incredible diligence of our colleagues on the REF assessment panel for Philosophy should be applauded: they read, in detail, every single piece of research submitted to them from all Philosophy departments across the country, and formed their own independent views on the merits of each piece. If there is to be a process like the REF, then it is reassuring that such genuine peer-review activity should lie at its heart.

Elsewhere: In October, as part of the 400th year celebration of the White’s Chair of Moral Philosophy, we were delighted to announce the chair’s re-endowment and preservation for the future as the Sekyra and White’s Chair of Moral Philosophy. Trinity Term brought the official return of the University entirely to business as usual, and we embarked on the giddy excitement of our full diet of in-person events being available. Highlights for me were the first in-person Joyce Mitchell-Cooke Lecture, the return of the John Locke Lectures, and splendid events to mark the distinguished Oxford careers of Anita Avramides and Simon Saunders. In the autumn I will be handing over to Prof. Ursula Coope as Chair of the Philosophy Faculty Board. I am delighted that the Faculty will be in such excellent hands.

Chris Timpson
Professor of the Philosophy of Physics
Tutorial Fellow in Philosophy, Brasenose College
New Fellow
Jean Baccelli
Associate Professor of Philosophy of Economics and Tutorial Fellow in Philosophy at Jesus College

Jean joins the faculty from the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, where he was a postdoctoral fellow. Previously, he held a postdoctoral fellowship at the Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh. He received his PhD from Ecole Normale Supérieure—Ulm, Paris, where he also did his undergraduate studies. His main research interests are in decision theory (in particular, decision theory under risk and uncertainty), social choice theory, and the philosophy of economics. He has additional research interests in the general philosophy of science (especially in measurement theory) and formal epistemology.

Practical Ethics and Responsibility competition 2022

The Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics is delighted to announce that Julia Phillips, Carlotta Orr Prosper, and Estella Fiore from St Mary’s School Ascot have been selected as winners of the 2022 Practical Ethics and Responsibility competition.

Pupils from around the world were invited to submit videos about an ethical problem and how responsibility is involved. Four teams were selected for a final round where they battled it out through rounds of debate. More details, including the video entries from the four finalists and nine other teams whose entries were highly commended can be found here.

News
Rachel Fraser wins Marc Sanders Prize in Epistemology

Rachel Fraser, Associate Professor of Philosophy and Michael Cohen Fellow in Philosophy, at Exeter College was awarded the prestigious 2021 Epistemology Prize of the Marc Sanders Foundation for her paper, ‘The Will in Belief’.

The prize includes $5000 and publication of the paper in Oxford Studies in Epistemology. For more on Rachel’s award see here.

Anil Gomes Appears on BBC Radio 4’s In Our Time

Last October Anil Gomes, Associate Professor of Philosophy and Fellow of Trinity College, appeared on BBC Radio 4’s In Our Time to talk about Iris Murdoch.

The programme focussed on Murdoch’s account of morality and goodness, and can be listened to here.

Portraits of Oxford Philosophers on Daily Nous

In October 2021 Daily Nous featured portraits of Oxford philosophers by Keiko Ikeuchi. Keiko has been the Graphic Designer and Photographer for Oxford Philosophy since its inception in 2009.

In discussing how she approaches portrait photography, Keiko revealed her secret: “I treat the shoot as if it is a fashion shoot and work as if I am trying to win the approval of just one person, namely the subject’s mother. I want to produce an image in which she could recognise her child and feel proud of who they have become.”

Read here

New Statesman Articles by Oxford Philosophers

Over the past year, a number of Oxford philosophers have contributed ‘public philosophy’ articles to The New Statesman, which are all available to read online.

Is this the best of all possible worlds? Adrian Moore Read here

Why social science needs stories Alex Prescott-Couch Read here

Would extinction be so bad? Roger Crisp Read here

Do we have a duty to read women writers? Rachel Fraser Read here

Rachel Fraser wins Marc Sanders Prize in Epistemology

Anil Gomes Appears on BBC Radio 4’s In Our Time

Portraits of Oxford Philosophers on Daily Nous

New Statesman Articles by Oxford Philosophers
Previous holders of the Chair have contributed to debates around the biggest challenges facing humanity. John Broome continues to publish widely on climate change; Bernard Williams worked on royal commissions and government committees, including on drug abuse, gambling, social inequality and obscenity and film censorship; and the current Sekyra and White’s Professor of Moral Philosophy, Jeff McMahan, explores moral questions such as war, abortion and our treatment of animals.

A public event on Thursday 21 October 2021 marked the anniversary and the gift. This was a discussion on the topic ‘Is procreation morally wrong? Is it obligatory?’ between Oxford philosophers Jeff McMahan, John Broome, and Hilary Greaves, which was chaired by Alison Hills. Mr Sekyra attended the event, which can be viewed [here](#).

