

FACULTY OF PHILOSOPHY
UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD



PHILOSOPHY LECTURE PROSPECTUS

HILARY TERM 2023

NOTES:

- The normal duration of an event is one hour. Where the class or lecture lasts longer than an hour, the start time and end time will be given.
- By convention, in-person lectures at Oxford begin at 5 minutes past the hour and end at 5 minutes before the hour.
- Unless otherwise specified, the lectures and classes are given for all of weeks 1 to 8.
- Teaching is now taking place in person. You should not expect recordings to be made available on a general basis.
- Every effort is made to ensure that the information contained in this Prospectus is accurate at the start of term, but sometimes errors persist. If you think you have found a mistake, please contact James Knight (james.knight@philosophy.ox.ac.uk).

Lectures for the First Public Examination

Students preparing for their First Public Examination (Prelims or Mods) should attend the following lectures this term:

PPE, Philosophy and Modern Languages, Philosophy and Theology, Psychology and Philosophy: Moral Philosophy, and General Philosophy

Mathematics and Philosophy, Physics and Philosophy, Computer Science and Philosophy: Elements of Deductive Logic, and General Philosophy

Literae Humaniores: any listed Prelims/Mods lecture that corresponds to their chosen Philosophy option for Mods

Elements of Deductive Logic

Prof Alex Paseau – T. 12, Maths Institute (L1)

Elements of Deductive Logic is primarily a course in metalogic. Our focus will be the metatheory of propositional logic. We'll examine several important results, notably the soundness and completeness of the natural deduction system from Introduction to Logic with respect to truth-table semantics. The only prerequisite is working knowledge of *The Logic Manual*. The course is primarily aimed at Mathematics & Philosophy, Physics & Philosophy and Computer Science & Philosophy students, but all are welcome. In particular, more advanced students in philosophy who wish to build on a first logic course and/or those interested in taking the Philosophical Logic paper for finals are encouraged to attend. The lecturer's notes from last year are available on his webpages (www.acpaseau.com—see the 'Teaching' section) and on Canvas. A revised version for this year's course, likely to be very similar, will be uploaded to Canvas.

Lucretius: *De Rerum Natura* IV

Prof Alexander Bown – M. T. 12 (*weeks 1 to 4*), Faculty of Classics (1st floor Seminar Room)

This series of lectures is primarily aimed at Classics students offering the 'Lucretius: Book IV' paper at Mods, although anyone interested in the subject is welcome to attend. The first two lectures will be devoted to a general introduction to Epicurean philosophy; the remaining six lectures will then be spent on discussions of the main topics that emerge from Book IV, proceeding roughly in Lucretius' order. A provisional plan is as follows:

1. Introduction to Epicurean philosophy, part 1: background and sources; the branches of philosophy; Epicurean physics.
2. Introduction to Epicurean philosophy, part 2: canonic and ethics.
3. Introduction to Lucretius; overview of Book IV; the mechanics of perception.
4. 'All perceptions are true' – what does this mean, and is it defensible?
5. Refutation and self-refutation; the Epicurean defence against scepticism.
6. Teleology, theology and cosmology.
7. Psychology: thinking, dreaming and moving.
8. Epicurean hedonism and Lucretius on love.

Bibliography

The *De Rerum Natura*:

- Rouse, W. H. D. and Smith, M. F., *Lucretius: On the Nature of Things*. Loeb Classical Library. 1992.
- Godwin, J., *Lucretius: De Rerum Natura IV*. Aris & Phillips, 1986.

Collections and translations of Epicurean texts:

- Long, A. A. and Sedley, D., *The Hellenistic Philosophers*, vols. 1 and 2. Cambridge, 1987.
- Inwood, B. and Gerson, L. P., *The Epicurus Reader: Selected Writings and Testimonia*. Indianapolis and Cambridge, 1994.

Introductory reading:

- Sedley, D., 'Lucretius'. In *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. by E. N. Zalta. Stanford, 2013 (<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/lucretius/>).
- O'Keefe, T., *Epicureanism*. Durham, 2010.

Plato: *Protagoras* (for Second Classical Language at Greats)

Dr Stefan Sienkiewicz – F. 12 (weeks 1 to 4), Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

These lectures are primarily intended for undergraduates doing the second classical language paper for Greats, in which the *Protagoras* features as one of the set texts, but other interested parties are welcome to attend. Topics covered will include the Platonic dialogue form, the teachability of virtue, Protagoras' political theory, the unity of the virtues, and *akrasia*.

Lectures for the Honour Schools

Lectures listed in this section are **core lectures** for the papers in the Honour Schools: that is, these are lectures intended especially for students taking those papers at Finals. Questions set in Finals papers usually take the content of core lectures into account to some extent. It is therefore very much in your interest if you are a finalist to attend as many relevant core lectures as your schedule permits.

Students should also refer to the section *Other Lectures*, following. Lectures listed there are not official core lectures, but sometimes cover topics of relevance to the Finals papers.

101 Early Modern Philosophy: Descartes

Prof Paul Lodge – T. 10, Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

- Week 1: Introduction to the philosophy of Descartes
- Week 2: The method of doubt
- Week 3: 'The *cogito*'
- Week 4: Cosmological arguments for God's existence
- Week 5: Knowledge and error
- Week 6: The ontological argument for God's existence
- Week 7: Mind-body dualism
- Week 8: The existence and nature of the material world

101 Early Modern Philosophy: Locke and Berkeley

Prof Anita Avramides – W.10, Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

- Week 1: Locke's Empirical Turn
- Week 2: On what we can know
- Week 3: Innate Ideas
- Week 4: Locke on Substance Pt 1
- Week 5: Locke of Substance Pt 2
- Week 6: Locke and Berkeley on abstract general ideas
- Week 7: Berkeley Immaterialism
- Week 8: Berkeley on (Finite) Spirit

102 Knowledge and Reality: Metaphysics

Prof Nicholas Jones – Th. 10 *except week 8*: Th. 9, Examination Schools (North School) *except week 3*: Sheldonian Theatre

These lectures will provide an introduction to some major themes of contemporary metaphysics. Topics to be covered include modality, identity, persistence, and properties.

103 Ethics

Prof Alison Hills – F. 10, Examination Schools (North School) *except weeks 3 and 8*:
Sheldonian Theatre

110 Medieval Philosophy: Duns Scotus and Ockham

See graduate class Universals below

112 The Philosophy of Kant

Prof Anil Gomes – M. 10, Examination Schools (Room 2)

These lectures will provide an introduction to some of the central ideas in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), one of the most important and influential thinkers in the western philosophical tradition. They are primarily intended for those taking the Philosophy of Kant paper (112), but anyone who is interested in the material is welcome to attend. The main focus will be Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (1781/ 1787), a work which aims to mark the boundaries to our knowledge and to explain the possibility of metaphysics, natural science, and mathematics. We will cover, amongst other topics, the nature of Kant's critical project; space and time in the first Critique; the Transcendental Deduction; the rejection of transcendent metaphysics; transcendental idealism. Our primary aim will be to try and get an overall sense of Kant's work in theoretical philosophy, partly as a way of understanding why it has exerted such influence and why it continues to attract such fascination. Details of translations and other readings can be found on the Faculty Reading list.

113 Post-Kantian Philosophy: Nietzsche

Prof Peter Kail – M. 12, Examination Schools (Room 1)

These lectures provide a general introduction to Nietzsche's philosophy, with particular emphasis on his naturalistic critique of modern Western morality. After a brief overview of his life and works, we shall turn to his *On the Genealogy of Morality* (GM) and work through that text. GM will serve as a springboard for a discussion of topics that will bring in material from other works from Nietzsche's so-called middle and late works, including *Beyond Good and Evil*, and *Twilight of the Idols*. The topics discussed include naturalism, genealogy, 'Christian' morality, self, agency and freedom. In preparation for these lectures, students are encouraged to read GM.

113 Post-Kantian Philosophy: Schopenhauer

Prof William Mander – M. 11, Examination Schools (Room 1)

Week 1 – Three arguments for idealism

Week 2 – Kant, and three objections to idealism

Week 3 – The argument for the world as will
Week 4 – Further exploration of the world as will
Week 5 – Pessimism and the platonic ideas
Week 6 – Aesthetic appreciation
Week 7 – Pessimism, death, and suicide
Week 8 – Character, free-will, ethics, and asceticism

115 / 130 Plato: *Republic*

Prof Dominic Scott and Prof Simon Shogry – T. W. 10 *except week 3: T. 10, W. 9 and week 8: T. 10, W. 1*, Examination Schools (various rooms; check on entry)

Plato's *Republic* is not only one of the most celebrated and influential works in the history of philosophy; it is also one of the most gripping. These 16 lectures will introduce you to the main questions raised in the dialogue and emphasise their continued philosophical relevance.

The first 8 lectures, given by Prof. Shogry, will focus on topics from books 1-5: Socrates' refutation of traditional accounts of justice; the 'immoralism' of Thrasymachus and the alleged inconsistency in his position; Glaucon's division of goods, and the challenge he and Adeimantus put to Socrates to defend the life of justice; the city-soul analogy and the construction of the ideal city; early childhood education in music and gymnastics; the first critique of poetry; civic and individual virtue; the tripartition of the soul; the role of women in the ideal city, and Plato's alleged proto-feminism; the distinction between knowledge and opinion, and the basis for rule-by-philosophers.

