reading:**

- Kant, Doctrine of Virtue, §§19-22
- Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, 4:421-424, 4:428-431
- Chance, "Kant and the Enhancement Debate: Imperfect Duties and Perfecting Ourselves"

**Week 6 - Duties of virtue to others**

In this week we consider our imperfect duties to others. We will look at Kant's distinction between duties of love and duties of respect and ask how the latter fit into his broader moral framework. We will also take a close look at the duty of gratitude. We will consider why it is so important for Kant, and how it relates to the previous duties we have looked at.

**Core reading:**

- Kant, Doctrine of Virtue §§23-44
- Herman, *The Moral Habitat*, chapter 2

**Weeks 7 & 8 - Up for discussion**

We will decide what to speak about in the last two classes in the seminar itself. Some possibilities for topics include:

- Any duties that we didn't have time to look at, such as:
  - the duty to adopt others' ends as your own (sympathy)
  - the duty to leave the state of nature
  - cosmopolitan duties, such as the duty to admit refugees
  - duties of right to non-state peoples
  - duties arising due to historic injustices
- The question of whether and why perfect duties always trump imperfect duties
- The demandingness of Kantian morality (as opposed, for example, to utilitarianism)
- Kant on race and/or gender and the scope of his moral theory
- Any other topics proposed by students in the class.



## Heidegger's later philosophy

Dr Jack Wearing and Prof Paul Lodge – W. 11 – 1, Mansfield College

This class will examine a number of the central themes from Heidegger's philosophy from the 1930s onward. After a brief recap in Week 1 of the question of being as posed in *Being and Time*, we will concentrate each week on one of Heidegger's most important article length essays and lectures. Some of the themes we will be covering include art and truth, the history of being, and Heidegger's critiques of humanism and modern technology.

The core readings listed below are essential – please read them in advance of each class, as we will be looking closely at these texts in the discussions. We will also distribute a longer reading list, containing suggestions for further reading and some introductory and general texts for students who are reading Heidegger for the first time or who plan to write an essay on Heidegger's later thought.

In advance of each class, please send at least one question regarding the core reading to [jack.wearing@philosophy.ox.ac.uk](mailto:jack.wearing@philosophy.ox.ac.uk); we will anonymise these questions and group them together to structure the discussion.

### Core Readings

#### **Week 1:**

Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1962), Introduction, especially §§1–5.

Martin Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, revised 2nd ed., eds. and trans. Gregory Fried and Richard Polt (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014), ch. 3 ['The Question of the Essence of Being'].

#### **Week 2:**

Martin Heidegger, 'The Age of the World Picture (1938)', in *Off the Beaten Track*, trans. Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 57–72.

#### **Week 3:**

Martin Heidegger, 'The Origin of the Work of Art (1935–6)', in *Off the Beaten Track*, trans. Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 1–56.

#### **Week 4:**

Martin Heidegger, 'Nietzsche's Word: "God is Dead" (1943)', in *Off the Beaten Track*, trans. Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 157–199.

**Week 5:**

Martin Heidegger, 'Letter on "Humanism"', in *Pathmarks*, ed. and trans. William McNeill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 239–276.

**Week 6:**

Martin Heidegger, 'The Question Concerning Technology', in *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper Perennial Modern Thought, 2013), pp. 3–35.

**Week 7:**

Martin Heidegger, 'The Thing', in *Poetry, Language, Thought*, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper Perennial Modern Thought, 2013), pp. 161–184.

**Week 8:**

Martin Heidegger, 'Address: The Principle of Reason', in *The Principle of Reason*, trans. Reginald Lilly (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), pp. 117–130.