The Sekyra Foundation has previously funded other developments across Oxford University and its colleges. This includes the construction of the Sekyra House, a student centre at Harris Manchester College, and the installation of a bench honouring Václav Havel in the University Parks. The Foundation also provides stipends for postgraduate students of philosophy and legal theory, including human rights issues. We are extremely grateful for its support.
Lea Cantor and Justin Holder present the work of Philiminality and other initiatives at Oxford to broaden the scope of academic philosophy.

Among academic disciplines, philosophy has a uniquely broad and timeless domain. Many of its characteristic preoccupations (what is there? what can we be certain of? how should we treat others? etc.) are equally pertinent to all human beings, regardless of time or place. One might think, then, that a serious philosophical community would study important contributions to these issues from people all over the world. However, virtually all of the canonical philosophers studied in European universities and throughout the Anglophone world are Europeans or part of the European diaspora. This may give the impression that the rest of the world has had nothing particularly significant to contribute to the interrogation of philosophy’s perennial questions. Is this the case? Not at all: major philosophical achievements have been, and continue to be, made across the world. The problem lies with the insularity of ‘Western Philosophy’ – and this is what needs to be made visible and addressed.

At Philiminality Oxford, we are doing what we can to tackle this problem at the University of Oxford.
Philiminality’s Martina Bani—who graduated from Oxford with an MSt in Film Aesthetics in 2020—convened an online ‘Philosophy-Film Week’ co-hosted with opp, exploring how films can do philosophy through the screen and help us practice radical openness to our philosophical and cultural assumptions in challenging times. A symposium co-organized with Minorities and Philosophy (MAP) in 2019, ‘Pluralising Philosophy: Learning from the Case of Chinese Thought’, explored the tensions within ‘canonical’ philosophy regarding the status of ‘non-Western’ philosophies, drawing on critical theory of ‘race’ and Chinese philosophy.

In a similar vein, we are now planning a more ambitious international conference titled ‘Questioning ‘Western Philosophy’: Philosophical, Historical, and Historiographical Challenges’ in collaboration with Josh Platzky Miller (KwaZulu-Natal/Cambridge), scheduled for Spring 2023. The conference will critically challenge ‘Western Philosophy’ as an idea to which our understanding of philosophy and its history must correspond, and to which so-called ‘non-Western’ traditions must supposedly conform. In so doing, we aim for the conference’s debates to lay the groundwork for new visions of a global, entwined, connected history of philosophy: one which neither makes ‘Western Philosophy’ the singular measuring stick for philosophy globally, nor uses the idea of ‘Western Philosophy’ to hermetically seal off parts of Europe from exchange with the rest of the world, either retrospectively or for generations to come.

Many of us at Philiminality have had our most rigorous and rewarding philosophical engagement with sources which are conspicuously absent from the canon taught in universities like Oxford. There is still a long way to go before these damaging omissions are redressed, but there are reasons for hope. Especially in the last decade, there has been a notable increase in awareness of, and opportunities to pursue, philosophy that has historically been absent from academia. We hope that Philiminality might lend some small lift to that rising tide.

Lea Cantor (Worcester College) and Justin Holder (Lady Margaret Hall) are graduate students in the Faculty of Philosophy.

Over the last academic year, Philiminality has also endeavoured to bring into view the marginalization of women in the history of philosophy. Particularly close to home is the neglect and underappreciation of members of the ‘wartime quartet’—namely, Elizabeth Anscombe, Philippa Foot, Mary Midgely, and Iris Murdoch. This was the subject of a Michaelmas 2021 talk organized in conjunction with the Philosophy Faculty’s Equality and Diversity Student Representative, Sebastián Sánchez-Schilling. And in collaboration with the Philosophy Faculty’s Women’s Student Representative, Lara Scheibli, we also hosted a talk in November 2021 on the topic of ancient women philosophers, which questioned the commonplace that ancient philosophy was exclusively the domain of male thinkers.

Since Philiminality’s inception, we have worked to foster an inclusive and global approach to the study of ancient philosophy in several other projects. For instance, in June 2019, we organized an international conference, ‘Curing through Questioning’, gathering perspectives on philosophy as therapy from Chinese, Indian, Japanese, and Graeco-Roman philosophy. In the academic year 2020-2021, we ran a reading group and seminar on the Chinese Daoist tradition as well as a series of talks by world-leading scholars on Confucius’ Analects (now publicly available as podcasts here; in Michaelmas 2021, we co-hosted a graduate workshop titled ‘One-Many Relations in Chinese Philosophy’ with Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (HKUST); and in Hilary Term 2021, we ran a discussion group and series of talks on Mesopotamian and Egyptian cosmogonies in collaboration with Early Text Cultures (ETC).

We have also collaborated with several other Oxford groups to promote cross-disciplinary dialogue and offer students resources to pursue research in less commonly taught areas of philosophy. An informal mentorship scheme organized with people for womxn* in philosophy (pwip) aims to support undergraduate and graduate students in navigating the world of academic philosophy, and creating longer-term systemic change therein. Together with oxford public philosophy (opp), we have organized several information sessions about studying ‘non-Western’ or ‘world’ philosophies at Oxford and beyond. At the height of the pandemic,
Spring of 2022 St Hilda’s hosted the on-site launch of this series, with a talk by Professor Kathryn Sophia Belle, Associate Professor of Philosophy and African American Studies at Pennsylvania State University. Professor Belle is also the founding director of the Collegium of Black Women Philosophers, and the author of several books and articles. Her latest book Beauvoir and Belle: A Black Feminist Critique of The Second Sex will be published by Oxford University Press next year.

