

FACULTY OF PHILOSOPHY
UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD



PHILOSOPHY LECTURE PROSPECTUS
(UNDERGRADUATE LECTURES
AND OTHER EVENTS)

MICHAELMAS TERM 2023

NOTES:

- The normal duration of an event is one hour. Where the class or lecture lasts longer than an hour, the start time and end time will be given.
- By convention, in-person lectures at Oxford begin at 5 minutes past the hour and end at 5 minutes before the hour.
- Unless otherwise specified, the lectures and classes are given for all of weeks 1 to 8.
- Teaching is now taking place in person.
- Every effort is made to ensure that the information contained in this Prospectus is accurate at the start of term, but sometimes errors persist. If you think you have found a mistake, please contact James Knight (james.knight@philosophy.ox.ac.uk).

Lectures for the First Public Examination

Students preparing for their First Public Examination (Prelims or Mods) should attend the following lectures this term:

PPE, Philosophy and Modern Languages, Philosophy and Theology, PPL: Logic, Moral Philosophy, and General Philosophy

Mathematics and Philosophy, Physics and Philosophy, Computer Science and Philosophy: General Philosophy

Literae Humaniores: any listed Prelims/Mods lecture that corresponds to their chosen Philosophy option for Mods

Plato: *Euthyphro* and *Meno*

Dr Stefan Sienkiewicz – W. 12 and F. 12, Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

These lectures are primarily intended for Classics Mods students who are offering Plato as their philosophy option. The lectures serve as an introduction to the philosophical issues and arguments raised by these two dialogues. Topics covered will include the Platonic dialogue form, the Socratic elenchus, the Euthyphro Dilemma, Socratic definition, desire and the good, the paradox of enquiry, the method of hypothesis, the distinction between knowledge and true belief, and the relationship between virtue and knowledge.

Early Greek Philosophy

Prof Marion Durand – M. 12, Examination Schools (Room 12 *except week 7: Room 11*)

These lectures are primarily aimed at students planning to offer the 'Early Greek Philosophy' paper for Lit Hum Mods. Lectures will provide an introduction to Presocratic Philosophy, covering (over the 8 lectures) early Ionian philosophers (Thales, Anaxiamander, Anaximenes, Xenophanes), Heraclitus, Parmenides, Anaxagoras, Empedocles, Zeno and the atomists.

Lucretius: *De Rerum Natura* IV

Prof Alex Bown – M. 12, Examination Schools (Room 2)

This series of lectures is primarily aimed at Classics students offering the 'Lucretius: Book IV' paper at Mods, although anyone interested in the subject is welcome to attend. The first two lectures will be devoted to a general introduction to Epicurean philosophy; the remaining six lectures will then be spent on discussions of the main topics that emerge from Book IV, proceeding roughly in Lucretius' order. A provisional plan is as follows:

1. Introduction to Epicurean philosophy, part 1: background and sources; the branches of philosophy; Epicurean physics.
2. Introduction to Epicurean philosophy, part 2: canonic and ethics.
3. Introduction to Lucretius; overview of Book IV; the mechanics of perception.
4. 'All perceptions are true' – what does this mean, and is it defensible?
5. Refutation and self-refutation; the Epicurean defence against scepticism.
6. Teleology, theology and cosmology.
7. Psychology: thinking, dreaming and moving.
8. Epicurean hedonism and Lucretius on love.

General Philosophy

Prof Alex Kaiserman – W. 12, Examination Schools (North School)

These lectures will cover the following topics: knowledge, scepticism, induction, perception, free will, mind and body, personal identity, and God and evil.

Introduction to Logic

Prof Volker Halbach – M. 12, Examination Schools (North School)

The lectures follow Volker Halbach's *Logic Manual* (Oxford University Press 2010). Further materials, including the Exercises Booklet, sample papers, and worked examples, are available at: <http://logicmanual.philosophy.ox.ac.uk>.

One chapter of the Logic Manual is covered in each lecture. It is recommended that you read each week's chapter before the lecture.

Moral Philosophy: Mill, *Utilitarianism*

Dr Jeremy Fix – F. 12, Examination Schools (North School)

These lectures offer an introduction to ethical theory organized around objections to utilitarianism, especially as presented by John Stuart Mill in *Utilitarianism*, and what they reveal about the theoretical and practical aims of ethical theory. We will start with an account of the explanatory structure of consequentialist ethical theory in general and the utilitarian version of consequentialism in particular. We will then discuss challenges which target one or another part of that explanatory structure. Questions will include:

- (1) Is happiness in fact the final end of our actions?
- (2) Is the greatest happiness possible in fact the end of anyone's action?
- (3) Does utilitarianism license violating the rights of individuals?
- (4) Can a utilitarian specifically or a consequentialist generally be a true friend?
- (5) Does rule-consequentialism avoid the problems with utilitarianism?; and
- (6) Do alternatives to consequentialism miss something that consequentialism captures?