The second part of the course, consisting of 8 lectures given by Prof. Scott, will focus on topics from books 6-10: the defence of philosopher-rulers in book VI, including the ship of state analogy; the images of the sun, line, and cave, including the famous problem of why philosophers should be expected to return to the cave; the account of education in book VII, especially the emphasis put on the study of mathematics; the difference between mathematical inquiry and philosophy (dialectic); the analysis of injustice in books VIII–IX, both at the level of the state and the individual; and the critique of poetry in book X.

These lectures are intended primarily for undergraduates studying the *Republic* in translation or in Greek (papers 115/130), but any student with an interest in learning more about this fundamental text is welcome to attend. No knowledge of ancient Greek required.

116 / 132 Aristotle: *Nicomachean Ethics*

Dr Stefan Sienkiewicz – Th. 10, Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

These lectures are primarily intended for undergraduates taking the *Nicomachean Ethics* paper in Greek or in translation, but other interested parties are welcome to attend. This term's lectures will focus on topics from Books 6-10 of the *NE*. Topics covered will include the

intellectual virtues, Aristotle's dialectical method, *akrasia*, pleasure, friendship and the relationship between contemplation and *eudaimonia*. Topics from Books 1-5 were covered in lectures in Michaelmas Term.

120 Intermediate Philosophy of Physics: Special Relativity

Dr Patrick Duerr – M. T. 11, Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

121 Advanced Philosophy of Physics

Dr James Wills – Th. 11 – 1, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room *except week 2*: Colin Matthew Room)

125 Philosophy of Cognitive Science

Prof Philipp Koralus – W. 11, Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

These lectures will provide an introduction to the philosophy of cognitive science. Topics will be drawn from those on the Faculty of Philosophy reading list for the FHS Finals paper Philosophy 125. We will spend comparable amounts of time on (1) foundational issues in cognitive science that in one way or another are in the background of most areas of research and (2) the question of how experimental results relate to philosophical issues like consciousness and free will. Various concepts will be illustrated with examples from the scientific literature, but no previous experience with psychology or empirical cognitive science is assumed.

127 Philosophical Logic

Prof James Studd – M. 12, *plus* T. 12 (*weeks 1 and 2*), Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

These are the core lectures for students taking FHS Paper 127. But they may also be of interest to others who want to learn about the technical details and philosophical applications of extensions to (and deviations from) classical logic.

There will also be two additional lectures in weeks 1 and 2. These deal with the mathematical methods used in the course, and are primarily aimed at students who did not take the second logic paper, Elements of Deductive Logic, for Prelims.

The paper is studied in conjunction with a set textbook, Theodore Sider's *Logic for Philosophy* (Oxford University Press). I recommend that you read the indicated sections of the book before attending the lecture each week.

The schedule for the main series of lectures is as follows:

Week 1. Classical propositional logic, variations, and deviations

LfP 2.1–2.4 (2.5 non-examinable), 3.1–3.4 (3.5 non-examinable)

Review of syntax and classical semantics for PL; three-valued semantics; supervaluationism

Week 2. Modal propositional logic: semantics

LfP 6.1–6.3, 7.1–7.3 (7.4 non-examinable)

Syntax of MPL; Kripke semantics for K, D, T, B, S4 and S5. Deontic, epistemic and tense logic.

Week 3. Modal propositional logic: proof theory

LfP 2.6, 2.8, 6.4

Axiomatic proofs for PL. Axiomatic proofs for K, D, T, B, S4 and S5.

Week 4. Modal propositional logic: metatheory

LfP 2.7, 6.5 (Proofs in 2.9, 6.6 non-examinable)

Soundness and Completeness for MPL. (Proof of completeness is non-examinable).

Week 5. Classical predicate logic, extensions, and deviations.

LfP 4, 5

Review of the syntax and classical semantics of PC. Extensions of PC.

Week 6. Quantified modal logic: constant domains

LfP 9.1–9.5, 9.7

Semantics and proof theory for SQML.

Week 7. Quantified modal logic: variable domains, 2D semantics

LfP 9.6, 10

Kripke semantics for variable domain K, D, T, B, S4, and S5. Two-dimensional semantics for @, X and F.

Week 8. Counterfactuals.

LfP 8

Stalnaker's and Lewis's semantics for counterfactuals.

Lecture notes and problem sheets will be posted on the course page on Canvas.

129 The Philosophy of Wittgenstein

Prof Edward Harcourt – W. 12, Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

The lectures will cover topics in Wittgenstein's philosophy both early and late, concentrating mostly on the *Tractatus* and the *Philosophical Investigations*. Topics covered will include language and world, rules, 'private experience', other minds and Wittgenstein's conception of philosophical method.

131/137 Plato on Knowledge, Language and Reality in the *Theaetetus* and *Sophist*
Prof Michael Peramatzis – Th. 11 (*weeks 1 to 6*), Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

The lectures cover some of the most fascinating and rewarding arguments in Plato's late epistemology, philosophy of language, and metaphysics on the basis of his dialogues *Theaetetus* and *Sophist*. The six lectures to be given in HT23 will focus on the *Sophist*, the dialogue where Plato attempts to define what a sophist is, and will examine the method of definition by division; the view that it is impossible to say or think 'what is not'; the discussion of the number and nature of what there is; the view of the so-called 'Late-Learners'; the communion of kinds; the analysis of negative predication; the 'fragmentation' of the kind difference; negative properties; and the analysis of falsehood.

In discussing these topics, we will examine issues of interpretative and philosophical significance.

These lectures are intended primarily for those undergraduate students who will sit paper 131 [Plato on Knowledge, Language, and Reality in the *Theaetetus* and the *Sophist* (in Greek)] or 137 [Plato on Knowledge, Language, and Reality in the *Theaetetus* and the *Sophist* (in translation)], and for students on the MSt in Ancient Philosophy who plan to write their Option A essay on Plato's *Theaetetus* or/and *Sophist*, but anyone with an interest in Ancient Greek Philosophy, Plato's theoretical philosophy, or the history of epistemology, metaphysics, and the philosophy of language is welcome to attend (knowledge of Greek is not required).

Greek Text:

Platonis Opera I, ed. by E. A. Duke, W. F. Hicken, W. S. M. Nicoll, D. B. Robinson, and J. C. G. Strachan, (Oxford, 1995).

Suggested English Translation:

Sophist, tr. White (Hackett, 1993).

NB: this translation is re-printed in J. Cooper's *Plato: Complete Works* (Hackett, 1997).

Hand-outs and further bibliographical suggestions will be given in the lectures.

133 / 138 Aristotle on Nature, Life and Mind

Dr Chiara Martini – W. 12, Examination Schools (Room 8)

This course of lectures explores some key topics on Aristotle's account of living beings and of the natural world they inhabit.

The course is designed primarily for undergraduate students taking the paper, Aristotle on Nature Life and Mind, and for MSt students taking this as one of their options. Other graduate or undergraduate students who are interested in the topics are very welcome to attend.

It provides an excellent overview of Aristotle's theoretical philosophy. The questions that will be examined span from what we would now call metaphysics, philosophy of science, to philosophy of mind.

This lecture series continues, and completes, the lectures given in MT22. It is nonetheless possible to join the lecture series at any moment, even without having attended the previous lectures. The MT22 part of the course focused on Aristotle's *Physics* I-II. In particular, we explored Aristotle's account of nature, causation, teleology, and chance.

The HT23 part of the course is divided in two sections. The first one (weeks 1-5) focuses on Aristotle's account of change, and on the physical and metaphysical notions that are necessary to understand it – such as time, place, and the infinite. The second (weeks 6-8) turns to the *De Anima* and to questions about the nature of perception and thought and about the relation between the mind and the body.

The provisional schedule is as follows:

Week 1: Change

Readings: *Physics* III.1-2

Week 2: Agency & Patiency

Readings: *Physics* III.1-2

Week 3: Infinite

Readings: *Physics* III.4-8; VI, and VIII.8

Week 4: Time

Readings: *Physics* IV.10-14

Week 5: Place and the Void

Readings: *Physics* IV.1-10

Week 6: Soul

Readings: *De Anima* I.1 and II.1-2

Week 7: Perception

Readings: *De Anima* II and III.1-2

Week 8: Understanding and Imagination

Readings: *De Anima* III.3-5

135 Latin Philosophy

Prof Simon Shogry – T. W. 10 (*weeks 5 to 8*), Oriel College (MacGregor Room)

These lectures are primarily aimed at undergraduates in Lit. Hum. and joint Classics courses preparing to take the Latin Philosophy paper, but anyone interested in Stoic ethical thought or the philosophical works of Cicero and Seneca is welcome to attend.

In the eight lectures this term, we will examine fundamental issues in Stoic ethics, as they are presented in Cicero (*De Finibus* III, *De Officiis* I) and Seneca (*Letters* 92, 95, 121; *De Constantia*; *De Vita Beata*). This task will occasionally require forays into Stoic logic and physics, given the systematic character of Stoic philosophy.