Professor Belle spoke to us of the achievements of several black women whom she termed ‘true philosophers’—including Joyce Mitchell Cook, the campaigner and activist Claudia Jones, and the 18th century slave-turned-poet, Phillis Wheatley (pictured with Joyce Mitchell Cook above). With these women as leading examples, she encouraged future generations of black women to join the ranks of true philosophers, and she called for philosophy to widen its horizons and embrace new philosophical perspectives—including ones that will speak to a new generation of black women philosophers.

As we can see from Joyce’s words, her commitment to philosophy went deep and beyond race. While at Oxford she studied with, among others, Jean Austin, Mary Warnock, and Peter Strawson. She graduated with highest honours. Back in the US, her PhD supervisors included Paul Weiss and Wilfred Sellars. She went on to succeed Paul Weiss as the Managing Editor of the philosophical journal The Review of Metaphysics. After receiving her PhD, she taught for a time at Yale—the first woman graduate student teaching assistant to be appointed at Yale in any subject outside of a foreign language subject.

By instituting this annual lecture in her name, we hope that generations of students will be able to remember Joyce Mitchell Cook, and all that she accomplished in philosophy. And to this end St Hilda’s College, also with the support of Professor Shaffer, has established a graduate scholarship fund for BAME students to come to Oxford, and St Hilda’s, to study philosophy. In 2022, the College has partnered with the University’s Black Academic Futures programme, using the Joyce Mitchell Cook Fund to create a fully-funded scholarship in Philosophy.

Anita Avamides
Senior Research Fellow, St Hilda’s College

“I would say that I have to create whatever value there is in my life. I reject a religious point of view. I think that I’m here to make sense of my life and to give meaning to it. Now, I have arrived at that point of view beyond any considerations about colour. And I think that is it true of me, of a white person, of a red person.”

These words were written by Joyce Mitchell Cook, the first black American woman to receive a PhD in philosophy—at Yale in the United States. Some years before that, from 1955-57, she came to St Hilda’s College, Oxford, to study for her second BA in the Honours School of PPP (Philosophy, Psychology and Physiology—now PPL, Philosophy, Psychology and Linguistics). With the generous support of the Faculty of Philosophy, and thanks to a donation from a contemporary and College friend of Joyce’s, Professor Elinor Shaffer, St Hilda’s has established an annual lecture to commemorate the achievements of Joyce Mitchell Cook. Due to the pandemic, the series was launched online in the Spring of 2021. The Inaugural speaker was Professor Anita Allen, Henry R. Silverman Professor of Law and professor of philosophy at the University of Pennsylvania Law School. The lecture was followed by questions from an invited panel of current and ex-students: Lawrence Okoth-Odida, Ombline Damy, and Buki Fatoma. In the

Anita Avamides introduces the recently inaugurated annual Joyce Mitchell Cook Memorial Lecture.
I don’t remember the precise point at which I decided to mimic this. A song that I wrote in 1993 had an awkward reference to reading Heidegger in Canada. But in early 1994 I found myself turning to the idea of taking the words of philosophers themselves and setting them to music. Three of the songs that make up Cantat Ergo Sumus come from that time. ‘Small Country’ is a somewhat loose rendition of the penultimate poem from the Daodejing, and ‘Foolishness’ and ‘Brahma’ are settings of poems by the medieval Catalan philosopher Ramon Llull and the 19th Century American Transcendentalist Ralph Waldo Emerson respectively.

On leaving Rutgers I took up a position at Tulane University in New Orleans. Ironically, however, I didn’t perform any music at all during the five years I lived there; and it wasn’t until 2006, three years after I had returned to Oxford, that I began writing again. However it was different project altogether that led me to expand the three philosophical songs I already had into Cantat Ergo Sumus. Again, with brother Richard as the lyricist, I wrote a set of songs each inspired by one Shakespeare’s plays, which became collectively known as Shakespeare in the Alley. In 2019 I performed some of these at The Old Fire Station in Oxford at an event which also featured music from The Food of Love Project, an album of songs by various artists from Shakespeare’s plays or written around that time. One of the bands on the bill was the Oxford Psychedelic-drone band Flights of Helios, and after the gig I got talking to their bass player Phil Hanaway-Oakley. I mentioned my philosophy songs, which had expanded from three to eight with the addition of two poems by Margaret Cavendish (‘Of Shadow and Echo’ and ‘The Island’); a setting of Zarathustra’s Roundelay from Nietzsche’s Thus Spake Zarathustra; a reworking of an antiphon composed by Hildegard von Bingen (‘Redness of Blood’); and a song based on the ninth of Walter Benjamin’s ‘Theses on the Philosophy of History’ (‘New Angel’), which was written using an electronic version of the cut-up technique pioneered by Dadaists in the 1920s and put to great effect by David Bowie and Thom Yorke. Phil was intrigued and mentioned the possibility of collaboration.