Lectures for the Honour Schools

Lectures listed in this section are **core lectures** for the papers in the Honour Schools: that is, these are lectures intended especially for students taking those papers at Finals. Questions set in Finals papers usually take the content of core lectures into account. It is therefore very much in your interest if you are a finalist to attend as many relevant core lectures as your schedule permits.

Students should also refer to the section *Other Lectures*, following. Lectures listed there are not official core lectures, but sometimes cover topics of relevance to the Finals papers.

Advanced undergraduates, especially but not only those considering graduate study of philosophy, are encouraged to consider attending relevant graduate classes as well. Permission should be sought from the class-giver(s): it is usually readily given.

101 Early Modern Philosophy: Descartes

Prof Paul Lodge – T. 10, Examination Schools (Room 7)

This lecture series will provide an overview of Descartes' philosophy suitable for those who are preparing for the FHS paper in Early Modern Philosophy. In Week 1 I will provide a general overview of Descartes' philosophical projects; thereafter, the lectures will be concerned with some of the main topics that arise when studying his ideas in greater depth. The order of the lectures will track the structure of the *Meditations On First Philosophy* (one Meditation per week in weeks 2-7). However, material from Descartes' other writings will be discussed in order to shed further light on the ideas under consideration; and there will be an extended discussion of Descartes' conception of the material world in Week 8.

- Week 1: Introduction to the philosophy of Descartes
- Week 2: The method of doubt
- Week 3: The *cogito* and the nature of the mind
- Week 4: Cosmological arguments for God's existence
- Week 5: Knowledge and error
- Week 6: The ontological argument for God's existence
- Week 7: Substance and mind-body dualism
- Week 8: The existence and nature of the material world

101 Early Modern Philosophy: Hume

Prof Peter Kail – Th. 10, Examination Schools (room 6)

These lectures are for paper 101, Early Modern Philosophy, and offer an overview of the set text, Book I Hume's *Treatise of Human Nature*. I shall follow the major contours of the Hume's masterpiece, introduce its main themes, discuss its coherence and Hume's overall aims. The topics covered include naturalism and scepticism, causal inference and the so-called problem of induction, causal powers and realism, the external world, the self

and Hume's dissatisfaction with his account it. For an introduction to the work, see Peter Kail "David Hume: A Treatise of Human Nature" in John Shand (ed.) *The Central Works of Philosophy* Vol. 2, Acumen Press (2005). Students should use either the Oxford Student edition (ed. Norton or Norton) or the older, but still acceptable, Selby-Bigge/Nidditch edition (again Oxford University Press).

102 Knowledge and Reality: Epistemology

Prof Bernhard Salow – M.10, Examination Schools (North School *except week 1*: Room 1)

These lectures will focus on the nature of knowledge and justification. Recurring themes include skepticism, a focus on structural features, and the connection between knowledge and probability.

- Week 1: The Analysis of Knowledge
- Week 2: Closure
- Week 3: Contextualism and Subject-Sensitivity
- Week 4: Statistical Evidence and Moral Encroachment
- Week 5: Scepticism I: Externalist and Contextualist Responses
- Week 6: Internalism and Luminosity
- Week 7: Scepticism II: Dogmatist Responses
- Week 8: Self-Doubt and Open-Mindedness

103 Ethics I

Prof Thomas Sinclair – F. 10, Examination Schools (South School)

These lectures will focus on theories of morality—that is, theories that aim to make sense of moral prohibitions, permissions, and requirements, explain how the contents of such prohibitions, permissions, and requirements are determined, and identify the the source of their authority. The lectures will discuss attempts to derive moral prescriptions from foundational ideas about impartial goodness, agential excellence, rationality, human dignity, and the value of certain kinds of relationship. The lectures will survey Kantian ethics, consequentialism, virtue ethics, and contractualism. Recordings of companion lectures from MT22 on moral responsibility and the reactive attitudes, rights and wronging, and practical reasons are available on Canvas.

106b Philosophy of Social Science

Prof Alex Prescott-Couch – W. 12, Examination Schools (Room 8)

Contemporary social science is extremely heterogeneous, with seemingly little consensus about methods and fundamental assumptions. While some social scientific projects take the form of causal analysis of large data sets, others primarily employ case studies or involve the construction of highly idealized models that bear only an indirect relation to real-world

phenomena. Many anthropologists are interested less in causal questions and more in understanding the “meanings” of events or cultural practices. Some theorists believe that a deep understanding of society requires a functional analysis of key institutions, while other, more historically inclined researchers hold that understanding these institutions requires historical narratives or “genealogies.”