**Metaphysics and modality**

Prof James Studd – M. 11 – 1, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

This class will cover topics relating to the use of modality in metaphysics and the metaphysics of modality. The classes in weeks 1 and 2 begin by considering whether metaphysical modality and modal metaphysics are in good standing (roughly, Williamson think they are; Clarke-Doane thinks otherwise). Later classes will look at the relationship between modality and possibilities (possible world and possible objects). For example, should modal discourse be given an extensional analysis in terms of possibilities (e.g. Lewis's counterpart theory)? Or is it the other way round? Should talk of 'possibilities' be regimented in a language equipped with a primitive modal operator which quantifies only over actual items (e.g. Fine)? A third option, in line with recent work on modal logicism, is that modality and possible worlds alike should be defined in a suitable higher-order logic (e.g. Fritz). Some of these questions are sensitive to another issue we will consider: the necessitism–contingentism debate over whether the supply of objects (or higher-order entities) remains fixed or varies across different possible worlds.

I'll set some core reading for each class, which attendees should aim to read in advance. Some of the topics get a bit technical in places, and the classes will presuppose familiarity with (non-

modal) predicate logic; but I'll try not to assume more than that. We'll fill in any other formal background material in the classes as we go along.

Here is the core reading for the first two classes:

- Week 1: Williamson, Modal Science, *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 46 (2016)  
(read §§1–3 and 8; §§4–5 are optional; we'll return to the topics in §§6–7 later on)
- Week 2: Clarke-Doane, Modal Objectivity, *Noûs* 53 (2019)  
(feel free to omit the appendix)

Readings for later weeks and a handout for the classes will be posted on the course Canvas page.

### **Logical Consequence, Interpretations, Truth, and Generality**

Dr Marco Grossi – W. 2 – 4, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

General Info:

- Please e-mail me ([marco.grossi@philosophy.ox.ac.uk](mailto:marco.grossi@philosophy.ox.ac.uk)) if you'd like to come to these classes.
- Class structure: At the start of each class, we will introduce the topic by presenting an article or a book chapter that all participants are required to read beforehand. This will be followed by a discussion. Students are encouraged to ask if they wish to present.
- Requirements: The paper doesn't require any advanced technical knowledge above the usual logical tools taught in any undergraduate "Introduction to Logic" paper.
- Readings: They are all available on SOLO/Bodleian libraries. I am also happy to share the pdfs of each reading, just drop me an email.
- Students are invited to send me an email before each week's class with any questions they have about the reading that they would like to discuss. All questions are welcome.

Structure

This is a preliminary structure, which is flexible and open to changes: I am happy to adapt it to students' preferences along the way.

Week 1 Logical Consequence 1: What is it?

While we are all familiar with the "model-theoretic" notion of logical consequence we have been taught in our BA, philosophers disagree on what the model-theoretic notion is "modelling", and on what is its relationship with the historically prevalent notion of consequence discussed since Aristotle.

- Etchemendy, J. (1990) *The Concept of Logical Consequence*. Harvard University Press, Intro + chapters 1-3.

Week 2 Logical Consequence 2: From Tarski's definition to the model-theoretic definition. Issues of quantification and modality

What is the role of domains in model-theory? Can we show in model-theory that the premises of a valid argument "necessarily" imply what they imply model-theoretically?

- Etchemendy, J. (1990) *The Concept of Logical Consequence*. Harvard University Press, chapters 4-6.
- Extra reading (not required) Hanson, W. H. (1997). The concept of logical consequence. *The philosophical review*, 106(3), 365-409.

Week 3 Higher-order logic detour: a primer

We discuss the main results and notions of model-theory for higher-order logic

- Shapiro, S. (1991). *Foundations without foundationalism: A case for second-order logic* (Vol. 17). Clarendon Press. pages 59-96.
- Extra reading, not required: *ibidem*, part 5 of section 2.

Week 4 Logical consequence 3: The missing link between consequence and truth

We discuss how model-theory often fails at providing an intended model. This "fracture" between models and reality affects the relationship between truth and (model-theoretic) consequence.

- Kreisel, G. (1972). Informal rigour and completeness proofs. In I. Lakatos (ed.), *"Problems in the Philosophy of Mathematics"*. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
- Extra reading (not required) Shapiro, S. (1987). Principles of reflection and second-order logic. *Journal of Philosophical Logic*, 309-333.