Paul Lodge showcases his recent project with Oxford band Flights of Helios, which marries his interests in philosophy and music.

I started writing and performing songs when I was in secondary school, with the lyrics written by my younger brother Richard. This continued into our time as undergraduates when we were contemporaries at Oxford. However, after moving to New Jersey in 1992 to study for my PhD at Rutgers University, I found myself without a lyricist and it was during this time that Cantat Ergo Sumus was born.

The idea of philosophy entered my consciousness as a teenager primarily through references that I came across in popular culture. I was raised on reruns of Monty Python’s Flying Circus with its philosophers’ football match and philosophers’ song, and The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy, at the centre of whose plot is the claim that 42 is the answer to “the Ultimate Question of Life, the Universe and Everything.” But perhaps more than anything it was the allusion to philosophical ideas in music that peaked my interest. I spent hours listening to existentially laden concept albums such as Pink Floyd’s Dark Side of the Moon and Genesis’s The Lamb Lies Down on Broadway; and I found even more explicit connections with philosophy in songs like ‘Close To The Edge’ by Yes, which is inspired by Hermann Hesse’s Siddartha, and ‘I Dreamed I Saw Saint Augustine’ by Bob Dylan.
all of the conferences, and lectures by external speakers that are the lifeblood of research went online. Grzegorz and I took advantage of this to organize a discussion of the relation between philosophy and music with legendary rock journalists David Fricke (one time editor at Rolling Stone Magazine), and Sylvie Simmons (also famous for her biography of Leonard Cohen), and BBC Radio 6 DJ Gideon Coe. And it was at this event that the first of the Cantat recordings, ‘Redness of Blood’, had its public debut. The discussion can be viewed here.

As I write, ‘Redness of Blood’ and a second song, ‘Shadow and Eccho’, have received airplay on BBC Introducing Oxfordshire and can be downloaded from Bandcamp. I have also presented both of the songs at a virtual conference ‘New Voices’ which was held under that auspices of the research centre History of Women Philosophers and Scientists in Paderborn, Germany. We are close to releasing an EP featuring two more songs (‘Small Country’ and ‘Foolishness’), and the remaining songs from the project are reasonably close to completion. And, whilst rehearsals came in fits and starts as various people succumbed to the virus, we were finally able to make good on our twice postponed gig at The Old Fire Station in February 2022. What comes next is a little unclear. We aim to roll out the other components of the project that was initially funded by TORCH. But the broader aim of using music to get into people’s heads and lure them into finding more about philosophy remains. And, of course, the best way to achieve that will be through global rock star status!

Paul Lodge
Professor of Philosophy
Tutorial Fellow in Philosophy, Mansfield College

For more on Cantat Ergo Sumus and Paul’s other musical interests, see paullodge.com/music
Decentralizing the production of public goods can help resolve certain longstanding challenges in political philosophy. Many commentators have claimed that public policy should take account of persistent disagreements throughout societies about metaphysical questions and questions of value. One unresolved question here concerns which institutional design schemes might enable governments to do this well. Separately, many philosophers have wondered how individuals can develop the capacities necessary to participate effectively in political life and hold governments accountable. I suggest that philanthropy can help address both problems. Decentralizing the provision of certain public goods can be a way of acknowledging reasonable pluralism about various questions. It can also foster a vibrant civil society that cultivates civic virtues and counterbalances state power. Others have made these claims before, and part of the book’s aim is to put them on more secure footing and defend them against recent objections.

However, a larger portion of the book is devoted to advancing and working through various challenges to the justification of philanthropy. Are all public goods equally fit to be provided privately? In some societies, private donations are (or have been) used to finance military campaigns, law enforcement, social assistance, and basic education. I argue that there are strong reasons, rooted in the value of democracy, to treat certain goods and services as essentially public responsibilities. To be democratically legitimate, these goods must be collectively financed and governed. Democracy can only welcome private provision of these goods on a transitional or supplementary basis.

The topic of philanthropy matters a great deal to the Philosophy Faculty, both as a beneficiary of philanthropic gifts and as a sponsor of research on the ethics of philanthropy. The Faculty hosts the world’s oldest endowed philosophy professorship, the Sekyra and White’s Professorship of Moral Philosophy, thanks to gifts from Thomas White and Luděk Sekyra. The Faculty is also home to the new Institute for Ethics in AI, where I am fortunate to be appointed. The Institute is a key beneficiary of the University’s largest donation since the Renaissance, a commitment of 150 million pounds from financier Stephen Schwartzman. Additionally, the Faculty has provided institutional support to the effective altruism movement, serving as a home for leading thinkers and several EA-affiliated research clusters. Although effective altruism’s concerns have broadened in the past few years, the movement first made its mark as a critique of conventional views of charitable giving.