How should we think about this heterogeneity? Are these differences superficial, masking a single underlying set of fundamental aims and a unitary logic of scientific inference? Or do they indicate deep disagreement about the correct approach to studying society? Moreover, if such deep disagreements do exist, to what extent should we look to the natural sciences as a model in order to resolve them?

These lectures address these (and other) questions by examining classic debates in the philosophy of social science in light of contemporary social science and recent philosophy of science. Topics will include scientific explanation, the doctrine of *Verstehen*, idealization and modeling, functional explanation, historical narrative, critical theory and ideology, social metaphysics, and the role of values in science. The aim is to show how examining social science can provide a fuller picture of substantive and methodological commitments of the sciences as well as how philosophical analysis might inform methodological discussion within social science itself.

110 Medieval Philosophy: Aquinas

Prof Cecilia Trifogli – M. 12, Examination Schools (Room 8)

I will present the following topics from Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, qq. 2-11, 75-89; II.I, qq. 1-10, 90-97: (1) Existence of God (I, q. 2); (2) Nature of God (I, q. 3); (3) Soul (I, qq. 75-76); (4) Cognition (I, qq. 79, 84-86); (5) Will (I, qq. 80, 82-83; II.I, qq. 8-10); (6) Happiness (II.I, qq. 1-5); (7) Voluntary Actions (II.I, q. 6); (8) Eternal and Natural Law (II.I, qq. 90-97).

113 Post-Kantian Philosophy: Sartre

Prof Joseph Shear – M. 12, Christ Church (Research Centre)

This course of lectures is primarily devoted to Jean-Paul Sartre's 1943 book, *Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology* ('BN'). The intended audience are undergraduates taking the Post-Kantian philosophy paper but anyone is welcome to attend. I will be citing the recent translation of BN by Sarah Richmond, published by Routledge. Provisional schedule:

Introduction: Phenomenology, Ontology, Existentialism

1. The Transcendence of the Ego
2. The Cogito and the Problem of Nothingness
3. Bad faith
4. Being-for-Others I
5. Being-for-Others II
6. Freedom I
7. Freedom II

113 Post-Kantian Philosophy: Heidegger

Prof Stephen Mulhall – T. 12, New College (Lecture Room 6)

These lectures will aim to give an introduction to Heidegger's major early work, *Being and Time*; no previous knowledge of his writings will be assumed. Although the primary audience is assumed to be those working on Heidegger for the Post-Kantian Philosophy paper, anyone interested in the material is welcome to attend. We shall work through the text in the order in which it is written, and in some detail; so it might be advisable to bring a copy along. There will be plenty of time for questions.

120 Intermediate Philosophy of Physics: Quantum Mechanics

Dr Owen Maroney – M. T. 11, Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

This will be a sixteen lecture course looking in detail at the central conceptual problems of quantum theory. While the application of the mathematical structure of quantum theory has been unambiguously successful, having predictive and explanatory success across vast range of phenomena, there is little consensus on its physical interpretation.

The course will have a particular focus upon clearly distinguishing the operational content of the theory from the properties of physical models that have been proposed to account for quantum phenomena.

Topic to be covered include, but may not be limited to:

- The mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics, including quantum uncertainty, mixed states and decoherence;
- The phenomena of quantum interference and entanglement and why these raise problems for simple attempts to physically interpret the formalism;
- The measurement problem, and the principle interpretative responses to it;
- A more detailed examination of the advantages and weaknesses of the dynamical collapse and the hidden variable programs, with use of the Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber and de Broglie-Bohm theories as exemplars;
- The problem of quantum non-locality, including the Einstein Podolsky-Rosen paradox, and Bell's theorem.

The lectures are primarily aimed at 3rd year undergraduates studying Physics & Philosophy, and at graduate students studying the MSt in Philosophy of Physics. Others are welcome, but some familiarity with quantum mechanics and its mathematical framework will be assumed. Background Reading:

- Feynman, *Lectures on Physics* (Addison Wesley) Volume III, Chapters 1 to 3.
- Rae, *Quantum Physics: Illusion or Reality* (2nd Edition, Cambridge, 2004)

Helpful books:

- Albert, *Quantum Mechanics and Experience* (Harvard, 1992)
- Home, *Conceptual Foundations of Quantum Physics* (Plenum, 1997)
- Bell, *Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics* (2nd Edition, CUP, 2004) (Also known as 'On The Foundations Of Quantum Mechanics')
- Maudlin, *Quantum Nonlocality and Relativity* (Blackwell, 1994)

121 Advanced Philosophy of Physics

Prof Adam Caulton (*weeks 1 to 4*) and Dr Owen Maroney (*weeks 5 to 8*) – Th. 11 – 1,
Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

Weeks 1-4: Classical Symmetries and Spacetime

This course of four classes is devoted to the topic of symmetry in classical spacetime and other field theories. The focus is largely on interpretative issues, such as the role of symmetries in identifying redundant representational structure in a theory's formalism, and questions of ontology and explanation.