Week 5 Absolute Generality

Can "everything" really mean absolutely everything, or is all discourse always restricted to some relevant domain? Should we care? Are quantifiers absolutely general in model-theory?

- Williamson, T. (2003). Everything. *Philosophical perspectives*, 17, 415-465.

Week 6 Higher-order logic: Innocent? Intelligible?

We critically assess Boolos' influential "plural" interpretation of higher-order talk.

- Boolos, G. (1984) To Be Is to Be a Value of a Variable (or to Be Some Values of Some Variables). *The Journal of Philosophy*, 81:8, 430-449.
- Extra reading (not required) Boolos, G. (1985). Nominalist platonism. *The Philosophical Review*, 94(3), 327-344.

Week 7 Higher-order semantics 1: higher-order model-theory

We discuss an alternative semantic theory based on a non-reductive interpretation of higher-order quantification, which promises to fix the relation between consequence and truth and regain generality.

- Rayo, A., & Uzquiano, G. (1999). Toward a theory of second-order consequence. *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic*, 40(3), 315-325.
- Additional reading (not required) Rayo, A. (2006) Beyond Plurals. In Rayo & Uzquiano, (eds) *"Absolute Generality"*, 220-254, Oxford University Press.

Week 8 Higher-order semantics 2: self-applicability and cross-order generality

We will discuss some criticisms of higher-order semantics.

- Parsons, C. (2006) The problem of absolute universality. In Rayo & Uzquiano (eds), *Absolute Generality*, 203-19, Oxford University Press.

### **Mind-dependence**

Dr Christopher Frugé— Th. 9 – 11, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

### **Overview**

This class will explore mind-dependence, covering various approaches and worries. We'll canvass both general metaphysical mechanics as well as particular views on social phenomena. Some of the approaches we'll canvass include those based on structuralness, essence, and grounding. Specific mind-dependent phenomena that we'll touch upon will include color, aesthetic properties, art and artifacts, and socially constructed phenomena like gender and race and law.

### **Topics**

1. Social Construction
2. Realism and Objectivity
3. Structure
4. Essence
5. Grounding
6. Grounding Again
7. Anti-Realism

### **Instructions**

#### *Readings*

Focus on the required reading, though the background and optional reading may be helpful.

#### *Questions*

Before each class you should come up with a question about the reading, and email it to me. The deadline for submitting them is the midnight before class, and I will use them to structure discussion.

### **Week 1: Social Construction**

Reading:

Haslanger, Sally. *Ontology and Social Construction*.

Searle, John. *Construction of Social Reality* chs. 1-2.

Optional:

Diaz Leon - What is social construction?

## **Week 2: Realism and Objectivity**

Reading:

Rosen, Gideon. Objectivity and Modern Idealism.

Thomasson, Amie. Realism and Human Kinds.

Optional:

Khalidi, Muhammad Ali. Mind-Dependent Kinds.

Mason, Rebecca. Against Social Kind Anti-Realism.

## **Week 3: Structure**

Reading:

Sider, Ted. Writing the Book of the World ch. 4.

Barnes, Elizabeth. Going Beyond the Fundamental sec. 1.

Sider, Ted. Substantivity in Feminist Metaphysics.

Background:

Lewis, David. New Work for a Theory of Universals.

Sider, Ted. Writing the Book of the World chs. 1-2.

## **Week 4: Essence**

Reading:

Mason, Rebecca. Social Kinds are Essentially Mind-Dependent. Passinsky, Asya. Social Objects, Response-Dependence, and Realism.

Optional:

Raven, Michael. A Puzzle for Social Essences.

Background:

Fine, Kit. Ontological Dependence.

## **Week 5: Grounding**

Reading:

Epstein, Brian. The Ant Trap chs. 5-6.

Schaffer, Jonathan. Anchoring as Grounding.

Epstein, Brian. Anchoring versus Grounding.

Background:

Fine, Kit. Guide to Ground.

Rosen, Gideon. Metaphysical Dependence, Grounding, and Reduction.