The Faculty thus finds itself at the centre of several important debates in the ethics of philanthropy. What role should donations play in the finance of higher education? Despite recent interest in these questions from philosophers, many other important questions have gone overlooked. My new book, The Tyranny of Generosity: Why Philanthropy Corrupts Our Politics and How We Can Fix It (OUP, 2021), is an attempt to expose and animate several such puzzles and offer some resources for thinking through them.

As the title suggests, the book illuminates how philanthropy constitutes a form of political power that both challenges and supports democratic ideals. To appreciate this, it is necessary to broaden the analysis from the standpoint of the donor and consider philanthropy as a wider social practice. Philanthropy is a way of financing public goods through voluntary and discretionary transfers of private property. It shares with taxation the purpose of providing goods that benefit the public. Though it shares certain features with taxation, its mechanisms have more in common with market exchange, as decisions about contribution and direction depend on voluntary choices. Philanthropy can thus be understood as a way of decentralizing the finance and governance of public goods. Characterizing philanthropy in this way prompts us to consider some different ethical questions. Namely, under what conditions might the practice itself be just or legitimate?

Ted Lechtermann tells us about his new book, which analyses conflicts between philanthropic giving and the value of democracy.

The Tyranny of Generosity

Ted Lechtermann tells us about his new book, which analyses conflicts between philanthropic giving and the value of democracy.
A second challenge I address concerns how philanthropy can create a vehicle for inequalities in wealth to be converted into inequalities in social and political power. This challenge persists even in situations where the case for private provision itself is less disputed, such as in the finance of public interest groups, think tanks, and other advocacy-focused organizations. I argue that an unlimited ability to convert wealth into influence is inconsistent with principles of political equality that are core to democratic legitimacy, and I offer a radical proposal for addressing this problem. The proposal calls for replacing at least certain cash donations with a scheme that grants each citizen a packet of vouchers, redeemable by the organizations of their choice. Individuals who wish to donate more can purchase additional packets at increasing costs. This scheme has the benefit of constraining inequalities in power without sacrificing other important values like liberty and efficiency.

A third set of challenges I address concerns how philanthropy can enable certain groups (e.g., the dead, donors from the Global North) to exercise forms of control over other groups (e.g., future generations, recipients in the Global South). These relationships often fail to show due appreciation for recipients’ interests in autonomy and equal respect. The book analyses several varieties of this problem and offers some ideas about how shifts in policy and strategy can help to minimize it.

Exploring the ethics of philanthropy may provide insights that are portable to other practices. Individuals and organizations are increasingly pursuing social ends through means other than donation, through such activities as impact investing, social enterprise, and corporate activism. Future work might show how the principles uncovered in this book can be extended to address broader issues in economic ethics.

The book has also been instrumental to shaping my thinking about artificial intelligence, my main area of current research. Certain philosophical problems that AI raises are structurally similar to the problems that philanthropy presents. Both AI and philanthropy allow the control of social conditions to be offloaded to agents that are not democratically authorized or accountable. With philanthropy, those agents are private donors. With AI, those agents are both private corporations and autonomous systems. Studying philanthropy has forced me to think carefully about what makes democracy valuable and how that value applies to different agents and practices. Many of these insights are highly relevant for current debates about what AI should be used for, who should control it, and how it can be accountable.

Ted Lechterman  
Research Fellow, Institute for Ethics in AI  
Research Fellow, Wolfson College

The Philosophy of Absolutely Everything

Nick Jones shares his research into the ways in which recent work in philosophical logic sheds new light on some of the oldest puzzles in metaphysics.

My philosophical interests lie primarily in metaphysics and the philosophy of logic, and especially their intersection. One goal of metaphysics is to understand the nature and structure of reality in highly general and abstract terms. This understanding is shaped by the resources we have available to formulate questions, hypotheses, and theories. This article describes some of my recent work examining the metaphysical effects of adopting one such logical resource in particular, known as higher-order quantification.

Here at Oxford, as elsewhere, logic is one of the first things we teach our undergraduates. In particular, we teach a form of logic known as first-order logic. One of its distinctive features concerns the kind of generalisations that can be captured within the logic. First-order logic is good at capturing generalisations like “she asked Aida”. Yet first-order logic struggles to capture similar generalisations where the something isn’t expressed with a name. For example, in “she believes something”, the something is expressed by a sentence, not a name, as in “she believes it’s raining”. Other examples include “she did something” (swim), “she hurt him somehow” (by treading on his toe), “they’re both something” (generous), and “or” means something” (or).

By contrast, higher-order logic is good at capturing generalisations like those I just mentioned. This is because it contains a wider range of resources for expressing generalisations. Those resources are known collectively as higher-order quantifiers. In fact, higher-order logic is good at capturing generalisations in particular, known as higher-order quantification.