The intended audience includes MSt students in Philosophy of Physics, BPhil and DPhil students interested in naturalised metaphysics, and fourth year Physics & Philosophy undergraduates offering Advanced Philosophy of Physics. Others are welcome if there is space.

Week 1. The interpretation of symmetries

Week 2. The "hole argument" in general relativity

Week 3. The ontology of electrodynamics in light of the Aharonov-Bohm effect

Week 4. Symmetries and conservation laws: what explains what?

A reading list will be provided in the first session. The following should be read in advance for week 1 (and are easily available on-line):

A reading list will be provided in the first session. The following should be read in advance for week 1 (and are easily available on-line):

- Belot, G., 'Symmetry and Equivalence', in R. W. Batterman (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Physics* (OUP, 2013). Preprint available at: <http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/9275/>
- Dasgupta, S., 'Symmetry as an Epistemic Notion (Twice Over)', *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 67 (2016), pp. 837-878. Available at: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/43946095>

Weeks 5 to 8

These sessions will deal with the conceptual problems involved in our best accounts of thermal physics.

The reduction of thermodynamics to statistical mechanics is one of the most prominent inter-theoretic reductions to be found in the literature. However, the statistical mechanical approach itself has been understood in two very different frameworks - the Gibbsian

framework, emphasising the role of probability distributions, and the neo-Boltzmannian framework, focussed upon dynamical explanations of individual systems. The lectures will cover the differences between the two statistical mechanical frameworks, how they attempt to account for the time asymmetric phenomena described by thermodynamics, and how they treat phenomena that goes beyond thermodynamics, such as thermal fluctuations or particle symmetries.

122 Philosophy of Mathematics

Prof Beau Mount – M. 10, Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

This series of self-contained lectures on the philosophy of mathematics is designed for final honour school students preparing paper 122, 'The Philosophy of Mathematics', but all others (undergraduate and postgraduate) are welcome to attend. The sequence of lectures will be as follows:

- Lecture 1: Frege and Neo-Fregeanism
- Lecture 2: Hilbert's Program
- Lecture 3: Intuitionism
- Lecture 4: Empiricism and Nominalism I
- Lecture 5: Empiricism and Nominalism II
- Lecture 6: Deductivism and Eliminative Structuralism
- Lecture 7: Benacerraf's Problem and Ante Rem Structuralism
- Lecture 8: Philosophy of Set Theory

Slides and handouts will be distributed in class and also made available on the web. Students are encouraged to consult the following books for preliminary reading:

Stewart Shapiro, *Thinking about Mathematics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

Joel Hamkins, *Lectures on the Philosophy of Mathematics* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2021).

For further explorations, the following collections are highly recommended:

Paul Benacerraf and Hilary Putnam, eds., *Philosophy of Mathematics: Selected Readings*, 2nd edn. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

Stewart Shapiro, ed., *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

124 / 106a Philosophy of Science

Dr Henrique Gomes – M. T. 12 (*weeks 1 to 6*), Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

This is a twelve-lecture course on the philosophy of science. The focus is on what science tells us; what does it mean to accept a scientific theory? Here is a provisional plan for the course:

1. Popper's Falsificationism
2. Induction and Confirmation
3. Probability and Bayesianism
4. Logical Empiricism
5. Quine's Naturalism
6. Kuhn's Paradigms
7. Values and Virtues
8. Feminist Philosophy of Science
9. Scientific Realism
10. Scientific Explanation
11. Constructive Empiricism
12. Structural Realism

Introductory Reading: Peter Godfrey-Smith, *Theory and Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science* (University of Chicago Press)

131/137 Plato on Knowledge, Language and Reality in the *Theaetetus* and *Sophist*
Prof Michael Peramatzis – Th. 10 (*weeks 1 to 6*), Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

The lectures cover some of the most fascinating and rewarding arguments in Plato's late epistemology, philosophy of language, and metaphysics on the basis of his dialogues *Theaetetus* and *Sophist*. The first six lectures in MT22 will focus on the *Theaetetus*, Plato's dialogue about the nature of knowledge, and will discuss the claim that knowledge is perception; being and becoming; the self-refutation of relativism; the refutation of the proposed definition of knowledge as sense perception; knowledge as true belief; false belief; Socrates' dream; knowledge as true belief plus an 'account' (*logos*).