Schaffer, Jonathan. On What Grounds What.

## **Week 6: Grounding again**

Reading:

Griffith, Aaron. Social Construction and Grounding.

Barnes, Elizabeth. Going Beyond the Fundamental sec. 2.

Schaffer, Jonathan. Social Construction as Grounding.

## **Week 7: Anti-Realism**

Reading:

Taylor, Elanor. *Against Explanatory Realism*

Taylor, Elanor. *Substantive Social Metaphysics*

### **Philosophy of Physics**

Prof Adam Caulton and Prof Christopher Timpson – Th. 11 – 1, Radcliffe Humanities  
(Lecture Room)

The overall topics this term will be philosophy of thermal physics in weeks 1-4, and advanced philosophy of quantum mechanics and quantum field theory in weeks 5-8.

A central theme of the first half of term will be the nature and origin of time asymmetry in thermal physics (thermodynamics and statistical mechanics). We will pay particular attention to the logical structure of classical (phenomenological) thermodynamics, before moving to competing interpretations of the foundations of statistical mechanics (Boltzmannian vs Gibbsian approaches), and competing conceptions of the nature of probabilities in statistical mechanics. If time allows we will discuss Maxwell's Demon and its (alleged) information-theoretic exorcism via Landauer's Principle.

In the second half of term, we will turn to quantum mechanics and quantum field theory. We will explore the role of decoherence in attempted solutions to the measurement problem, and the celebrated Deutsch-Wallace representation theorem in Everettian quantum mechanics. Then we will look at some foundational and conceptual problems specific to quantum field theory. We will end the term with a dive into the fraught matter of localisation for relativistic quantum particles.

The intended audience is 4<sup>th</sup> years reading Physics and Philosophy, MMathPhys students taking this paper as an option, MSt Physics and Philosophy students, and BPhil and DPhil students with an interest in philosophy of physics.

Useful preparatory reading for the first part of term is: David Albert *Time and Chance* (Harvard 2000) and Huw Price *Time's Arrow and Archimedes' Point* (OUP 1996). A reading list for the second part of term is on the Canvas site.

## Risky Ethics

Dr Emma J. Curran– F. 9 – 11, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

The outcomes of our actions are rarely certain; when we act, we might bring about any number of outcomes. For our ethical theories to be action-guiding, they must tell us what to do in the face of such uncertainty. This seminar will serve as an introduction to the ethics of risky decision-making. It will cover questions of how to interpret, conceptualise and distribute risk, and it will address a series of problems risk poses for ethical theories.

The reading list will be kept up-to-date on [emmajcurran.co.uk/risky-ethics](http://emmajcurran.co.uk/risky-ethics).

### Week 1. *Ex Ante Pareto*

*Core readings:*

- Mahtani, Anna. (2017). The Ex Ante Pareto Principle, *Journal of Philosophy*, 11(6): 303-323
- Gustafsson, Johan E and Kacper Kowalczyk. (forthcoming). Ex Ante Pareto Principle and Opaque Identity, *Journal of Philosophy*, accessed: [johangustafsson.net/papers/ex-ante-pareto-and-the-opaque-identity-puzzle.pdf](http://johangustafsson.net/papers/ex-ante-pareto-and-the-opaque-identity-puzzle.pdf)

*Additional readings:*

- Mahtani, Anna. (2020). Frege's puzzle and the ex ante Pareto principle, *Philosophical Studies*, 178(6): 2077-2100

### Week 2. *Egalitarianism*

*Core readings:*

- Fleurbaey, Marc and Alex Voorhoeve. (2013). "Decide As You Would With Full Information: An Argument Against Ex Ante Pareto" in Nir Eyal, Samia A. Hurst, Ole F. Norheim, Dan Wikler (eds.) *Inequalities in Health*, New York: Oxford University Press: ch.8
- Frick, Johann. (2013). "Uncertainty and Justifiability to Each Person: Response to Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve" in Nir Eyal, Samia A. Hurst, Ole F. Norheim, Dan Wikler (eds.) *Inequalities in Health*, New York: Oxford University Press: ch.9