The book has also been instrumental to shaping my thinking about artificial intelligence, my main area of current research. Certain philosophical problems that AI raises are structurally similar to the problems that philanthropy presents. Both AI and philanthropy allow the control of social conditions to be offloaded to agents that are not democratically authorized or accountable. With philanthropy, those agents are private donors. With AI, those agents are both private corporations and autonomous systems. Studying philanthropy has forced me to think carefully about what makes democracy valuable and how that value applies to different agents and practices. Many of these insights are highly relevant for current debates about what AI should be used for, who should control it, and how it can be accountable.
languages such as English. Higher-order logic and higher-order quantifiers thereby extend our theoretical resources, opening up new kinds of questions, hypotheses, and theories for investigation. Thanks in no small part to the work of other Oxford, and former-Oxford, philosophers (especially Timothy Williamson), this approach has become prominent within metaphysics, leading to a new sub-field of higher-order metaphysics.

In my recent work, I've been particularly interested in how this new perspective affects some older debates. Those effects are quite striking for the metaphysics of properties. Since Aristotle (at least), some philosophers have believed in universals such as wisdom, which all wise things somehow have in common. These philosophers naturally want to generalise about universals, so that they can express systematic theories about all universals, not just about whatever specific universals they happen to have words for. When generalisations about universals are expressed within first-order logic, the internal structure of the logic — specifically, the fact that in first-order logic one can only generalise about what can in principle be named — ensures that certain other questions about universals can also be formulated. Where is wisdom located? Can it be a cause or effect? Is wisdom concrete or abstract? Is the wisdom possessed by Aristotle the very same thing as the wisdom possessed by Plato?

Much metaphysical labour has been spent on questions like these. Yet they still seem intractable. To many, this suggests that something has gone wrong en route to the questions. Fault might lie with the initial doctrine of universals. However, higher-order metaphysics offers a different kind of answer. Fault may lie not with the doctrine of universals itself, but with how generalisations about universals are expressed. When generalisations about universals are expressed using higher-order quantifiers, there is no guarantee that we can ask where universals are located, or whether they are concrete or abstract. The internal structure of the logic no longer ensures that those questions can be formulated. The possibility of formulating them becomes an optional extra at best, not a core commitment. Those questions may thereby be dissolved. Moreover, one can also show by purely logical means that Aristotle's wisdom is one and the same as Plato's wisdom, given that they are both wise. That seemingly intractable question is thereby resolved.

Higher-order metaphysics also has interesting consequences for absolute generality: generalisation about absolutely everything whatsoever without restriction, wherever and whenever it may be, part of the material universe or not. Absolute generality is central to metaphysics because it's required to theorise about the nature and structure all reality rather than just some restricted portion thereof. When a metaphysician says “there are no abstract objects”, they don’t just mean something like “there are no abstract objects amongst those I happen to be talking about right now”. Instead, they mean “there are absolutely no abstract objects whatsoever”. This differentiates generalisations in metaphysics from ordinary generalisations, such as when I look in the empty fridge and truthfully say “there’s no milk”. The difference arises because generalisations in metaphysics are often intended to express absolute generality. What exactly is it to generalise about absolutely everything whatsoever? The answer appears simple: if there’s something one isn’t generalising about, one isn’t generalising about absolutely everything whatsoever; otherwise, one is. Higher-order metaphysics complicates the picture.

A distinctive feature of higher-order logic is its array of different resources for expressing generalisations. A large part of its metaphysical interest arises from those resources being genuinely different resources, not somehow reducible to, or explicable in terms of, one another. One natural view is that absolute generality would somehow combine all these different resources for expressing generalisations into one, encompassing each of them as a special, restricted case. However, it is difficult to make sense of this within standard systems of higher-order logic. Especially so, if the different kinds of higher-order quantifiers really cannot be reduced to, or explained in terms of, one another. And even if one could make sense of it, certain formal results suggest that it would be impossible anyway, on pain of paradox. Absolute generality would then be impossible at best and incoherent at worst. Higher-order metaphysics thus seems to presuppose a conception of higher-order logic that presents a significant problem for absolute generality, one of the central tools of metaphysics. Yet as so often in philosophy, matters are not so clear cut.

Standard systems of higher-order logic—known as simply typed systems—do not provide a way to make sense of the idea that what one generalises about with one quantifier is (or even is not) amongst what one generalises about with a different order of quantifier. Assuming my earlier, simple answer to the question of what exactly it is to generalise about absolutely everything whatsoever, this creates space for many different kinds of absolute generality, one for each different kind of higher-order quantifier. Absolute generality would then be both coherent and possible. There would, however, be no unique notion of all reality. There would instead be many different such notions.

In an ongoing collaboration with Salvatore Florio (University of Birmingham), we aim to bypass some of these complexities by focusing not on what absolute generality is, but on what absolute generality does. It allows us to express generalisations like “there are no abstracts” so that they take account of everything that could in principle count as a counterexample and thereby render it false. Our research shows that kind of generalisation to be possible in both standard systems of higher-order logic and some non-standard, more permissive systems known as cumulatively typed. It is not always possible, however, including in certain even more permissive systems of higher-order logic.