The next six lectures (to be given in HT23) will focus on the *Sophist*, the dialogue where Plato attempts to define what a sophist is, and will examine the method of definition by division; the view that it is impossible to say or think 'what is not'; the discussion of the number and nature of what there is; the view of the so-called 'Late-Learners'; the communion of kinds; the analysis of negative predication; the 'fragmentation' of the kind difference; negative properties; and the analysis of falsehood.

In discussing these topics, we will examine issues of interpretative and philosophical significance. These twelve lectures are intended primarily for those undergraduate students who will sit paper 131 [Plato on Knowledge, Language, and Reality in the *Theaetetus* and the *Sophist* (in Greek)] or 137 [Plato on Knowledge, Language, and Reality in the *Theaetetus* and the *Sophist* (in translation)], and for students on the MSt in Ancient Philosophy who plan to write their Option A essay on Plato's *Theaetetus* or/and *Sophist*, but anyone with an interest in Ancient Greek Philosophy, Plato's theoretical philosophy, or the history of epistemology, metaphysics, and the philosophy of language is welcome to attend (knowledge of Greek is not required).

Greek Text:

Platonis Opera I, ed. by E. A. Duke, W. F. Hicken, W. S. M. Nicoll, D. B. Robinson, and J. C. G. Strachan, (Oxford, 1995).

Suggested English Translation:

Theaetetus, tr. Levett, revised by Burnyeat (Hackett, 1990).

Sophist, tr. White (Hackett, 1993).

NB: both of these translations are re-printed in J. Cooper's *Plato: Complete Works* (Hackett, 1997).

Hand-outs and further bibliographical suggestions will be given in the lectures.

133 / 138 Aristotle on Nature, Life and Mind

Dr Hannah Laurens – Th. 9, Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

This course of lectures explores some key topics on Aristotle's account of living beings and of the natural world they inhabit.

The course is composed by 12 lectures (4 in MT22, and 8 in HT23) and it is designed primarily for undergraduate students taking the paper, Aristotle on Nature Life and Mind, and for MSt students taking this as one of their options. Other graduate or undergraduate students who are interested in the topics are very welcome to attend.

It provides an excellent overview of Aristotle's theoretical philosophy. The questions that will be examined span from what we would now call metaphysics, to philosophy of science, to philosophy of mind.

The first four sessions will focus on Aristotle's *Physics*, books 2-4; they will explore Aristotle's account of nature, causation, teleology, and change. The provisional schedule is as follows:

1. The Doctrine of Matter and Form and the Definition of Nature (Thursday week 5)

Primary Texts: *Physics* I, 7-8 and *Physics* II, 1-2.

2. The Four Causes (Thursday week 6)

Primary Texts: *Physics* II, 3-7, *Generation of Animals* V.8. *Parts of Animals* I.1

3. Chance and Teleology (Thursday week 7)

Primary Texts: *Physics* II, 4-9, *Parts of Animals* I.1

4. The Definition of Change (Thursday week 8)

Primary Text: *Physics* III.1-2

The following eight sessions (which will take place in HT23) will examine other topics for the *Physics* – in particular, Aristotle's understanding of the infinite, place, and time. To conclude, we will turn to the *De Anima* and to questions about the nature of perception and thought and about the relation between the mind and the body.

134 / 136 / 139 Knowledge and Scepticism in Hellenistic Philosophy

Prof Luca Castagnoli – W. 10 – 12 (*weeks 1 to 6*), Oriel College (MacGregor Room)

‘Human beings have a natural desire for knowledge’, said Aristotle. However, both before and after him the philosophical quest for knowledge led some to the view that it was a hopeless or misguided aspiration. In the Hellenistic age the debate on the possibility of knowledge took centre stage as Plato’s school, the Academy, ‘turned sceptical’ with Arcesilaus and Carneades and argued against the epistemological optimism of the two major rival Hellenistic schools, Stoicism and Epicureanism. To complicate things, not long before Zeno of Citium and Epicurus founded their schools, Pyrrho embraced and embodied the anti-dogmatic ideal of a human life stripped of knowledge and belief and thereby free from anxiety as a recipe for human happiness. That ideal was revived and developed more than two centuries later by Aenesidemus, the founder of the Pyrrhonian school, a brand of Scepticism different from the Academic one and in competition with it (the late writings of Sextus Empiricus are our best source). The lectures will introduce some of the central Hellenistic epistemological views and debates as they developed between (and within) these philosophical schools. They aim to offer an understanding of

- some of the main sources for philosophical scepticism from the fourth century BC to the 3rd century AD, and for the ‘empiricist’ epistemologies of Stoicism and Epicureanism;
- the variety of different positions encompassed by the term ‘Sceptic’;
- the Sceptics’ attacks on ‘dogmatic’ epistemology and the various strategies adopted by the ‘dogmatists’ to defend the possibility of knowledge;
- the ‘dogmatic’ counter-attacks against the Sceptical positions, and the Sceptics’ attempts to defend themselves;
- how the issue of epistemology impacted on the field of ethics: do we need knowledge to live a good and happy life? Is it possible and desirable to *live* one’s Scepticism in a consistent way?