In particular, we will be focusing on the following topics: the Stoic account of happiness and the goal; the role of nature in ethics, and the Stoic theory of 'natural appropriation' (*oikeiôsis*); the Stoic distinction between being good and being preferred, and whether it is tenable; Stoic arguments for why only virtue is good, and why virtue is sufficient for happiness; the analysis and evaluation of emotions (*pathê*); and whether Stoic ethics is impossibly demanding. Throughout, we will keep in mind philological and literary questions arising from Cicero and Seneca's re-packaging of Greek philosophy for a Roman audience.

198 Special Subject in Philosophy: Feminist Theory

Prof Daniela Dover, Dr Emily Dyson, Mori Reithmayr, Maya Krishnan – W. 10 (*weeks 1 to 7*), Examination Schools (Room 6)

This series of four lectures is aimed at students sitting the special subject in Feminist Theory (Philosophy 198 / Politics 297), though others are also welcome. The topics are as follows:

- 1 Emily Dyson: Feminism, Work and Capitalism
- 2 Maya Krishnan: Historical Roots of Standpoint Theory
- 3 Mori Reithmayr: Trans
- 4 Daniela Dover: Sex and sexuality
- 5 Daniela Dover: Reproduction
- 6 Daniela Dover: Queer Feminism
- 7 Daniela Dover: Feminism and Philosophical Method

198 Special Subject in Philosophy: The Ethics of Artificial Intelligence and Digital Technology

Prof John Tasioulas and Dr Max Kiener – T. 10 (*odd weeks*), Examination Schools
(*weeks 1, 3*: Room 1, *weeks 5, 7*: Room 7)

Jan 17: Rights and Responsibilities

Jan 31: A Right to a Human Decision?

Feb 14: Work and Play

Feb 28: Democracy and AI

Supplementary Subject in the History and Philosophy of Science: Philosophy of Science

Dr Sophie Allen – M. 12, Examination Schools (Room 7)

This course introduces you to some general topics in the philosophy of science. What is science and can we distinguish science from other forms of enquiry? What are scientific theories about? Do scientists discover what there is in the world, or are scientific theories tools with which we predict and explain? Is there a scientific method, and what does it involve? How are scientific theories, models or hypotheses confirmed or rejected? What is the relationship between evidence and theory? Does science make progress? And if so, how does it progress? Is scientific enquiry free from social and cultural influences?

These lectures will not presuppose any prior study of philosophy. They support the options of *History and Philosophy of Science*, available in some Honour Schools in the natural sciences subjects, and the supplementary subject *Philosophy of Science* in the Honour School of Physics. Students considering taking these options are encouraged to come along.

Students should initially approach philosophy tutors in their own colleges in order to arrange tutorial teaching for this course (or ask their own subject tutors to do this for them), although there may also be the possibility of arranging some tutorial teaching at the lectures.

Interested students are referred to past papers on OXAM for some idea of what is covered (search on paper code, using the search term "S00004W1").

Other Lectures (suitable for all audiences)

The 2020 John Locke Lectures: *On Being Distinctively Human*

Prof Susan Wolf – T. W. 5 – 7 (weeks 1 to 3), Keble College (H B Allen Lecture Theatre)

The Faculty is delighted to welcome the esteemed 2020 John Locke lecturer, Prof Susan Wolf, to give her long-anticipated series On Being Distinctively Human, originally intended for 2020 but delayed by the Covid pandemic. Prof Wolf is the Edna J. Koury Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

Since at least the seventeenth century, philosophers have distinguished membership in the species *homo sapiens* from moral personhood, a category which they take to be of considerable ethical and practical significance. But there are other nonbiological features that are of ethical and practical significance as well, suggesting that there is an ethical, non-biological conception of humanity that is different from the standard philosophical understanding of moral personhood. After reflecting on the benefits and dangers of focusing attention on the idea of “the distinctively human,” the lecture explores the variety of features and capacities that distinguish “selves like us” from other animals, artificially intelligent machines, and possibly imaginary divine and extraterrestrial rational individuals.

Lectures

Lecture 1: On being distinctively human

Lecture 2: Aesthetic Responsibility

Lecture 3: Character and Agency

Lecture 4: Criticizing Blame

Lecture 5: Freedom for humans

Lecture 6: *Discussion session*

Philosophy of Economics

Prof Jean Baccelli – W. 12, Examination Schools (*weeks 1 and 2: Room 7, thereafter: Room 1*)

These undergraduate lectures will introduce to selected topics in the philosophy of economics. The present outline, which was followed in Trinity 2022, is likely to be revised in Hilary 2023. However, it suffices to give an idea of the kinds of topics to be covered. Going beyond the specific topics to be discussed in class, the general references listed next are recommended.

Textbooks:

Julian Reiss. *Philosophy of Economics: A Contemporary Introduction*. New York: Routledge, 2013.

Daniel Hausman, Michael McPherson, and Debra Satz. *Economic Analysis, Moral Philosophy, and Public Policy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016 (Third Edition).

Handbooks:

Conrad Heilmann and Julian Reiss, editors. *The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Economics*. New York: Routledge, 2022.

Harold Kincaid and Don Ross, editors. *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Economics*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.

Anthology:

Daniel Hausman, editor. *The Philosophy of Economics: An Anthology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012 (Third Edition).

1. Introduction

Julian Reiss. *Philosophy of Economics: A Contemporary Introduction*. New York: Routledge, 2013. Chapter 1 (“The Why, What and How of Philosophy of Economics”).

Roger Backhouse and Steven Medema. Retrospectives: On the Definition of Economics. *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 23(1):221–233, 2009.

Gary Becker. *The Economic Approach to Human Behavior*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976. Chapter 1 (“The Economic Approach to Human Behavior”).

Further readings:

Harold Kincaid and Don Ross, editors. *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Economics*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009. Introduction (“The New Philosophy of Economics”).

Daniel Hausman and Michael McPherson. The Philosophical Foundations of Mainstream Normative Economics. In Daniel Hausman, editor, *The Philosophy of Economics: An Anthology*, 226–250. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012 (Third Edition).

Harry Landreth and David Colander. *History of Economic Thought*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin College Division, 2002 (Fourth Edition). Chapters 14 (“The Development of Modern Microeconomic Theory”), 15 (“The Development of Modern Macroeconomic Theory”), and 16 (“The Development of Econometrics and Empirical Methods in Economics”).

2. Rationality

Julian Reiss. *Philosophy of Economics: A Contemporary Introduction*. New York: Routledge, 2013. Chapters 3 (“Rational-Choice Theory”) and 4 (“Game Theory”).

Amartya Sen. Behaviour and the Concept of Preference. *Economica*, 40 (159):241–259, 1973.
Wade Hands. Foundations of Contemporary Revealed Preference Theory. *Erkenntnis*, 78(5):1081–1108, 2013.

Further readings:

John Quiggin. Non-Expected Utility Models Under Objective Uncertainty. In Mark Machina and William Viscusi, editors, *Handbook of the Economics of Risk and Uncertainty*, volume 1, 701–728. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 2014.

Jürgen Eichberger and David Kelsey. Ambiguity. In Paul Anand, Prasanta Pattanaik, and Clemens Puppe, editors, *The Handbook of Rational and Social Choice*, 113–139. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Francesco Guala. Preferences: Neither Behavioural Nor Mental. *Economics & Philosophy*, 35(3):383–401, 2019.

Erik Angner. What Preferences Really Are. *Philosophy of Science*, 85(4): 660–681, 2018.

3. Idealization

Julian Reiss. *Philosophy of Economics: A Contemporary Introduction*. New York: Routledge, 2013. Chapter 7 (“Models, Idealization, Explanation”).

Mary Morgan and Tarja Knuuttila. Models and Modelling in Economics. In Uskali Mäki, editor, *Handbook of the Philosophy of Economics*, 49–87. Amsterdam: North Holland, 2012.

Further readings:

Michael Weisberg. Three Kinds of Idealization. *The Journal of Philosophy*, 104(12):639–659, 2007.

Journal of Economic Methodology, 20(3), 2013: Symposium on the Explanation Paradox.

Robert Sugden. Credible Worlds: The Status of Theoretical Models in Economics. *Journal of Economic Methodology*, 7(1):1–31, 2000.

4. Methodology

Mikaël Cozic. Philosophy of Economics. In Anouk Barberousse, Denis Bonnay, and Mikaël Cozic, editors, *The Philosophy of Science: A Companion*, 542–594. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.

Bruce Caldwell. *Beyond Positivism*. New York: Routledge, 1994 (Second Edition). Chapter 8 (“Friedman’s Methodological Instrumentalism”).

Daniel Hausman. Why Look Under the Hood? In Daniel Hausman, editor, *The Philosophy of Economics: An Anthology*, 183–187. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012 (Third Edition).

Further readings:

Daniel Hausman. *The Inexact and Separate Science of Economics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992. Chapters 8 (“Inexactness in Economics Theory”) and 12 (“Economics as an Inexact and Separate Science”).

Milton Friedman. *Essays in Positive Economics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953. Chapter 1 (“The Methodology of Positive Economics”).

Faruk Gul and Wolfgang Pesendorfer. The Case for Mindless Economics. In Andrew Caplin and Andrew Schotter, editors, *The Foundations of Positive and Normative Economics*, 3–39. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.