One central lesson is that the possibility of absolute generality depends in a systematic and predictable way on the nature and structure of meaning. This shows how one’s views about the tools of metaphysics – in this case, absolute generality and higher-order logic—can both influence and be influenced by one’s views about a specific metaphysical subject matter—in this case, meaning itself.

Nick Jones
Associate Professor of Philosophy
Tutorial Fellow in Philosophy, St John’s College
If we get things right from the start, we can have a huge positive impact on people’s chances of having a good life now and in the future.

When I was studying practical ethics as an undergraduate, I felt a pang of jealousy at the pioneers of medical ethics. How exciting it must have been, I thought, to be a philosopher and to have had the chance to suggest some answers to unchartered real-life problems that needed urgent solutions. Enjoying the pleasures of theory in philosophy while having a practical impact seemed to me the best possible combination. Little did I know that I would get to work in a field with even more uncharted real-life problems, at a larger scale, needing even more urgent solutions.

The last decade has witnessed a drastic change in attitudes concerning the Internet and the digital; from tech hype to techlash. As concern grows regarding digital technologies, more is being written about their ethical problems. Much of it, however, has been produced by journalists, engineers, computer scientists, sociologists, or legal scholars. In comparison, philosophers are lagging. But not for long.

When I wrote my dissertation, and then my first book, Privacy Is Power, I knew of only a handful of philosophers working on similar topics. When I started editing The Oxford Handbook of Digital Ethics, it was difficult to find papers in the top philosophy journals that dealt with the tech problems we were reading about every day on the newspapers. Two years later, the field is mushrooming at a speed that is hard to keep up with. As I work on finishing an academic book on the ethics of privacy in the digital age, I keep having to revise it to take into account the newest literature.

At a minimum, AI ethics encompasses insights from practical ethics, political philosophy, and public policy. Working on privacy and the ethics of AI has taken me from the written page to interacting with the general public, being a witness for the House of Lords, and advising the US Congress and the Spanish government.

One of the roles of ethics is to work as grounding for good regulation and the development of best practices. Even though big tech often refers to its developments as “inevitable”, no technology is inevitable, and every device we have ever invented could have had a different design. Once something is invented, marketed, and is successful, however, it can remain in usage for a long time, even if it has been shown to be detrimental to people’s health and wellbeing, and even when better alternatives are possible (e.g., gasoline and diesel cars). That is why building ethics into the very fundamentals of digital design is of vital importance. If we get things right from the start, we can have a huge positive impact on people’s chances of having a good life now and in the future. If we fail to think through the ethical implications of the digital technologies we are developing now, we might be hampered by toxic consequences for decades to come.

The importance of developing AI ethics as fast as possible cannot be understated. That task will be made easier if we can learn from the experience of medical ethics. From its successes—avoiding cases of harm and exploitation, setting up ethics committees in every hospital, and ethics review for research, etc.—as well as its failures.

Three challenges, among many others, strike me as particularly daunting for AI ethics. The first has to do with medical ethics’ biggest failure: not curbing some of Big Pharma’s worst practices. AI is mostly being developed by powerful international companies, and instituting structures of ethics will be much harder than it was for medical ethics to set up ethical committees and reviews in hospitals and universities. In this regard, it is extremely important to count with AI ethics research that is completely independent of Big Tech. The role of the university as a guarantor of the public good has never been so important. The second challenge has to do with international relations: harnessing alliances between democracies and dealing with competition from international rivals—China in particular. Too often it is assumed that competing with China in AI necessitates making compromises in ethics. But if we aim to compete with China at its own game, with its own rules, we may run towards authoritarian tendencies and away from our liberal and democratic values. Competing with China in AI and remaining democratic countries necessitates doing better than China in AI ethics. The third challenge is about gaining a better understanding of how AI is affecting liberal democracy and the social fabric.

The questions and challenges facing the ethics of AI are as formidable as they are exciting. There is nothing else I’d rather spend my time and energy on.

Carissa Véliz
Associate Professor of Philosophy
Tutorial Fellow in Philosophy, Hertford College

Carissa Véliz discusses her work at the cutting edge of the burgeoning field of AI Ethics.

Ethics in Artificial Intelligence

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Ethics and Existence: The Legacy of Derek Parfit

Edited by Jeff McMahan, Tim Campbell, James Goodrich, and Ketan Ramakrishnan

This book is the second of three volumes of essays in honour of Derek Parfit, who died in 2015. They have all been inspired by his work—in particular, his work in population ethics, which is concerned with moral issues raised by causing people to exist. Until Parfit began writing about these issues in the 1980s, there was almost no discussion of them in philosophy. In Reasons and Persons (1984) he revealed that population ethics abounds in deep and intractable problems and paradoxes that not only challenge all the major moral theories but also threaten to undermine many common-sense moral beliefs. Indeed, a broad range of practical moral issues cannot be adequately understood until fundamental problems in population ethics are resolved, including abortion, prenatal injury and prenatal screening for disability, genetic enhancement, meat eating, climate change, and the threat of human extinction. The contributors include many of the most influential writers in this burgeoning area of philosophy.