*Additional readings:*

- Broome, John. (1991). Fairness, *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 91(1): 87-102
- Wasserman, David. (1996). Let them Eat Chances, *Economics & Philosophy*, 12(1): 29-49
- Stefánsson, Orri H. (2023). In Defence of Pigou Dalton for Prospects, *Utilitas*, 35: 292-311



### **Week 3. Prioritarianism**

#### *Core readings:*

- Otsuka, Mike and Alex Voorhoeve. (2009). Why It Matters That Some People Are Worse Off Than Others: An Argument Against the Priority View, *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 37(2): 171-199
- Buchak, Lara. (2017). Taking Risks Behind the Veil of Ignorance, *Ethics*, 127(3): 610-644
- Van Fossen, Stephanie. (2024). Can Relative Prioritarianism Accommodate the Shift?, *Ethics*, 134(4): 525-537

#### *Additional readings:*

- Buchak, Lara. (2013). *Risk and Rationality*, New York: Oxford University Press, chs. 1-3.
- Thoma, Johana. (2023). Taking Risk on Behalf of Another, *Philosophy Compass*, 18(3): 1-13

### **Week 4. Contractualism**

#### *Core readings:*

- Frick, Johann. (2015). Contractualism and Social Risk, *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 43(3): 175-223
- Otsuka, Mike. (2015). "Risking Life and Limb: How to Discount Harms by Their Improbability" in I. Glenn Cohen, Norman Daniels, and Nir Eyal (eds.) *Statistical versus Identified Victims: An Interdisciplinary Perspective*, New York: Oxford University Press: ch.5
- Steuwer, Bastian. (2021). Contractualism, Complaints, and Risk, *Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy*, 19(2): 111-147
- John, Stephen. (2014). Risk, Contractualism, and Rose's "Prevention Paradox", *Social Theory and Practice*, 40(1): 28-50
- Hare, Caspar. (2012). Obligations to Merely Statistical People, *Journal of Philosophy*, 109(5/6): 378-390

### **Week 5. Partial Aggregation**

#### *Core readings:*

- Horton, Joe. (2020). Aggregation, Risk, and Reductio, *Ethics*, 130(4): 514-529
- Wu, Patrick. (2021). Aggregation and Reductio, *Ethics*, 132(2): 508-

#### *Additional readings:*

- Lazar, Seth. (2018). Limited Aggregation and Risk, *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 46 (2):117-159
- Curran, Emma. (2023). "Aggregation and Risk" in *Doing Less Than Best*, thesis submitted to the University of Cambridge: 64-93, [doi.org/10.17863/CAM.104249](https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.104249)
- Horton, Joe. (2017). Aggregation, Complaints, and Risk, *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 45(1): 54-81

## **Week 6. Constraints**

### *Core readings:*

- Hare, Caspar. (2016). Should We Wish Well To All?, *Philosophical Review*, 125(4): 451-472
- Kowalczyk, Kacper. (2022). People in Suitcases, *Journal of Moral Philosophy*,

### 20(1-2): 3-30 *Additional readings:*

- Tenenbaum, Sergio. (2017). Action, Deontology, and Risk: Against the Multiplicative Model, *Ethics*, 127(3): 674-707
- Harris, John. (1975). The Survival Lottery, *Philosophy*, 50(191): 81-87

## **Week 7. Risk Offsetting**

### *Core readings:*

- Barry, Christian and Garrett Cullity. (2022). Offsetting and Risk Imposition, *Ethics*, 132(2): 352-381
- Berkey, Brian. (2024). When Is It Permissible to Impose and Offset Risks? A Response to Barry and Cullity, *Ethics*, 134(4): 512-524
- Byrne, Thomas. (2022). Increasing the Risk That Someone Will Die Without Increasing the Risk That You Will Kill Them, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 107: 395-412