5. Welfare

Daniel Hausman, Michael McPherson, and Debra Satz. *Economic Analysis, Moral Philosophy, and Public Policy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016 (Third Edition). Chapter 8 (“Welfare”).

Ingrid Robeyns. The Capability Approach: A Theoretical Survey. *Journal of Human Development and Capabilities*, 6(1):93–117, 2005.

Further readings:

Guy Fletcher. *The Philosophy of Well-Being: An Introduction*. London: Routledge, 2016. Chapters 1 (“Hedonism”), 2 (“Desire-Fulfilment Theory”), 3 (“Objective List Theories”) and 4 (“Perfectionist Theories of Well-Being”).

Anna Alexandrova. *A Philosophy for the Science of Well-Being*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. Chapter 2 (“Is There a Single Theory of Well-Being?”).

Ingrid Robeyns. The Capability Approach in Practice. *Journal of Political Philosophy*, 14(3):351–376, 2006.

6. Unanimity

Amartya Sen. *Collective Choice and Social Welfare*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2017 (Second edition). Chapters 2 (“Unanimity”) and 2* (“Collective Choice Rules and Pareto Comparisons”).

Daniel Hausman, Michael McPherson, and Debra Satz. *Economic Analysis, Moral Philosophy, and Public Policy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016 (Third Edition). Chapter 9 (“Welfare Economics”).

Amartya Sen. Liberty, Unanimity and Rights. *Economica*, 43(171):217–245, 1976.

Philippe Mongin. Spurious Unanimity and the Pareto Principle. *Economics and Philosophy*, 32(3):511–532, 2016.

Further readings:

John Chipman. Compensation Principle. In Steven Durlauf and Lawrence Blume, editors, *The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics*, volume 2, 38–48. London: Palgrave–MacMillan, 2008.

John Weymark. Conundrums for Nonconsequentialists. *Social Choice and Welfare*, 48(2):269–294, 2017.

Marc Fleurbaey. Welfare Economics, Risk and Uncertainty. *Canadian Journal of Economics*, 51(1):5–40, 2018.

7. Justice

Amartya Sen. Utilitarianism and Welfarism. *The Journal of Philosophy*, 76 (9):463–489, 1979.

Marc Fleurbaey and Peter Hammond. Interpersonally Comparable Utility. In Salvador Barbera, Peter Hammond, and Christian Seidl, editors, *Handbook of Utility Theory, Volume II: Extensions*, 1179–1285. Boston: Kluwer Academic Press, 2004. Sections 3 (“Social Choice without Interpersonal Comparisons”), 4 (“Social Choice with Interpersonal Comparisons”), and 5 (“The Basis of Interpersonal Comparisons”).

Wulf Gaertner. *A Primer in Social Choice Theory*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009 (Second Edition). Chapter 7 (“Distributive Justice: Rawlsian and Utilitarian Rules”).

Further readings:

Marc Fleurbaey. On the Informational Basis of Social Choice. *Social Choice and Welfare*,

21(2):347–384, 2003.

Christian List. Are Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility Indeterminate? *Erkenntnis*, 58(2):229–260, 2003.

Bertil Tungodden. Equality and Priority. In Paul Anand, Prasanta Pattanaik, and Clemens Puppe, editors, *The Handbook of Rational and Social Choice*, 411–432. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

William Thomson. Fair Allocation. In Matthew Adler and Marc Fleurbaey, editors, *The Oxford Handbook of Well-Being and Public Policy*, 193–226. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.

Wittgenstein's Conception of Philosophy

Dr Peter Hacker – W. 2 – 3.45 (*weeks 1 to 4*), Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

The first week will be spent on the missed final lecture of last term, namely on whether machines can think. This will be supplemented by a discussion of the nature of dreaming. The next fortnight will be dedicated to scrutiny of Wittgenstein's later conception of philosophy. The final lecture will examine and rebut criticisms of Wittgenstein's later conception of philosophy.

Topics in Aristotle's Metaphysics

Andrea Buongiorno – W. 2 (*weeks 5 to 8*), Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

This course aims to introduce students to certain key topics in Aristotle's metaphysics. The selected topics lie at the core of Aristotle's mature metaphysical thought. They also permeate much of the rest of his theoretical philosophy (including his philosophy of nature, of language, and of mind). Furthermore, Aristotle's insights concerning these issues have had a long-standing impact on debates in past and contemporary metaphysics. Accordingly, the course should be of particular interest and use to a fairly broad audience of students taking papers in ancient philosophy, history of philosophy quite broadly, general philosophy, and knowledge and reality. The course is structured as follows.

1. *Substance and accident*. This lecture will serve as an introduction to the most basic tenets of Aristotle's ontology. Some questions to be discussed are: what types of thing are there? Are some types of thing more fundamental than others? If so: how? The lecture will address these questions by reference to the Aristotelian scheme of the 'categories', and specifically to the distinction between substance and accident. Particular attention will be devoted to Aristotle's claim that substances are somehow ontologically more basic than other types of thing: how exactly should this claim be interpreted?

2. *Potentiality and actuality*. This lecture will examine Aristotle's distinction between potential and actual being. Some questions to be addressed are: what is it for something to be potentially, rather than actually? How can we, and why should we distinguish between

these two ways of being? Are they equally fundamental, or is one of them more basic than the other? If so: how? We will also ask whether this distinction is helpful for tackling deeper metaphysical problems, such as the possibility of change, and the relationship between an object's form and its underlying matter.

3. *Language and reality.* This lecture will explore Aristotle's thoughts on the relationship between language and reality. Some questions to be addressed are: what types of thing admit of being true or of being false? What makes such items true, or false? In what sense, if any, is reality 'prior' to the truth of what we say about it? Should metaphysicians even bother to address questions regarding truth and falsehood? If so: to what extent? Time permitting, we will also survey Aristotle's remarks on the truth and falsehood of what we say about objects that are simple, actual, and unchanging.

4. *God and first philosophy.* The course concludes with a survey of Aristotle's theological views. The lecture's first aim is to discuss Aristotle's conception of God as an eternal, unchanging, fully actual substance, which serves as the first principle or cause of everything else. The second is to raise some metatheoretical questions, concerning the place which theology occupies within the wider landscape of theoretical science. How does the study of God relate to that of perceptible substance? And how does 'special' metaphysics, or theology, relate to 'general' metaphysics, or the study of being *as such*?

Recommended readings.

Overall: *Metaphysics* Γ1 and Δ7.

Lecture 1: *Categories* 1–5; *Metaphysics* Γ2 [1003a33-b10] and Z1.

Lecture 2: *Metaphysics* Θ1, Θ3, Θ6, and Θ8.

Lecture 3: *Categories* 5 [4a10-b19] and 12; *Metaphysics* Γ7 [1011b23-29], E4 and Θ10.

Lecture 4: *Metaphysics* Γ1, E1, Λ5–10.

Editions.

Oxford Classical Texts (original texts).

Clarendon Aristotle Series (translations and commentaries).

Scepticism in the Global History of Philosophy

Lea Cantor – F. 10 (*weeks 5 to 8*), Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

Are things really as they seem? Can I be certain about anything? Does the external world exist? Can I know other minds? Can I be sure about my own existence? Can I know that I know – or that I don't know? How can I adjudicate between different views about how things are? In this lecture series, we will consider how to approach these foundational epistemological questions by attending to sceptical themes, ideas, arguments, and thought experiments found in ancient Greek philosophy, classical Chinese and Indian philosophy, medieval Islamic philosophy, and early modern European and African philosophy. In doing so, we will assess the extent to which looking to the history of philosophy – including to a range of traditions

currently marginalized from the mainstream 'canon' – can help illuminate and complement relevant debates in contemporary epistemology and philosophy of mind.

Course outline

Lecture 1: Introduction to Sceptical Themes

In this first lecture, we will begin by considering contemporary debates relating to external world scepticism with reference to Descartes' (1596-1650) dream argument and *cogito*, and see what can be learned from attending to Ibn Sina's (980-1037) less well-known *Floating Man* thought experiment and to al-Ghazali's (c.1056-1111) dream argument.

Lecture 2: The scope of Scepticism

In this lecture, we will distinguish those views that disavow knowledge about some things but not others ('local' or bounded forms of scepticism) from those views that disavow – or doubt the possibility of – any kind of knowledge at all (versions of 'global' scepticism). We will consider how the former variations of scepticism informed the philosophical thinking of many early Greek philosophers. We will then see how more radical forms of scepticism in later Greek philosophy built on this early tradition. We will also consider ancient reports that speak to a possible influence of Indian philosophy on Greek (Pyrrhonian) scepticism, and ponder what new avenues of research this opens up for the study of ancient scepticism in a globally connected orientation.

Lecture 3: From Relativism to Scepticism

In this lecture, we will explore the conceptual links between relativism and scepticism, noting how the relativity of perception, customs, norms, etc. has historically tended to motivate or foreground sceptical views across a range of philosophical traditions. Here we will focus on the Pyrrhonian sceptic Sextus Empiricus (2nd-3rd cent. CE) and another radically sceptical philosopher in the Classical Chinese tradition, Zhuangzi (4th cent. BCE). We will also attend to relativist themes in thinkers wedded to more 'local' or circumscribed forms of scepticism, including in the early Greek philosopher Xenophanes (6th-5th cent. BCE) and the early modern Ethiopian philosopher Zera Yacob (1599-1692).