The Practice of Generosity: Why Philanthropy Corrupts Our Politics and How We Can Fix It

Theodore Lechterman

The practice of philanthropy, which releases private property for public purposes, represents in many ways the best angels of our nature. But this practice’s noteworthy virtue is also the fact that philanthropy also represents the exercise of private power. In this book, Theodore Lechterman shows how this private power can threaten and undermine the values of a democratic society. The deployment of private wealth for public ends may rival the authority of communities to determine their own affairs. And, in cases characterized by wide disparities in wealth, philanthropy often combines with background inequalities to make public decisions overwhelmingly sensitive to the preferences of the rich. Although it is argued that allowing private wealth to dictate social outcomes collides with core commitments of a democratic society, the book builds to a surprising conclusion: realizing the democratic ideal may be impossible without philanthropy.

From Existentialism to Metaphysics: The Philosophy of Stephen Priest

Peter Lang

Edited by Benedikt Goecke and Ralph Weir

The pieces collected here are written by fifteen philosophers and one poet who have been influenced by the ideas of Stephen Priest (Senior Research Fellow in Philosophy at Blackfriars Hall), have developed themes in Priest’s philosophy, or both. They include contributions from authors working in a range of traditions, among whom are Oxford faculty members Timothy Williamson, Nicholas Waghorn, Samuel Hughes, and the late Michael Inwood. Topics covered include philosophical method, the analytic/continental divide, the nature of the mind (or self, or soul), metaphysics, and the meaning of life. The volume also includes responses by Priest and an intellectual biography, describing some of the life-experiences which caused Priest to become interested in philosophy and to make the transition from existentialism to metaphysics.

Oxford Philosophy
Joseph Raz 1933-2022

Joseph Raz was born in 1939 in Mandate Palestine, where he grew up in a house with no books except his own. He studied law at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem and subsequently came to Oxford to work under H.L.A. Hart’s supervision, completing his doctorate in 1967. He then took up a tutorial fellowship in law at Balliol College in 1972, and went on to hold a personal chair in the philosophy of law (1985-2006), and then a research professorship (2006-2009). In the latter part of his career he also held posts at Columbia Law School and King’s College London.


Joseph Raz was one of the leading legal philosophers of the last hundred years; and along with John Rawls, he was arguably one of the two most significant political philosophers in the liberal tradition since John Stuart Mill. In legal philosophy, Raz succeeded Hart as the torch-bearer of legal positivism. One bone of contention in the multi-faceted quarrel between legal positivists and natural lawyers is whether moral judgments are necessary in determining the existence and content of laws. According to the original version of legal positivism that he championed, the existence and content of legal norms is always exclusively a matter of social fact e.g., of what has been laid down by legislatures or judicial decisions—rather than moral evaluation.

Jane Day (née Osborn) 1940-2021

Jane Day studied Classics at Somerville College (1959-63). Subsequently, she took the B.Phil. in writing a thesis on causality. She spent one year as an Assistant Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Leeds (1965-66), but soon returned to Oxford. In 1966 Jane became Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy at Lady Margaret Hall, a position she held until her retirement in 2007. Whilst at LMH, she Senior Tutor for five years in the 1980s and Vice-Principal for another five years from 1997-2002. Her central interest was in Plato. She edited the volume Plato’s Meno In Focus (Routledge, 1993) and wrote a number of articles on ancient philosophy.

However, as her husband, the Old Testament Scholar John Day, relates in his own tribute.

“her heart was primarily in her teaching. She taught over an enormous range, including Plato and Aristotle, Pre-Socratic Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Ethics, Philosophy of Religion, Early Modern Philosophy and Formal Logic. And John reports that “Students found in her an encouraging and sympathetic tutor, as well as a stickler for the most rigorous thinking. One student simply wrote on their feedback form about Jane’s teaching, ‘We all love Mrs Day!””

Michael Inwood 1944-2021

Michael Inwood studied Classics at University College, where he graduated in 1966. A year later he was appointed a Fellow of Trinity College, where he remained until his retirement in 2011. He was especially well known for his work on Hegel and Heidegger and in ancient philosophy. He was author of numerous articles and several books, including Hegel (Routledge, 1983) and Heidegger: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford, 2000).

Michael had an exceptional capacity, not only for engaging with what was deep in these notoriously difficult philosophers, but for doing so in a way that rendered its depth accessible.

He was a dedicated tutor and supervisor, and was adored by his students. They appreciated his kindness, his preparedness to understand what they were trying to say. Michael also contributed a huge amount to the Faculty. He played a particularly active role in examining, partly because his specialisms equipped him to examine in subjects that few others could. Among his outside interests were writing comic fiction and playing chess. Michael was also known for his room at Trinity, which was thought by many to be the most chaotic in Oxford. But he will be best remembered for his fierce intelligence, his sense of humour, his humility, his disdain for all kinds of affectation, and his endearing warmth.