Philosophy of Mind Work-in-Progress Seminar
In Hilary Term 2022, we plan to meet in person in the Lecture Room, with the possibility of joining remotely.
The Philosophy of Mind Work-in-Progress Group provides a forum for Faculty members, graduate students, and visiting scholars to discuss their current works-in-progress in philosophy of mind.
Seminars in HT22 are on Fridays 13.30 - 15.00 in weeks 1, 4 and 6. All are welcome.
The format is usually read-ahead, with the paper usually circulated on the Monday before the Friday seminar. Those intending to attend a particular session should email Nicholas Shea in advance to be put on the circulation list for that week’s paper and meeting link.
Philosophy of Mind Work-in-Progress Convenor: Nicholas Shea
Knowing the Qualitative
A Kantian criticism of modal rationalism
|Week 2 (29th Jan)||
|'Perception, Perceptual Knowledge, and Perceptual Self-Knowledge'|
|Week 4 (12th Feb)||Patrick Butlin||
'Model-based Reinforcement Learning and Action for Reasons'
|Week 2 (23rd Oct)||
|'The causal argument for Russellian panpsychism'|
|Week 4 (6th Nov)||Dominic Alford-Duguid||
'Whence come properties before the mind?'
|Week 6 (20th Nov)||Will Davies||
'Seen the Light?'
|Week 2 (7th May)||Alex Moran (Oxford)||'Causative Disjunctivism'|
|Week 4 (21st May)||Laurenz Casser(Texas)||'Pain is modular'|
|Week 2 (31 January)||Jake Quilty-Dunn (Oxford)||Unconscious Rationalization, or: How (Not) to Think about Awfulness and Death|
|Week 4 (14 February)||Will Davies (Oxford)||A Relational Theory of Colour Constancy|
|Week 2 (25th October)||Marc Artiga (Valencia)||'Radical Liberal Representationalism'|
|Week 5 (15th November)||Anil Gomes & Matthew Parrott (Oxford)||'On Being Internally the Same'|
|Week 8 (6th December)||Nicholas Shea (Oxford)||'Drawing on the Meaning of a Concept'|
Week 1 (3 May): Joulia Smortchkova - First impressions and mind misreading
Week 3 (17 May): Umut Baysan - The non-mental life of some groups
Week 5 (31 May): Ben Sorgiovanni - Past-Tense Self-Knowledge
Week 7 (14 Jun): Nicholas Shea - The Role of Non-Conceptual Metacognition in Reasoning
Week 3 (1st February): Dominic Alford-Duguid - 'On the Epistemic Significance of Perceptual Structure'
Week 5 (15th February): Anne Jacobson - ‘Reading and the Clark-Chalmers extended mind’
Week 7 (1st March): Mike Martin - 'Embedded Information'
Week 1 (12 Oct): Jake Quilty-Dunn: 'Is iconic memory iconic?'
Week 3 (26 Oct): Sam Clarke: 'Perception is Analogue: the common format hypothesis revisited'
Week 5 (9 Nov): Joulia Smortchkova: 'Representational Kinds'
Week 7 (23 Nov): Matthew Parrott: 'Delusional Predictions and Explanations'
Week 1 (27 April): Zoe Jenkin: 'The Epistemic Role of Core Cognition'
Week 3 (11 May): Ben Sorgiovanni: 'Agentialism and Memory'
Week 5 (25 May): Margot Strohminger: ‘What underlies supposition and imagination?’
Week 7 (8 June): Nicholas Shea: ‘Is There Concept-Metacognition?'