Lecture 4: Expressing and Vindicating Scepticism

This final lecture will consider the puzzles involved in *expressing* and *defending* a radically interrogative sceptical stance, including as to the correctness of the sceptical approach, or as to the reliability of words and arguments, etc. We will explore how different variants of global scepticism (explored in previous weeks) might be thought to fall prey to the charge of self-refutation. We will consider whether radical sceptics can anticipate or sidestep this kind of charge, and if not, whether this has fatal consequences for their scepticism.

Reading Wittgenstein

Daniel Simons – F. 11 (*weeks 5 to 8*), Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

This lecture series engages with Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* as a work that is at once attractive to, and yet uncomfortable within philosophy. The series compliments the faculty lectures and their emphasis on topics by introducing a number of readings of Wittgenstein's work. Each account opens up exhilarating ways of looking at Wittgenstein's philosophy and poses questions about its relationship to the philosophical tradition. Every week covers a writer who presents a vision of the *Investigations* which brings new perspectives to topics within it. Intended for anyone with an interest in the later Wittgenstein.

The plan is as follows.

Lecture 1: Friedrich Waismann and vision

Key text:

- (1968). *How I See Philosophy*, Ch.1 'How I see Philosophy'.

Lecture 2: Gordon Baker and therapy

Key texts:

- (2004). *Wittgenstein's Method: Neglected Aspects*, Ch.9 'A vision of Philosophy' and Ch.10 'Wittgenstein's Method and Psychoanalysis'.

Lecture 3: Rupert Read and liberation

Key texts:

- (2021). *Wittgenstein's Liberatory Philosophy*, Introduction 'Thinking through Wittgenstein' and Ch.10 'The Anti-'Private-Language' Considerations as a Fraternal and Freeing Ethic Towards a Re-Reading of PI 284–309'.

Lecture 4: Stanley Cavell, criteria and skepticism

Key texts:

- (2002, updated edition). *Must We Mean What We Say*, Ch.2 'The Availability of Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy'.
- (1979). *The Claim of Reason*, Ch.2 'Criteria and Skepticism' and Ch. 7 'Excursus on Wittgenstein's Vision of Language'.

Graduate Classes

Graduate classes are, except where otherwise indicated, intended for the Faculty's graduate students. (The BPhil Pro-Seminar is restricted to first-year BPhil students.) Other students may attend Faculty graduate classes, and are welcome, provided they first seek and obtain the permission of the class-giver(s).

BPhil Pro-Seminar: Practical Philosophy

Various class-givers and times

The Pro-seminar introduces students to study, practice, and standards in graduate-level philosophy. Every starting BPhil student will attend four sessions with one class-giver, then change group midway through term for four sessions with another class-giver. Seminars in Michaelmas Term will cover key material in theoretical philosophy. Class-givers will contact their groups, specifying readings and confirming the class time, in advance of term.

Stoic Philosophy of Language

Prof Marion Durand – Th. 11 – 1 (*weeks 1 to 6*), Corpus Christi College (Seminar Room)

This seminar will survey some of the Stoic views on language. We'll consider the place of the study of language in the Stoic system as well as some of the idiosyncratic and sophisticated semantic theories the Stoics developed with a focus on theories related to propositions, reference, and predication. Questions we will be particularly interested in include: What constitutes meaning, according to the Stoics? How do the Stoics conceive of linguistic items? How does language function as a tool for communication? What is the relationship of language to objects in the world?

Participation is open to and encouraged from any Philosophy graduate student with an interest in ancient philosophy or the history of the philosophy of language, as well as any Classics graduate student interested in the philosophy language and the history of grammar. No previous knowledge is required.

The schedule for the term can be found below. Volunteer presenters are invited to express interest in briefly (10-15min would suffice) introducing a problem or question relevant to the week's topic. Please do contact marion.durand@philosophy.ox.ac.uk if you would like to present.

A good general introduction to some of the relevant questions and material is Bobzien, S. (1999). Logic: The Stoics. in K. Algra, J. Barnes, J. Mansfeld, and M. Schofield (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy*. Cambridge: CUP. Section III.1-4 92-121.

As far as possible primary texts will be taken from Long, A.A. and Sedley, D.N. (1987). *The Hellenistic Philosophers*. Cambridge: CUP. References below are to chapters (e.g. "Long and

Sedley 26" refers to chapter 26 and all the passages therein). Additional material will be circulated or posted to Canvas.

Provisional schedule

Week 1: Introduction. Stoic Logic and Dialectic and the Stoic System.

Is there such a thing as "Stoic philosophy of language"? What are some of the challenges in reconstructing Stoic views about language? What are the goals and scope of the study of language and what is its place in Stoic philosophy?

Primary reading (it would be useful to read this in advance of the first meeting)

Long and Sedley 26 and 31

Additional secondary reading (participants are not *expected* to have read this)

Bronowski, A. 2019. *The Stoics on Lekta: All There is to Say*. New York: OUP. chapter 1.

Week 2: Language and *Lekta*

What are *lekta*? How do they relate to language and to objects in the world? How and on what basis are *lekta* classified? Do all words express *lekta*?

Primary reading: Long and Sedley 33

Additional secondary reading: Frede, M. (1994b). The Stoic Notion of a Lekton. In S. Everson (ed.), *Language*. CUP. 109-128.

Week 3: Propositions

What are Stoic propositions? How and on what basis are they classified? What constitutes them and how are they structured? How do they differ from other *lekta*?

Primary reading: Long and Sedley 34-35

Additional secondary reading: Brunschwig, J. 1994. Remarks on the classification of simple propositions in Hellenistic logics. In *Papers in Hellenistic Philosophy*. Cambridge: CUP. 57-71.

Week 4: Reference

Can we reconstruct a Stoic theory of reference? What words refer and how? What role does reference and referring expressions play in language and in propositions?

Primary reading: All material will be circulated/posted to Canvas

Additional secondary reading: Lloyd, A.C. (1971). Grammar and Metaphysics in the Stoa. In A.A. Long (ed.) *Problems in Stoicism*. London: Athlone. 58-74. or Lloyd, A.C. (1978). Definite propositions and the concept of reference. In J. Brunschwig (ed.) *Les Stoïciens et leur logique*. Paris: Vrin. 285-96.

Week 5: Predication

Is there a Stoic theory of predication? What are Stoic predicates and how do the Stoics conceive of them? How do predicates relate to verbs? How do they relate to objects in the world? What role do they play in propositions?

Primary reading: All material will be circulated/posted to Canvas

Weeks 6: Puzzles and Paradoxes

How does the Stoic interest in puzzles or semantic paradoxes relate to their philosophy of language? To what extent can their views on language help them tackle puzzles and paradoxes?

Primary reading: Long and Sedley 37

Additional secondary reading: Mignucci, M. (1999). Logic: The Stoics. in K. Algra, J. Barnes, J. Mansfeld, and M. Schofield (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy*. Cambridge: CUP. Section III.8 121-176.

Universals

Prof Cecilia Trifogli – W. 11 – 1, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

I will present and discuss two major views in the medieval debate about the ontological status of universals: that of John Duns Scotus and that of William of Ockham. I will cover the following topics:

- (1) Scotus on the existence and ontological status of common natures.
- (2) Scotus's theory of individuation ('haecceity').
- (3) Ockham's arguments against realism about universals.
- (4) Ockham's positive account of universals ('conceptualism').

The texts of Scotus and Ockham are available in English translation in:

Five Texts on the Mediaeval Problem of Universals, transl. Paul Vincent Spade, Hackett, Indianapolis 1994, pp. 57-113 (Scotus), 114-231 (Ockham).

Introductory reading:

M. McCord Adams, 'Universals in the early fourteenth century' in: *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, ed. N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny, J. Pinborg, CUP 1982, pp. 411-439.

Heidegger: *Being and Time*

Prof Mark Wrathall – F. 2 – 4, Corpus Christi College (Rainolds Room *except weeks 1, 4*: Seminar Room)

We will spend the first five weeks of the term exploring Division Two of *Being and Time* in some depth. We'll focus in particular on Heidegger's analysis of human existence through his account of death, guilt, authenticity, and temporality. Starting in week 6, we'll turn to a close study of Heidegger's analysis of truth and unconcealment in *Being and Time* and in his later essays. We'll be guided in our exploration of the theme of unconcealment by Kate Withy's recent book: *Heidegger on Being Self-Concealing*.

Primary Texts

Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*

I recommend that you use the Macquarrie and Robinson translation of *Being and Time*, although the revised edition of the Stambaugh translation is acceptable. I will refer to *Being and Time* using the marginal “H” numbers, so that you can find the relevant passages in either translation.

Martin Heidegger, *Pathmarks* (CUP 1998)

Martin Heidegger, *Early Greek Thinking* (Harper & Row, 1984)

Martin Heidegger, *On Time and Being* (Harper & Row, 1972)

Katherine Withy, *Heidegger on Being Self-Concealing* (Oxford UP, 2022)

Other useful works by Heidegger:

Martin Heidegger, *The Concept of Time: The First Draft of Being and Time*, trans. Ingo Farin (Continuum, 2011)

Martin Heidegger, *The History of the Concept of Time*, trans. Theodore Kisiel (Wiley, 1985)

Martin Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, revised edition, trans. Albert Hofstadter (Indiana University Press, 1988).