This course is primarily intended for those undergraduate students who plan to sit papers 134, 136 or 139 (Knowledge and Scepticism in Hellenistic Philosophy), but anyone (including graduate students) with an interest in ancient Greek philosophy, philosophical scepticism and the history of epistemology is welcome to attend (knowledge of ancient Greek or Latin is not required).

The main topics to be introduced in the lectures are provisionally scheduled as follows:

Week 1 - Wed 12 October, 10-12 MacGregor Room (Oriel College)

- An introduction to Hellenistic philosophy and epistemology.
- Epicurean epistemology.
- Introduction to Stoic epistemology.

Week 2 - Wed 19 October, 10-12 MacGregor Room (Oriental College)

- Cicero's *Academica*: Scepticism in Plato's Academy I: Academics vs. Stoics

Week 3 - Wed 26 October, 10-12 MacGregor Room (Oriental College)

- Cicero's *Academica*: Scepticism in Plato's Academy II.

Week 4 - Wed 2 November, 10-12 MacGregor Room (Oriental College)

- Sextus Empiricus' Pyrrhonism: beliefs, appearances, and the aim of Pyrrhonian scepticism.
- The modes of the suspension of judgement: Aenesidemus and Agrippa

Week 5 - Wed 9 November, 10-12 MacGregor Room (Oriental College)

- The Pyrrhonian attack on logic: criteria of truth, signs and proofs.
- The self-refutation charge and the possibility of Pyrrhonian inquiry.
- The Pyrrhonian attack on physics: causes, motion and time.
- The Pyrrhonian attack on ethics and the possibility of a Pyrrhonian life.

Week 6 - Wed 16 November, 10-12 MacGregor Room (Oriental College)

- Early Pyrrhonism: Pyrrho and Aenesidemus
- Conclusions

Main Texts

- A. A. Long, D. N. Sedley, *The Hellenistic Philosophers*, 2 vols., Cambridge: CUP, 1987. Vol. I: esp. sections 1-3 (Pyrrho); 15-19 (Epicureans); 39-42 (Stoics); 68-70 (Academics); 71-72 (Aenesidemus).
- Cicero, *Academic Books*, transl. by C. Brittain, Indianapolis: Hackett, 2006.
- Sextus Empiricus, *Outlines of Scepticism*, trans. by J. Annas and J. Barnes, Cambridge: CUP, 2000.

Introductory readings

- K. Vogt, 'Ancient Scepticism', *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/skepticism-ancient/>.
- D. Sedley, 'The Protagonists', in M. Schofield, M. Burnyeat, J. Barnes (eds.), *Doubt and Dogmatism: Studies in Hellenistic Epistemology*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980, 1-19.

198 Special Subject in Philosophy: Feminist Theory

Prof Amia Srinivasan and Prof Kate Kirkpatrick (*week 3*) – T. 2, Examination Schools (Room 1)

Week 1: What is a Woman?

Week 2: Intersectionality

Week 3: How to Read Beauvoir [guest lecture by Prof Kate Kirkpatrick]

Week 4: Feminist Epistemology

Week 5: Sexuality and Sexual Liberation

Week 6: Pornography

Week 7: Reproduction, Work and Capitalism

Week 8: Feminism and Method

198 Special Subject in Philosophy: The Ethics of Artificial Intelligence and Digital Technology

Prof John Tasioulas and Dr Linda Eggert – T. 10 – 12, Examination Schools (Room 1)

These lectures are intended only for those registered as taking the paper for Finals.

198 Special Subject in Philosophy: Indian Philosophy

Prof Jessica Frazier – T. 2.30 – 4.30 (*weeks 1 to 4*), Radcliffe Humanities (*week 1*: Lecture Room, *thereafter* Colin Matthew Room)

This course is restricted to those registered as taking the paper for Finals, who will be sent details of what is covered. Further lectures will be given in Hilary Term.

198 Special Subject in Philosophy: the Philosophy of Fiction and Literature

Prof Catharine Abell – F. 10, Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

This course is restricted to those registered as taking the paper for Finals, who will be sent details.