Week 2 (26 Jan): Lucy Campbell & Alexander Greenberg, 'No Representation without Misrepresentation'
Week 4 (9 Feb): Umut Baysan, 'Mad Qualia'
Week 6 (23 Feb): Casey Doyle, 'Conscious Judgment and Doxastic Self-Knowledge'
Week 8 (9 Mar): Anita Avramides, 'Disjunctivism and Other Minds'
Week 1 (13 Oct): Jake Quilty-Dunn
Week 3 (27 Oct): Cressida Gaukroger
Week 5 (10 Nov): Joulia Smortchkova
Week 7 (24 Nov): Dick Passingham
Week 2: Session with Alex Kaiserman, Oxford (to be held in SR5 in St Anne’s College)
Week 4: Alisa Mandrigin, Edinburgh (to be held in SR 3 in St Anne’s College)
Week 6: Anne Jacobson, Oxford (to be held in SR5 in St Anne’s College) 'Norms and Neuroscience: the case of Borderline Personality Disorder'
Week 8: Anna Marmodoro, George Darby & Robin Murphy (to be held in SR5 in St Anne’s College)
Week 2: 27th January - Cressida Gaukroger (Oxford) 'How to Individuate Concepts' in Seminar Room 1
Week 4: 10th February - Tom McClelland (Warwick) 'The Mental Affordance Hypothesis' in Seminar Room 1
Week 6: 24th February - Sophie Archer (Oxford) in Seminar Room 1
Week 8: 10th March - John Michael (Warwick) in Seminar Room 6 *this is in a different building to the usual seminar room*
Week 3: Denis Buehler (Oxford) 'Occurrent Agential Control'
** not week 2 as previously advertised **
Week 4: Lucy Campbell (Oxford) 'Self-Knowledge and the Alt-Ground Test'
Week 6: Nick Shea (Institute of Philosophy)
Week 8: Derek Brown (Brandon, soon to be at Glasgow)
Week 4: Joseph Schear (Oxford) 'Is all consciousness self-consciousness?'
Week 6: James Stazicker (Reading) 'Partial Report, Consciousness and Self-Knowledge'
Week 8: Peter Forrest (Oxford) 'Can phenomenology determine the content of thought?'
Week 2: Oliver Rashbrook-Cooper (Oxford), 'What is the Phenomenal Unity of Consciousness?'
Week 4: Anya Farennikova (Bristol), 'Seeing Absence' (Anya will present a paper so there is no need to read ahead, though anyone wishing to might look at her paper on 'Seeing Absence' in Phil Studies 166:3 (2013))
Week 6: Myrto Mylopoulos (Jean Nicod), 'Intentions and Agentive Awareness'
Week 2: Ian Phillips, 'Unconscious Perception Reconsidered'
Week 4: Josh Shepherd, 'Conscious experience and knowledge of action'
Week 6: Neil Levy, 'Implicit bias and moral responsibility: probing the data'
Week 1: Amit Saad, 'Achilles Last Stand- a solution to the Kripkenstein Paradox' (Commentator: Anil Gomes)
Week 3: Alex Moran, 'Naïve Realism, The Time-Lag Argument, and Eternalism' (Commentator: Oliver Rashbrook-Cooper)
Week 5: Helen De Cruz, 'Are philosophical intuitions a natural kind? (Commentator: Joshua Shepherd) [Please note venue change - Ryle Room this week]
Week 7: Istvan Aranyosi, 'Explanatory-role functionalism' (Commentator: Bill Child)
Week 3: Alex Kaiserman, Interventions and Mental Surgery (Commentator: Joshua Shepherd)
Week 5: Paul Lodge, Leibniz’s Mill Argument Against Mechanical Materialism Revisited (Commentator: Martin Pickup)
Week 7: Jonathan Erhardt, Gods, Minds, and Other Physical Things (Commentator: Oliver Rashbrook-Cooper)
Week 3: Oliver Rashbrook-Cooper, Temporal Presence and Time Lags (Commentator: Ian Phillips)
Week 5: Joshua Shepherd, Consciousness, Control, and Zombie Action (Commentator: Alex Moran)
Week 7: Peter Forrest, Cognitive Phenomenology and the Fringe (Commentator: Oliver Rashbrook-Cooper)
Week 3: Lee Walters, The invalidity of the argument from illusion
Week 5: Scott Sturgeon, Epistemic Attitudes
Week 7: Declan Smithies, Belief and Moore's Paradox
Week 3: Oliver Rashbrook-Cooper, Individuating experiences and the unity of consciousness
Week 5: Michael Sollberger, Conscious Experience and Delusions of Inserted Thoughts
Week 7: Jeremy Goodman, Perceptual Experience: Back to Basics