Recommended commentaries on *Being and Time*:

Hubert L. Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division 1* (MIT Press, 1991).

William Blattner, *Heidegger's Temporal Idealism* (Cambridge UP, 1999).

Other resources on Heidegger:

Mark A. Wrathall (ed.), *The Cambridge Heidegger Lexicon* (Cambridge University Press, 2021)

Mark A. Wrathall (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger's Being and Time* (Cambridge University Press, 2013).

Charles Guignon (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger*, 2nd edition (Cambridge University Press, 2006).

Hubert L. Dreyfus and Mark A. Wrathall (eds.), *A Companion to Heidegger* (Blackwell, 2005).

Schedule:

Week 1: Everyday being-in-the-world

Primary text: *Being and Time*, §12-13, 15, 18, 29-34

Wrathall, section on *Being and Time* from forthcoming SEP entry on Heidegger

Week 2: Inauthenticity, Incompleteness, and Dispersion

Primary text: *Being and Time*, §§25-27, 35-38, 45-48

Week 3: The Existential-Ontological Structure of Death and Guilt

Primary text: *Being and Time*, §§49-60

Week 4: Authenticity and the Care Structure

Primary text: *Being and Time*, §§39-41, 61-66

Week 5: Temporality and Everydayness

Primary texts:

Being and Time, §§67-71

Week 6: Truth and Unconcealment

Primary Texts:

Being and Time, §44

Withy, *Heidegger on Being Self-Concealing*, pp. 1-74

Week 7: "On the Essence of Truth"

Primary Texts:

Heidegger, "On the Essence of Truth" & "On the Essence of Ground" in *Pathmarks*

Withy, pp. 75-134

Week 8: The Clearing ("Lighting")

Primary Texts:

Heidegger, "Aletheia" in *Early Greek Thinking*

Heidegger, "The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking," in *On Time and Being*

Withy, pp. 135-165

Other Minds: Analytic and Phenomenological Approaches

Prof Anita Avramides and Prof Joseph Schear – M. 11 – 1, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

Weeks 1-4

Dr Joseph Schear on Phenomenological Approaches

Week 1

(a) Introduction to the problem of other minds in phenomenology

(b) Husserl & Stein on 'empathy' as our way of knowing about others

Week 2 & 3

Sartre on 'Being for others'. Recent work in contemporary philosophy on interpersonal self-consciousness as counterpoint. (Peacocke, O'Brien)

Week 4

Merleau-Ponty's critique of and alternative to Sartre's account

Weeks 5 – 8

Dr. Anita Avramides on Analytic Approaches

Week 5. (a) Introduction to the problem of other minds in analytic philosophy
(b) Fred Dretske's perceptual account

Week 6. Another perceptual account of other minds: John McDowell

Week 7 – 8 A Critique of the work of Dretske and McDowell (from the perspective of work by Stanley Cavell and Edith Stein)

Logic and the Philosophy of Logic

Prof Volker Halbach and Prof Timothy Williamson – T. 2 – 4, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

Topics will include logical validity, logical constants, the logic of "because", and impossible worlds. For a more detailed list, readings, and up-to-date information please go to the web page:

<https://users.ox.ac.uk/~sfop0114/lehre/bphil23.html>

Epistemic Externalism

Prof Bernhard Salow – M. 9 – 11, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

We will read and discuss recent work on various facets of the debate between epistemic internalists and epistemic externalists. Further details including readings can be found in the Canvas page for the class.

Philosophy of Physics

Dr James Wills – Th. 11 – 1, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room *except week 2*: Colin Matthew Room))

Please consult the Canvas page for the course.

Philosophy of Science

Dr Sophie Allen – M. 2 – 4, St Peter's College (*week 1*: Latner Room, *thereafter*: Theberge Room)

In this BPhil course, we will discuss a variety of topics from the contemporary literature. The seminars are intended primarily for students doing the BPhil in Philosophy and the MSt in Philosophy of Physics, but all interested and engaged participants are welcome. Each week, the topic will be introduced with a short presentation given by one of the participants (with the convenor presenting for the first week).

Below are the proposed topics for the term in the anticipated order. Readings and topics might be adjusted to reflect the abilities and research interests of the class, but do not skip seminars because you think that it will be on an area of science you know nothing about: specialisation is not required to come along and discuss philosophical problems. Updates will be posted to Canvas as we progress through term.

Those attending the class should be sure to have read the essential reading(s) for each session in advance. Some background reading and some further reading might also be suggested. If possible, these seminars will be held in person at St Peter's College but please make sure that the convenor has your email address in case we need to go online at short notice.

1. Reference over theory-change

Essential readings:

- Stein, H. 1989. Yes, but... Some skeptical remarks on realism and anti-realism. *Dialectica* 43: 47–65. <https://www.istor.org/stable/42970610>
- Myrvold, W. 2019. “—It would be possible to do a lengthy dialectical number on this;” Preprint (2019), available at: <http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/16675/>

2. Varieties of reduction

Essential readings:

- Lewis, D. K., ‘How to define theoretical terms’, *Journal of Philosophy* 67 (1970), pp. 427–446. <https://www.istor.org/stable/2023861>
- Dizadji-Bahmani, F., Frigg, R. & Hartmann, S. 2010. Who's afraid of Nagelian reduction?.

Erkenntnis 73: 393–412. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-010-9239-x>

Background:

- Schaffner, K. F. 1967. Approaches to reduction. *Philosophy of science* 34: 137–147. <https://www.istor.org/stable/186101>

3. Data vs. phenomena

Essential readings:

- Bogen, J. & Woodward, J. 1988. Saving the phenomena. *The Philosophical Review* 97: 303–352. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2185445>
- Glymour, B. 2000. Data and Phenomena: A Distinction Reconsidered. *Erkenntnis* 52: 29–37. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20012966>

4. Theoretical equivalence

Essential readings:

- Glymour, C. 1970. Theoretical realism and theoretical equivalence', *PSA: Proceedings of the biennial meeting of the philosophy of science association*. Vol. 1970. (D. Reidel Publishing, 1970). <https://www.jstor.org/stable/495769>
- Coffey, Kevin (2014). Theoretical Equivalence as Interpretative Equivalence. *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 65 (4): 821-844. <https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.1093/bjps/axt034>

Additional Reading

- Barrett, T. W. and Halvorson, H. 2016. Glymour and Quine on theoretical equivalence. *Journal of Philosophical Logic* 45(5): 467-483. <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10992-015-9382-6>
- Teitel, Trevor. 2021. What Theoretical Equivalence Could Not Be. *Philosophical Studies* 178 (12): 4119-4149. <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-021-01639-8>

5. Structural Realism

Essential Reading:

- Ainsworth, P. M. 2010. What is Ontic Structural Realism? *Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics* 41: 50–57. https://solo.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/permalink/f/1lj314/TN_cdi_crossref_primary_10_1016_jshpsb_2009_11_001
- Chakravartty, Anjan. 2004. Structuralism as a form of Scientific Realism. *International Studies in the Philosophy of Science* 18: 151-171. <https://doi.org/10.1080/0269859042000296503>

Background:

- Worrall, J. 1989. Structural Realism: The Best of Both Worlds? *Dialectica* 43: 99-124. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/42970613>
- Ladyman, James and Don Ross (with John Collier and David Spurrett). 2007. *Every Thing Must Go*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Especially chapters 2 and 3. https://solo.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/permalink/f/1lj314/TN_cdi_proquest_ebookcentral_EBC693945

6. Natural Kinds, Interactive Kinds and Property Clusters

Essential reading:

- Boyd, R. 1991. Realism, anti-foundationalism, and the enthusiasm for natural kinds. *Philosophical Studies* 61: 127–148. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/4320174>
- Khalidi, M. A. 2010. Interactive kinds. *The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 61: 335–60. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/40664352>

7. Evolution

Essential reading:

- Lewens, Tim. The Extended Evolutionary Synthesis: what is the debate about, and what might success for the extenders look like?, *Biological Journal of the Linnean Society*, Volume 127, Issue 4, August 2019, Pages 707–721, <https://doi.org/10.1093/biolinnean/blz064>

8. Nancy Cartwright: Fundamentalism vs the Patchwork of Laws

Essential reading:

- Cartwright, Nancy (1999). Fundamentalism vs the Patchwork of Laws, which is chapter 1 in: *The Dappled World: A Study of the Boundaries of Science*. Cambridge University Press. <https://solo.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/permalink/f/n28kah/oxfaleph020561477>
- Spurrett, David (2000). Cartwright on laws and composition. *International Studies in the Philosophy of Science* 15 (3): 253– 268. <https://philpapers.org/rec/SPUCOL>

A Theory of Reason: Philosophy, Psychology, and Algorithms

Prof Philipp Koralus and Dr Sean Moss – T. 11 – 1, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

We will introduce the problem of understanding the human capacity to reason and work through Reason and Inquiry: The Erotetic Theory

(<https://global.oup.com/academic/product/reason-and-inquiry-9780198823766>).