### *Additional readings:*

- Stafánsson, Orri H and Mac Willners. (2023). Why Offsetting is Not Like Shaking a Bag: a Reply to Barry and Cullity, *Ethics, Policy and Environment*, 26(1): 144-148
- John, Tyler M., Amanda Askell, and Hayden Wilkinson. (forthcoming). The Moral Inefficacy of Carbon Offsetting, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, [doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2024.2328639](https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2024.2328639)

## **Week 8. Risk as a Harm**

### *Core readings:*

- Rowe, Thomas. (2021). Can a risk of harm itself be a harm?, *Analysis*, 81(4), 694-701
- Stefánsson, Orri H. (2024). How a pure risk of harm can itself be a harm: a reply to Rowe, *Analysis*, 81(1): 112-116

### *Additional readings:*

- Smith, Martin. (2024). Probability, Normalcy, and the Right Against Risk Imposition, *Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy*, 27(3): 505-524
- Maheshwari, Kritika. (2021). On The Harm of Imposing Risk of Harm, *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice*, 26(4): 965-980

## Philosophy and Literature

Prof Stephen Mulhall – T. 2 – 4, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

This class will not focus primarily on what is generally called ‘the philosophy of literature’, although various topics central to that field (eg the status of fictional entities, the relationship between author and reader, the significance of authorial intention) will surface along the way. My interest lies rather in the relationship between literature and philosophy more broadly conceived, and in particular upon the ways in which literature (contrary to its fateful Platonic banishment from the just city) might claim the right to make pertinent contributions not only to specific branches of philosophy (ethics, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind) but to revising philosophy’s conception of its own nature – its goals, its methods, and its resources.

The course will begin by examining the ways in which some philosophers have recently argued that literary texts should be seen as having a particularly important role to play in our thinking about ethics. The work of Nussbaum and Diamond will be discussed in relation to some of their most prominent philosophical critics (McMahan, O’Neill), and in relation to specific literary texts by Henry James and Iris Murdoch. These discussions quickly broaden out to encompass questions about the nature of rationality, its relation to emotion and embodiment, and the implications of these matters for our understanding of philosophy’s own presuppositions as an intellectual enterprise. The primary reference point here will be Coetzee’s Tanner Lectures, *The Lives of Animals*, which have prompted rich responses from a number of philosophers (Singer, McDowell, Diamond and Cavell), a full understanding of which will require not only an engagement with the moral standing of non-human animals but also a broader excursion into the nature of realism and modernism in the arts, particularly as interpreted by the art historian, critic and theorist Michael Fried. The final weeks of the course will then follow out some of the implications of this material by looking in detail at the work of David Foster Wallace (both his fiction and his non-fiction writing).

The class will presuppose no prior understanding of the material to be discussed, and so will be accessible to students at any stage of the B. Phil programme (although it may of course be of particular relevance to students intending to write on topics in ethics and aesthetics). Graduate students in other programmes (in the philosophy faculty and in other faculties) will also be welcome to attend, with the class-giver’s permission ([email](#)).

A reading list is available on [ORLO](#). Lengthiest among the works on the list will be a number of novels, which the class will discuss in detail as we go along. The first two (which are also the longest among the novels) will be encountered relatively early on in term; so it might be a good idea to read (at least some portions of) them both before the class begins, rather than trying to do so together with the other assigned reading in the relevant weeks during term. The novels, in order of appearance, are:

Henry James, *The Golden Bowl*

Iris Murdoch, *The Black Prince*

## Political Philosophy

Prof David Enoch – M. 1 – 3, The Cube, St Cross Building

I plan to discuss in detail the texts **in bold letters**. The others are mostly for background or further reading.

The reading material, as well as the handouts, will be available on Canvas, under JPT. **Students not from the Faculty of Law** – you may need me to add you to this course in order to gain access. To do this, please send me an email at [David.Enoch@law.ox.ac.uk](mailto:David.Enoch@law.ox.ac.uk).