Other Lectures (suitable for all audiences)

Solving, Resolving, and Dissolving Philosophical Problems, part 1

Dr Peter Hacker – W. 2 – 3.45, Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

The topics to be covered are:

1. The Nature of the Mind
2. The Mind/body Relation
3. Consciousness
4. Consciousness and Experience or what it is like to be a bat revisited
5. Knowledge
6. Belief
7. Memory
8. On the methods of connective and contrastive analysis

No reading is necessary – only curiosity and interest in the methodology of connective and contrastive logico-linguistic analysis. Topics 1-7 will exemplify the methodology, topic 8 will discuss it and objections to it. The results of the application of the method are surprising and unexpected, often cutting across the grain of much current philosophical doctrine.

Each session will involve a 40 minute talk followed by an hour of questions and debate. The latter is no less important than the former.

Those who wish to do any antecedent or, more importantly, consequent reading may find the following items helpful:

Ad 1 and 2:

P.M.S. Hacker, *Human Nature: The Categorical Framework*, chapters 8-10

P. F. Strawson, *Individuals*, chap. 3.

A.J.P. Kenny, *Metaphysics of Mind*, chap. 2.

B. Rundle, *Mind in Action*, chap.2

Ad 3 and 4

P.M.S. Hacker, *The Intellectual Powers: A Study of Human Nature*, chap. 1

M.R. Bennett and P.M.S. Hacker, *Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience*, chaps. 10-14

T. Nagel, 'What is it like to be a bat?', in his *Mortal Questions*

Ad 5 and 6

O. Hanfling, *Philosophy and Ordinary Language*, chap. 6

Alan R. White, *The Nature of Knowledge*

P.M.S. Hacker, *The Intellectual Powers*, chap. 4-6

B. Rundle, *Mind in Action*, chap. 2.5, chap. 3.2

Ad 7

N. Malcolm, *Memory*

M.R. Bennett and P.M.S. Hacker, *Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience*, 2nd ed., chap. 6.

B. Rundle, 'Memory and Causation', *Philosophical Investigations* 9 (1986), pp. 302-7.

Ethics of Paternalism: the limits of doing good for others

Lorenzo Elijah and Kyle van Oosterum – W. 11 (*weeks 1 to 4*), Radcliffe Humanities
(Lecture Room)

This lecture series discusses four issues in the contemporary ethics of paternalism. First, we ask: what is paternalism? Is it essential to its definition that it reflects common anti-paternalistic intuitions or is the concept better understood in a morally neutral way? This introductory lecture is important for ensuring conceptual clarity in the topics that follow.

Second, when is paternalism wrong? Most philosophers believe it is *pro tanto* wrong to act paternalistically towards someone, but can we delineate cases of permissible paternalism (if any) from impermissible paternalism? This touches on core issues in the Ethics (103) paper such as the nature of well-being and the contrast between consequentialism and deontology.

Third, can the state justify interference with its citizens for their own good? Liberals believe that the state ought to be neutral between various conceptions of the good life; perfectionists disagree. The discussion of paternalism offers students doing Theory of Politics (114) a lens through which to see the merits and flaws of each theory.

Fourth, how do our views on paternalism affect existing practices and policy-making? May the state make you wear a seatbelt? Can a patient's consent or advance directives ever be overridden by their doctor? These questions are directly relevant to the Practical Ethics (128) paper.

In addition to being relevant for these papers, paternalism itself is of enough independent interest to be the topic of an undergraduate thesis (199).

Lecture Topics and Reading List

§1. What is Paternalism?

Aims: To analyze the concept of 'paternalism' and to introduce students to the complexities of analyzing moral concepts.

Readings:

- Begon, Jessica. 'Recent Work: Paternalism'. *Analysis* 76, no. 3 (2016): 355–73.
- Bullock, Emma C. 'A Normatively Neutral Definition of Paternalism'. *Philosophical Quarterly* 65, no. 258 (2015): 1–21.
- Dworkin, Gerald. 'Defining Paternalism'. In *Paternalism: Theory and Practice*, edited by Christian Coons and Michael Weber, 25–38. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
- Grill, Kalle. 'The Normative Core of Paternalism'. *Res Publica* 13, no. 4 (2007): 441–58.

§2. When is Paternalism Wrong?

Aims: To explore the conflict between well-being and autonomy – if there is one – and how that explains the wrongness of paternalism.

Readings:

- Elijah, Lorenzo. 'For Your Own Good: Paternalism, Exclusion and Autonomy'. *MS*.
- Enoch, David. 'II - What's Wrong with Paternalism: Autonomy, Belief, and Action'. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 116, no. 1 (2016): 21–48.'
- Hanna, Jason. *In Our Best Interest: A Defense of Paternalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.
 - Chapter 1. Pro-Paternalism.
- van Oosterum, Kyle. 'Paternalism and Exclusion'. *Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy* (forthcoming).