Connections between empirical work in psychology and behavioural economics on the one hand, and philosophy, linguistics, and AI, on the other, will be a key theme. Neither prior background in these areas nor special technical skills are assumed. The emphasis will be on developing the erotetic theory as a theory-building framework and on flagging open problems for research. Reading links will be posted on Canvas. Please blank-email philipp.koralus@philosophy.ox.ac.uk with the subject “Seminar” to register your interest so we can send you announcements.

Week 1	Introduction to the problem(s) of reason. Reason and Inquiry, Ch 1
Week 2	The Erotetic theory of reason. Ch 2
Week 3	Conditionals and information source selection. Ch 3
Week 4	All, some, and generics. Ch 4
Week 5	Arbitrary objects, dependency, and axioms. Ch 4
Week 6	Success and failure in judgment under uncertainty. Ch 5
Week 7	Decision-making and agency. Ch 6
Week 8	Loose ends.

Legal Philosophy

Prof Kevin Tobia (Georgetown) – Th. 9 – 11 (*weeks 1 to 7*), Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

This is a broad introduction to legal philosophy, and any student with an interest in legal philosophy is welcome. We will cover questions in *general jurisprudence* (e.g. what is the nature of law?), *specific jurisprudence* (e.g. how should the law understand consent?), and *legal interpretation* (e.g. should a judge interpret the U.S. Constitution with reference to its original or contemporary meaning?). These inquiries will overlap with other areas of philosophy including ethics, philosophy of language, and experimental philosophy. This seminar places some emphasis on the relationship between legal philosophy and empirical research. Several classes will consider the relationship between philosophical theories about law and empirical findings from psychology, experimental philosophy, sociology, and behavioral economics. The course assumes no prior background in law or legal philosophy. Each week, one or two volunteers will open the class with a short presentation (10-15 mins) that raises reactions to one of the readings.

General Jurisprudence

Week 1: General Jurisprudence:

Week 2: Methodology: What is legal philosophy, and how should one do it?

Specific Jurisprudence

Week 3: Criminal Law: What (if anything) justifies criminal punishment?

Week 4: Private Law Theory: How should the law conceptualize central concepts including the reasonable person, causation, and consent?

Legal Interpretation

Week 5: Introduction to Legal Interpretation and Issues in the Philosophy of Language

Week 6: Experimental Jurisprudence of Interpretation

Week 7: Judicial Uncertainty

The Ethics of Creating, Saving, and Ending Lives

Prof Jeff McMahan – M. 2 – 4, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

This seminar is a continuation of the seminar with the same title from Michaelmas 2022. New students are, however, welcome and I will try to ensure that the material we discuss this term is accessible to those who did not attend in Michaelmas. We will be discussing a range of foundational issues in population ethics and their relevance to a variety of issues in practical ethics. The questions we will be addressing include the following:

- In determining whether it is permissible to cause an individual to exist, how does the good the individual's life would contain weigh against the suffering it would contain? Is a certain amount of suffering morally offset by an amount of well-being that is

equivalent in magnitude? Or is a certain amount of suffering offset only by well-being that is significantly greater in magnitude?

- What Parfit calls the “Non-Identity Problem” arises when acts that affect well-being also determine which individuals exist. In these instances, an act can have a bad effect in a person’s life without being worse for that person, as the person would not have existed if the act had not been done. This problem complicates our moral reasoning about a great many urgent and important practical moral problems. Among these issues are climate change, reparations for historical injustice, and proportionality in the morality of war. In discussing the Non-Identity Problem, we will address each of these issues, among others.
- The Non-Identity Problem has seemed to many philosophers to require that we accept that there is a moral reason to cause a better-off person to exist rather than cause or allow a different, less well-off person to come into existence instead. If there is such a reason, is it objectionably eugenicist?
- Is there a moral reason to pursue the genetic enhancement of our progeny?
- Do we have reasons to prevent the extinction of human beings? If so, what are these reasons and how strong are they?
- The Non-Identity Problem arises in many instances in which our acts affect the well-being of animals. If it matters in the case of persons whether an act that has bad effects is worse for individuals, does it also matter in the case of animals?
- Suppose that we cause animals to exist specifically in order to be able to eat them. But we ensure that they have lives that are better than those of most animals living in the wild. We then kill these animals prematurely but painlessly. Does the fact that they would never have existed with good lives if we had not intended to eat them somehow make the practice as a whole permissible?

We will concentrate mainly on these problems themselves rather than on the literature, but we will also, of course, discuss the published views of the most important writers in the area. I will identify and provide access to the writings that I think are most important as the term progresses but those who want to do some reading in advance could read some of the following:

Derek Parfit, *Reasons and Persons*, part 4

Johann Frick, “Conditional Reasons and the Procreation Asymmetry,” *Philosophical Perspectives* (2020)

Michael Otsuka, “How it makes a difference that one is worse off than one could have been,” *Politics, Philosophy, & Economics* (2017)

David Velleman, “Persons in Prospect,” *Philosophy & Public Affairs* (2008)

David Boonin, *The Non-Identity Problem and the Ethics of Future People* (2014)

Jeff McMahan, “Climate Change, War, and the Non-Identity Problem,” *Journal of Moral Philosophy* (2021)

Jacob Nebel, “Asymmetries in the Value of Existence,” *Philosophical Perspectives* 33 (2019)

John Broome, “Should We Value Population?,” *Journal of Political Philosophy* 13 (2005)

Derek Parfit, "Future People, the Non-Identity Problem, and Person-Affecting Principles," *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 45 (2017)

Belief, Acceptance and Practical Rationality

Dr Carlos Nunez Jimenez – W. 2 – 4, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

Theories of practical reason and rationality that accord a real role to "full" or "binary" belief (as opposed to "partial" or "graded" belief) are built on the assumption that rational agents intend to do what would be best conditional on the truth of their beliefs. That is, they portray belief as determining the space of possibilities in relation to which intentions are, at the functional level, regulated, and should be, at the normative level, rationally assessed. As different theorists have argued, however, there are pragmatic pressures that should affect what you take for granted in a given deliberative context that should not affect what you believe. If this is so, then it turns out that, contrary to philosophical orthodoxy, what one should intend to do is not always what would be best conditional on the truth of one's beliefs. In this course, we explore what a theory of practical rationality that takes this idea seriously should look like. Some themes we will cover include: what is the relation between belief and credence? Should belief be pushed around by pragmatic factors? What is the relation between belief and intention? What is the attitude of acceptance and what is its role in practical reason and rationality?

Schedule (subject to minor changes)

Week 1

Belief and Credence

- Maher, P. (1986). The Irrelevance of Belief to Rational Action. *Erkenntnis* (1975-), 24(3), 363–384.
- Foley, R. (2009). Beliefs, Degrees of Belief, and the Lockean Thesis. In: Huber, F., Schmidt-Petri, C. (eds) *Degrees of Belief*. Synthese Library, vol 342. Springer, Dordrecht.

Week 2

- Buchak, L. (2013). Belief, credence, and norms, *Philosophical Studies*, 169(2), 285–311.
- Weisberg, J. (2020). Belief in Psyontology. *Philosophers' Imprint*, 20(11).

Week 3

Pragmatic Encroachment on Belief

- Ross, J., & Schroeder, M. (2014). Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment, 88(2), 259–288.
- Brown, J. (2018). Pragmatic Approaches to Belief. In *Normativity: Epistemic and Practical*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Week 4

- Morton, J. M., & Paul, S. K. (2019). Grit. *Ethics*, 129(2), 175–203.
- Ichikawa, J. J., Jarvis, B., & Rubin, K. (2012). Pragmatic Encroachment and Belief-Desire Psychology. *Analytic Philosophy*, 53(4), 327–343.

Week 5

Intention, Belief and Practical Rationality

- Bratman, M. E., *Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason*, pp. 1-41.
- Velleman, J. D., “What Good is a Will?” in Anton Leist, ed., *Action in Context* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2007): 193-215.
- McCann, H. J. (1991). Settled objectives and rational constraints. *American Philosophical Quarterly* 28 (1):25-36.

Week 6

- Bratman, M. E. “Intention, Belief, Practical, Theoretical,” in Simon Robertson, ed., *Spheres of Reason: New Essays on the Philosophy of Normativity* (Oxford University Press, 2009): 29-61.
- Brunero, J. (2020). *Instrumental Rationality*. Oxford University Press. Ch. 6.

Week 7

Belief and Acceptance

- Bratman, M. E. (1992). Practical Reasoning and Acceptance in a Context. *Mind*, 101(401 ER -), 1–15.
- Harsanyi, J. C. (1985). Acceptance of empirical statements: A Bayesian theory without cognitive utilities. *Theory and Decision*, 18(1), 1-30.

Week 8

Acceptance and Practical Rationality

- Alonso, F. M. (2016). Reasons for Reliance. *Ethics* 126 (2):311-338.
- Núñez, C. (2020). Requirements of intention in light of belief. *Philosophical Studies* 177 (9):2471-2492.