### Week 1, Oct 14<sup>th</sup>: Consent and Coercion

- **Scott Anderson (2023), “Coercion”, in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/coercion/>** Please read the intro, and Section 2.
- Mitch Berman, “The Normative Functions of Coercion Claims”, *Legal Theory* 8 (2002), 45-89.

### Week 2, Oct 21<sup>st</sup>: Third-Party Coercion

- **My “Contrastive Consent and Third-Party Coercion”, Philosophers’ Imprint 24 (2024), available here: <https://journals.publishing.umich.edu/phimp/article/id/3169/>**
- Tom Dougherty (2021), “Sexual Misconduct on a Scale: Gravity, Coercion, and Consent”, *Ethics* 131, 319-344.
- Mollie Gerver (2021), “Consent and Third-Party Coercion”, *Ethics* 131, 246-269.
- Quill R. Kukla (2021), “A Nonideal Theory of Sexual Consent”, *Ethics* 131, 270-292.
- Hallie Liberto, “Coercion, Consent, and the Mechanistic Question”, *Ethics* 131 (2021), 210-245.
- Victor Tadros (2021), “Consent to Sex in an Unjust World”, *Ethics* 131, 293-318.

### Week 3, Oct 28<sup>th</sup>: Adaptive Preferences and False Consciousness

- **Rosa Terlazzo (2021), “Adaptive Preference in Political Philosophy”, *Philosophy Compass* 17.**
- **My “False Consciousness for Liberals, Part I: Consent, Autonomy, and Adaptive Preferences”, *The Philosophical Review* 129 (2020), 159-210.**
- My “Autonomy as Non-Alienation, Autonomy as Sovereignty, and Politics”, *Journal of Political Philosophy* 30 (2022), 143-165.

### Week 4, Nov 4<sup>th</sup>: Manipulation and Nudging

- **Sophie Gibert, “The Wrong of Wrongful Manipulation”, *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 51 (23), 333-372.**
- **Andreas T. Schmidt and Bart Engelen (2020), “The Ethics of Nudging: An Overview”, *Philosophy Compass* 15.**

- **My “How Nudging Upsets Autonomy”.**
- Andreas T. Schmidt, “Getting Real on Rationality—Behavioral Science, Nudging, and Public Policy”, *Ethics* 129 (2019), 511-543.
- Grant J. Rozenboom, “Nudging for Rationality and Self-Governance”, *Ethics* 131 (2020), 107-121.
- Maximilian Kiener (2021), “When do Nudges Undermine Voluntary Control”, *Philosophical Studies* 178, 4201-4226.
- Robert Noggle (2020), “The Ethics of Manipulation”, *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.
- Sarah Buss (2005), “Valuing Autonomy and Respecting Persons: Manipulation, Seduction, and the Basis of Moral Constraints”, *Ethics* 115, 195-235.

Week 5, Nov 11<sup>th</sup>: Exploitation

- **Matt Zwolinski and Alan Wertheimer (2017), “Exploitation”, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/exploitation/>**
- Nicholas Vrousalis (2018), “Exploitation: A Primer”, *Philosophy Compass* 13.
- Mikhail Valdman (2009), “A Theory of Wrongful Exploitation”, *Philosophers’ Imprint* 9(6), 1-14.

Week 6, Nov 18<sup>th</sup>: Contd.

(I suspect there will be “spillover” from previous sessions. If not, we can worry about the reading for this session later on.)

Week 7, Nov 25<sup>th</sup>: Raz on Autonomy

- **Joseph Raz, *The Morality of Freedom*, chapter 14.**
- Raz, chapter 15.
- My “Revisiting Raz on Autonomy”, forthcoming in (Marmor, Brownlee and Enoch eds.) *Engaging Raz*.
- Sarah Buss, “Personal Autonomy”, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, available here: <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/personal-autonomy/>
- John Christman, “Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy”, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, available here: <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/autonomy-moral/>
- Natalie Stoljar, “Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy”, available here: <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminism-autonomy/>

Week 8, Dec 2<sup>nd</sup>: A Unified Theory of Flawed Consent?

- Hopefully, a draft of mine...