§3. Paternalism and Political Theory

Aims: To discuss the debate between perfectionists and liberals through the lens of paternalism.

Readings:

- Clarke, Simon. 'State Paternalism, Neutrality and Perfectionism'. *Journal of Political Philosophy*.
- Mill, J.S. *On Liberty*.
 - Chapter 4. Of The Limits To The Authority of Society Over The Individual.
- Quong, Jonathan. *Liberalism without Perfection*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
 - Chapter 3. Paternalism and Perfectionism.

- Raz, Joseph. *Morality of Freedom*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986.
○ Chapter 15. Freedom and Autonomy.

§4. Paternalism and Practical Ethics (or Paternalism and Policymaking)

Aims: To discuss the practical applications of paternalism in public policy.

Readings:

- Flanigan, Jessica 'Seat Belt Mandates and Paternalism'. *Journal of Moral Philosophy*, 2017.
- Parry, J. (2017) 'Defensive Harm, Consent, and Intervention: Defensive Harm, Consent, and Intervention', *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 45(4), pp. 356–396.
- Sunstein, Cass & Thaler, Richard. *Nudge: improving decisions about health, wealth and happiness*. London: Penguin, 2008.
○ Introduction.
- Wilson, James. 'Why It's Time to Stop Worrying About Paternalism in Health Policy', *Public Health Ethics* 2011.

The Metaphysics of the Laws of Nature

Dr Daniel Grimmer – W. 11 (weeks 5 to 8), Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

Why do apples fall? "Because of the laws of gravity!" one might confidently answer. Lecture 1 will discuss the historical origins of the concept of "a law of nature". Where does this legalistic metaphor come from? Do the laws of nature really *govern* the world? Are physical substances really capable of *obeying* laws? Since at least Descartes, many have believed that the laws of nature do function in such a top-down way (e.g., as commands from God). As I will discuss, the modern versions of such governing views have been secularized to varying degrees.

Lecture 2 will introduce an alternate approach which understands the laws of nature in a more bottom-up way: The laws of nature merely *describe* the world's patterned behavior, they don't *cause* it per se. But if the laws of nature don't cause the world's law-like regularities, then what does? One natural thought is that matter itself has causal powers which help order the world. For instance, Aristotle might say that the apple falls, not because of the law of gravity per se, but rather because it has a natural disposition to move downwards. Note that while the air has a disposition to allow the apple to fall, the table has a disposition to stop it. On such a view, the world's law-like regularities arise from the complex interactions of a wide variety of competing and cooperating dispositions. Some find this metaphysical picture deeply puzzling: What is it about dispositions which allows one objects to causally necessitate the behavior of another objects? How is it possible for one disposition to cancel or negate the expression of another disposition? What organizes the complex interactions of these competing and cooperating dispositions? Finally, how can we even *know* about these causal powers? As Hume noted, all we ever see is constant conjunction.

Lecture 3 will introduce the Humean approach to the laws of nature (focusing on its adaptation and popularization by David Lewis). This view boldly denies that anything enforces the world's law-like regularities: There are no necessary connections between

distinct existences. Lewis invites us to think of the Humean mosaic, roughly, this is all of the world's categorical properties distributed over space and time. Given access to this mosaic, one can imagine scientists identifying certain universal patterns which greatly simplify their theories and thereby allowing them to more easily make predictions and retrodictions. On a broadly Lewisian view, the laws of nature are just the axiom-like rules which appear in the best systemization of the Humean mosaic. But can these laws-as-regularities really explain anything? Many complain that one can't *explain* the existence of a pattern by pointing to a law which merely summarizes the pattern in question.

Lecture 4 will discuss modern variants of Lewis's Best Systems Analysis which preserve (to varying degrees) its Humean spirit. One key issue is whether or not the laws of nature need to be (or even can be) picked out in an objective and mind-independent way, as Lewis thought. Alternatively, the laws might be picked out by the best systemization of nature *given the epistemic needs and limitations of the human mind*. Another key issue is whether the laws of nature can be understood individually or only collectively. If the laws are sentences (which don't refer to each other) then they can be understood and checked separately: Does the pattern it describes (e.g., all Fs are Gs) exist in the world? By contrast, one might think of the laws of nature as a web of interconnected rules for making predictions within a given theory. On this view, the laws do not straightforwardly correspond to patterns in the world and they cannot be checked individually. Instead, each of the laws are bound up in a theory and must face the tribunal of experience together.