Longtermism

Dr Tomi Francis and Dr Timothy L. Williamson – F. 1.30 – 3.30, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

Longtermism is, roughly, the view that the effects of our actions on the far future are overwhelmingly morally important. This graduate class aims to introduce students to the burgeoning literature on Longtermism and to critically engage with the latest work in the field. We will especially be interested in understanding and evaluating objections to Longtermism, from both consequentialist and non-consequentialist perspectives. The class will be primarily discussion-based. There are no prerequisites for this class. Background knowledge in population ethics and decision theory is useful, but will not be assumed.

The class is primarily intended for Philosophy BPhil, MSt and DPhil students. Others are welcome to attend, unless the class is oversubscribed (in which case BPhil and MSt students have priority).

Readings

Before each class, students should read the Core Readings, and are highly encouraged to read at least one Additional Reading of their choice. Further Readings are entirely optional, but interested students are encouraged to bring them up in class.

Week 1: Introduction to Longtermism

Core Reading

Hilary Greaves and William MacAskill (2021). "The Case for Strong Longtermism". GPI Working Paper No. 5–2021

Additional Readings

Max Roser (2022). Longtermism: The Future is Vast – What Does This Mean For Our Own Life? URL: ourworldindata.org/longtermism

Nick Bostrom (2003). "Astronomical Waste: The Opportunity Cost of Delayed Technological Development". In: *Utilitas* 15.3, pp. 308–314

Week 2: Overview of Population Ethics and Long Term Interventions

Core Readings

Hilary Greaves (2017). "Population Axiology". In: *Philosophy Compass* 12.11

Section 2 of Andreas L. Mogensen (2021b). "Moral Demands and the Far Future". In: *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 103.3, pp. 567–585

Additional Readings

Toby Ord (2020). *The Precipice: Existential Risk and the Future of Humanity*. London: Bloomsbury, chapter 6

Toby Newberry (2021). "How Many Lives Does The Future Hold?" GPI Technical Report No. T2-2021

Hilary Greaves and Christian Tarsney (forthcoming). "The Scope of Longtermism". In: *Essays On Longtermism*. Ed. by Jacob Barrett, David Thorstad, and Hilary Greaves. Oxford University Press

Katie Steele (forthcoming). "The Minor Role of Totalism in the Longtermists' Mathematics". In: *Essays On Longtermism*. Ed. by Jacob Barrett, David Thorstad, and Hilary Greaves. Oxford University Press

Further Reading

On population ethics in general:

Derek Parfit (1984). *Reasons and Persons*. Oxford: Clarendon Press (Part 4)

John Broome (2004). *Weighing Lives*. Oxford: Oxford University Press (especially chapters 4, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13 and 14.)

On impossibility theorems:

Dean Spears and Mark Budolfson (2021). "Repugnant Conclusions". In: *Social Choice and Welfare* 57.3, pp. 567–588

Gustaf Arrhenius (2022). "Population Paradoxes Without Transitivity". In: *The Oxford Handbook of Population Ethics*. Ed. by Gustaf Arrhenius et al. New York: Oxford University Press. Chap. 8

Jacob M. Nebel (2019). "An Intrapersonal Addition Paradox". In: *Ethics* 129.2, pp. 309–343

On context-dependent betterness and the rejection of transitivity:

Johann Frick (2022). "Context-Dependent Betterness and the Mere Addition Paradox". In: *Ethics and Existence: the Legacy of Derek Parfit*. Ed. by Jeff McMahan et al. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chap. 9, pp. 232–263

Larry S. Temkin (1987). "Intransitivity and the Mere Addition Paradox". In: *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 16.2, pp. 138–187

Larry S. Temkin (2012). *Rethinking the Good: Moral Ideals and the Nature of Practical Reasoning*. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Scepticism about different-number comparisons:

Ralf M. Bader (2022a). "Person-Affecting Utilitarianism". In: *The Oxford Handbook of Population Ethics*. Ed. by Gustaf Arrhenius et al. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chap. 11, pp. 251–270

Week 3: From Axiological to Deontic Longtermism

Core Reading

Andreas L. Mogensen (2019). "Staking Our Future: Deontic Longtermism and the Non-Identity Problem". GPI Working Paper - No. 9-2019

Additional Readings

Charlotte Unruh (forthcoming). "Constraining Longtermism? A Non-Consequentialist Objection to Longtermism". In: *Essays On Longtermism*. Ed. by Jacob Barrett, David Thorstad, and Hilary Greaves. Oxford University Press

Tomi Francis (n.d.[a]). "Every Plausible Population Axiology Implies Longtermism (if there are enough future people)". Unpublished manuscript

Week 4: Aggregation

Core Readings

Alex Voorhoeve (2014). "How Should We Aggregate Competing Claims?" In: *Ethics* 125.1, pp. 64–87

Emma J. Curran (2022). "Longtermism, Aggregation, and Catastrophic Risk". GPI Working Paper No. 18-2022

Additional Readings

Karri Heikkinen (2022). "Strong Longtermism and the Challenge from Anti-Aggregative Moral Views". GPI Working Paper No. 5-2022

Johann Frick (2015). "Contractualism and Social Risk". In: *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 43.3, pp. 175–223

Joe Horton (2020). "Aggregation, Risk, and Reductio". In: *Ethics* 130, pp. 514–529

Johan E. Gustafsson (2015). "Sequential Dominance and the Anti-Aggregation Principle". In: *Philosophical Studies* 172.6, pp. 1593–1601

Further Reading

Patrick Tomlin and Aart van Gils (2017). "On Limited Aggregation". In: *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 45.3, pp. 232–260

Alec Walen (2020). "Risks and Weak Aggregation: Why Different Models of Risk Suit Different Types of Cases". In: *Ethics* 131, pp. 62–86

Joe Horton (2018). "Always Aggregate". In: *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 46.2, pp. 160–174

Week 5: Extinction Risk and the Asymmetry

Core Reading

John Broome (2005). "Should We Value Population?" In: *Journal of Political Philosophy* 13.4, pp. 399–413

Johann Frick (2017). "On the Survival of Humanity". In: *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 47.2-3, pp. 344–367

Additional Readings

Elizabeth Finneron-Burns (2017). "What's Wrong With Human Extinction?" In: *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 47.2-3, pp. 327–343

Tomi Francis (n.d.[b]). "In Favour of Making Happy People". Unpublished manuscript

Further Reading

Johann Frick (2020). "Conditional Reasons and the Procreation Asymmetry". In: *Philosophical Perspectives: Ethics* 34, pp. 53–87

Teruji Thomas (2019). "The Asymmetry, Uncertainty, and the Long Term". GPI Working Paper No. 11–2019

Melinda A. Roberts (2011). "The Asymmetry: A Solution". In: *Theoria* 77.4, pp. 333–367

Ralf M. Bader (2022b). "The Asymmetry". In: *Ethics and Existence: The Legacy of Derek Parfit*. Ed. by Jeff McMahan et al. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chap. 1, pp. 15–37

Wlodek Rabinowicz (2009). "Broome and the Intuition of Neutrality". In: *Philosophical Issues* 19, pp. 389–411

Week 6: Fanaticism

Core Readings

Nick Bostrom (2009). "Pascal's Mugging". In: *Analysis* 69.3, pp. 443–445

Nick Beckstead and Teruji Thomas (2021). "A Paradox for Tiny Probabilities and Enormous Values". GPI Working Paper No. 7–2021

Petra Kosonen (2022). "Small Probabilities and Enormous Values". DPhil Thesis. University of Oxford (sections TBD)

Additional Readings

Hayden Wilkinson (2022). "In Defence of Fanaticism". In: *Ethics* 132.2, pp. 445–477

Timothy L. Williamson and Christopher Bottomley (n.d.). "Risk and Fanaticism: A Response to Wilkinson". Unpublished manuscript

Further Reading

Bradley Monton (2019). "How to Avoid Maximizing Expected Utility". In: *Philosophers' Imprint* 19.18, pp. 1–25

Week 7: Cluelessness

Core Reading

Hilary Greaves (2016). "Cluelessness". In: *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 116.3, pp. 311–339

Additional Readings

James Lenman (2000). "Consequentialism and Cluelessness". In: *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 29.4, pp. 342–370

Richard Bradley, Casey Helgeson, and Brian Hill (2017). "Climate Change Assessments: Confidence, Probability, and Decision". In: *Philosophy of Science* 84.3, pp. 500–522

Andreas L. Mogensen (2021a). "Maximal Cluelessness". In: *The Philosophical Quarterly* 71.1, pp. 141–162

Timothy L. Williamson (n.d.). "Answering Cluelessness". Unpublished manuscript

Week 8: Can We Systematically Affect The Far Future (in the right way)?

Core Readings

Johann Frick and Harvey Lederman (forthcoming). "Response to "The Case for Strong Longtermism"". In: *Essays On Longtermism*. Ed. by Jacob Barrett, David Thorstad, and Hilary Greaves. Oxford University Press, Sections TBD

David Thorstad (2022). "Existential Risk Pessimism and the Time of Perils". GPI Working Paper No. 1-2022

Additional Readings

Christian J. Tarsney (2022). "The Epistemic Challenge to Longtermism". GPI Working Paper No. 3-2022

David Bernard and Eva Vivalt (forthcoming). "What Are the Prospects of Fore-casting the Far Future?" In: *Essays On Longtermism*. Ed. by Jacob Barrett, David Thorstad, and Hilary Greaves. Oxford University Press